Tonight

2. Lecture Overview 1. The Traditional Account and Gettier 2. No False Premisses 3. The Causal Theory of Knowing

1. The Traditional Account S knows that p iff: 1. p is true 2. S believes that p 3. S’s belief that p is justified …but is the traditional account sufficient?

1. Gettier Counter-Examples I. Smith believes: Jones will get the job and has 10 coins in his pocket The person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket But Jones does not get the job, and Smith has 10 coins in his pocket. Satisfies traditional account: 1. (b) is true, 2. Smith believes (b), and 3. his belief is justified… …but Smith does not know (b).

1. Gettier Counter-Examples II. Smith believes: Jones owns a Ford Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona But Jones does not own a Ford, and Brown is in Barcelona. Satisfies traditional account: 1. (b) is true, 2. Smith believes (b), and 3. his belief is justified… …but Smith does not know (b). 3. Belief is justified: Belief in (a) is justified because he has seen Smith drive around in a Ford. Perception is a way of acquiring knowledge. Belief (b) is justified because it is inferred from (a)--which, as I’ve just said, is itself justified--and it is inferred from (a) it a completely reasonable way. Disjunction introduction: you can never say something false this way, so long as the original disjunct is true.

1. Gettier Counter-Examples S has a justified but false belief. S uses the justified but false belief to form a justified true belief. The true belief is justified, but not known. Something has gone wrong. But what?

2. No False Premisses S knows that p iff: 1. p is true 2. S believes that p 3. S’s belief that p is justified 4. S’s belief that p is not based on any false premisses Cf. M. Clark, ‘Knowledge and Grounds’, Analysis 1963

2. Sufficient? I. Smith believes: (p) there is a sheep in the field. What Smith sees is a dog that looks like a sheep. But there is a sheep in field, out of view. So, Smith’s belief (p) is true, Smith’s belief is justified, but Smith doesn’t know p. Q: does Smith’s belief that p rest on any (false) premisses? *Smith’s belief that there is a sheep in the field is comes about from looking. Important that Smith shouldn’t be too far, and that there shouldn’t too much else unusual about the situtation. *This explains why Smith’s belief is justified: perception is an accredited route to knowledge. *Does the belief rest on any premisses: is perceptual knowledge inferential? Something for you to think about, and something we’ll come back to later.

2. Sufficient? II. Smith believes: (p) Jones owns a Ford He was told this by Brown, a reliable witness. At the time, Brown’s information was correct But Smith then sells his Ford and buys a Volkswagen. An hour later, he then wins a Ford in a raffle, so he now owns a Ford and Volkswagen. 1. p is true; 2. Smith believes p; 3. Smith’s belief that p is justified; 4. Smith’s belief that p is not based on any false premisses (Brown’s info correct at time)… …but not knowledge

2. Necessary? III. Smith believes: (p) someone in his office owns a Ford Because he also believes: (q) Jones owns a Ford (r) Jones works in his office (s) Brown owns a Ford, (t) Brown works in his office. But (s) is false, hence not known. (Recall: knowledge is a success term: Nec, if S knows p, then p.) So there is a false premiss... …but Smith still knows p!

3. The Causal Theory Knowledge requires an appropriate causal connection between S’s belief that p and the fact that p Smith causally unrelated to the fact that he has 10 coins in his pocket Smith causally unrelated to the real sheep in the field Smith’s belief that Jones owns a Ford now is causally unrelated to the fact that Jones won one in a raffle Smith knows that someone in his office owns a Ford because he is causally connected to the fact that Jones owns a Ford.

3. The Causal Theory S knows that p iff: 1. p is true 2. S believes that p 3. S’s belief that p is appropriately causally related to the fact that p.

3. The Causal Theory ‘Appropriate causal connections’ include: 1. Perception 2. Memory 3. Testimony 4. Inference

3. The Causal Theory 1. ‘Weaker’ than traditional accounts Internalist Theory of Knowledge: you need to be able to say how you know. Externalist Theory of Knowledge: you don’t need to be able to say how you know; causal connection is sufficient. …but is this knowledge? E.g. Norman the clairvoyant. (See Week 4.)

3. The Causal Theory 2. Counter-Example? Henry is driving in ‘fake barn country’ Henry doesn’t know this, and forms the belief there is a real barn in front of him. In fact, this is the only real barn in the area, so he is appropriately causally related to a real barn... …but does he know there is a real barn in front of him?

Impressions? Some possible responses: The counter-examples are silly and contrived We haven’t found the right analysis yet The question ‘What is knowledge?’ is (in some sense) ill-conceived

Further Reading There is lots written on this, including: Dancy, Jonathan. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985), Chapter 2 Steup, Mattius. ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy (online). Sturgeon, Scott. ‘Knowledge’, in A.C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the Subject (Oxford University Press, 1998)

Recap 1. The Structure of Gettier Counter-Examples 2. No False Premisses 3. The Causal Theory of Knowing