Lecture 20 Linear Program Duality

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Presentation transcript:

Lecture 20 Linear Program Duality

Outline Duality for two player games Solving two player games using LP Duality for LP

Duality

Two-Player Zero-sum Games Game played with two competing players, when one player wins, the other player loses. Goal: Find the best strategy in the game

Game as a matrix Can represent the game using a 2-d array A[i, j] = if row player uses strategy i, column player uses strategy j, the payoff for the row player Recall: payoff for the column player is - A[i, j] R P S -1 1

Pure Strategy vs. Mixed Strategy Pure strategy: use a single strategy (correspond to a single row/column of the matrix) Obviously not a good idea for Rock-Paper-Scissors. Mixed strategy: Play Rock with probability p1… R P S -1 1

Payoff of the game. Let Srow be a mixed strategy for the row player, Scol be a mixed strategy for the column player. Payoff for the row player: 𝑃= 𝔼 𝑖∼ 𝑆 𝑟𝑜𝑤 , 𝑗∼ 𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑙 [𝐴 𝑖,𝑗 ] 1 0.25 -1 0.5

Solving two player games by LP Try to use LP to find a good strategy for Duke. A B C 3 1 -1 -2 2 4

What is a good strategy for Duke? B C 3 1 -1 -2 2 4 Strategy: Make play A with probability x1, B with probability x2, C with probability x3. Good strategy: no matter what the opponent does, we get a good payoff. Let the payoff be x4. max 𝑥 4 𝑥 1 + 𝑥 2 + 𝑥 3 =1 3 𝑥 1 −2 𝑥 2 + 𝑥 3 ≥ 𝑥 4 𝑥 1 +3 𝑥 2 −2 𝑥 3 ≥ 𝑥 4 − 𝑥 1 + 2𝑥 2 +4 𝑥 3 ≥ 𝑥 4 𝑥 1 , 𝑥 2 , 𝑥 3 ≥0 Solution: (9,6,4,19)/19.

Duality: what would UNC do? B C 3 1 -1 -2 2 4 Strategy: Make play A with probability y1, B with probability y2, C with probability y3. UNC wants to make sure no matter what we do, the payoff is always low (say lower than y4) min 𝑦 4 𝑦 1 + 𝑦 2 + 𝑦 3 =1 3 𝑦 1 + 𝑦 2 − 𝑦 3 ≤ 𝑦 4 −2 𝑦 1 +3 𝑦 2 +2 𝑦 3 ≤ 𝑦 4 y 1 −2 𝑦 2 +4 𝑦 3 ≤ 𝑦 4 𝑦 1 , 𝑦 2 , 𝑦 3 ≥0 Solution: (1,1,1,3)/3.

Comparing the Solution to two LPs Solution to 1st LP: no matter what UNC does, Duke can always get x4 points (in expectation). Solution to 2nd LP: no matter what Duke does, UNC can always make sure Duke don’t get more than y4 points (in expectation). Relationship between x4 and y4? Claim (Weak Duality): 𝑥 4 ≤ 𝑦 4

Min-Max Theorem Theorem [Von Neumann] For any two-player, zero- sum game, there is always a pair of optimal strategies and a single value V. If the row player plays its optimal strategy, then it can guarantee a payoff of at least V. If the column player plays its optimal strategy, then it can guarantee a payoff of at most V. Corollary: The solution to the two LP must be equal. (x4=y4)

Duality for Linear Programs Consider the following LP: min 2 𝑥 1 −3 𝑥 2 + 𝑥 3 𝑥 1 − 𝑥 2 ≥1 𝑥 2 −2 𝑥 3 ≥2 − 𝑥 1 − 𝑥 2 − 𝑥 3 ≥−7 𝑥 1 , 𝑥 2 , 𝑥 3 ≥0 Question: How can I prove to you that optimal solution is at most -1? Answer: You can check (4, 3, 0) Question: How to prove the optimal is at least -1?

Dual LP min 𝑐,𝑥 𝐴𝑥≥𝑏 𝑥≥0 Primal Constraints Variables Feasible solution gives an upper bound. max 𝑏,𝑦 𝐴 ⊤ 𝑦≤𝑐 𝑦≥0 Dual Variables Constraints Feasible solution gives a lowerbound. Strong Duality: The two LP has the same optimal value.