Is the concept of substance innate? Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing

‘Innatism’ about concepts Some of our concepts are innate ‘Innate’: some concepts are somehow part of the structure of the mind rather than being gained through experience. The mind as ‘tabula rasa’: all our concepts are derived from experience (Locke, Hume) © Michael Lacewing

On substance How do we gain a concept of SUBSTANCE? Substance: one and the same thing, persisting through change, possessing properties. We have concepts of two kinds of substance, physical (PHYSICAL OBJECT) and mental (MIND) Perhaps I gain the concept of MIND from reflection – experiencing myself as a substance. © Michael Lacewing

Descartes’ wax argument What is my concept of a physical object, e.g. a piece of wax? When I melt a piece of wax, it loses all of its original sensory qualities (the particular taste, smell, feel and shape it has). Yet I believe it is the same wax. Therefore, what I think of as the wax is not its sensory qualities. What I think is the wax is what remains through the changes of its sensory qualities. © Michael Lacewing

Descartes’ wax argument This is a body, something that is extended – i.e. has size and shape and takes up space – and changeable, i.e. its sensory and spatial properties can change. I know that the wax can undergo far more possible changes, including changes in its extension, than I can imagine. Therefore, my concept of the wax as extended and changeable does not derive from my imagination (and therefore it does not derive from perceptual experiences). © Michael Lacewing

Descartes’ wax argument Therefore, I ‘perceive’ (comprehend) the wax as what it is (as opposed to its sensory qualities) by my mind alone. Only this thought of the wax, and not the perceptual experience of it, is clear and distinct. The wax that I comprehend in judgment is the same wax presented in sensory images. © Michael Lacewing

PHYSICAL OBJECT as innate Descartes is not asking how he knows that the wax exists; he wants to understand the concept of it as a physical object. He has argued that the concept does not derive from sense experience. It must therefore be part of the understanding – it is innate. © Michael Lacewing

Objection Descartes identifies physical objects as extended The concept of EXTENSION must derive, by abstraction, from vision and touch. Berkeley: the concept PHYSICAL OBJECT is inherently confused (rather than innate). We never experience a physical substance, only sensory qualities (primary and secondary qualities) We cannot describe, or even conceive of, what substance is, apart from these qualities © Michael Lacewing

Hume on substance PHYSICAL OBJECT: concept of something independent of experience, existing in three-dimensional space. But I can’t have an experience of something existing independently of experience Two experiences of the ‘same’ thing, e.g. a desk, are very similar; but I can’t infer that they are two experiences of the same thing, which existed between the two experiences Qualitative identity is not quantitative identity. © Michael Lacewing

Hume on substance The concept PHYSICAL OBJECT results from confusing similarity with identity It is the result of the imagination So although it is not derived from experience in one sense, it is not innate. Hume applies the same argument to MENTAL SUBSTANCE We only experience ever-changing thoughts and feelings, not a substance (self) that remains the same © Michael Lacewing

An objection Hume’s theory makes our common-sense view of the world wrong We have no reason to think physical objects exist. We have no reason to think that we are enduring selves. So perhaps these are innate concepts? © Michael Lacewing