Philosophy 224 Divine Persons: Pt. 1

Broad, “Validity of Belief” "Broad is the clearest-headed of philosophers." Brand Blanshard An analytically oriented philosopher, Brand addresses the question of the validity of belief in a personal God by focusing our attention on the two problematic concepts: Person and God. Broad, “Validity of Belief”

Broad first analyzes the concept of person in this context. A “personal God” could just mean “a God who is a person.” However, that can’t be right, as it would leave out all Trinitarians: God is a trinity of persons (remember Aquinas). So, Broad defines “Personal God” as “a God which either is a person or is a whole composed of nothing but interrelated persons” (188c2). Of course, we’ve yet to ascertain what a person is. What sort of person?

Cognitive Property Theory Broad specifies the concept of person by drawing some contrasts. On this basis he asserts some necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood (189c1): “Think, feel, will, etc.” Experience of a “peculiar kind” of unity: “single total state of mind.” Experience of a less peculiar kind of unity: subject of an experiencing life. Awareness of oneself as these unities: “it must also know that it is a mind.” Cognitive Property Theory

On the basis of his theory of the person, Broad specifies some of its implications. Given the dependence of the person on the two unities, Broad concludes that personhood admits of degrees. The more strongly unified are these dimensions of consciousness, the more a person something is. Also, by the mind condition (#4), the more something is aware that it how unified it is. This in turn suggests the concept of an ideal person: one who is completely (or to the highest degree) unified and is also as completely aware of oneself as unified as possible. A First Implication

Given the strong cognitive bias to Broad’s definition, it is not surprising that he turns next specify the concept by reference to person-specific judgments and emotions. We make moral judgments only about those we consider persons (Oscar’s badness not withstanding). Emotions like love and gratitude are necessarily and only directed to persons. Love of country? A Second Implication

Satisfied with the discussion of ‘person,’ Broad then turns to God. Acknowledging the “extreme…” ambiguity of the term, Broad explains it by noting that the term is used in at least three senses: Popular: like us, only better. Theological: both wider and narrower than popular; Trinitarian God is not a person, not just better, perfect. Philosophical: much wider than either of the other two. Let’s not forget God

Broad specifies a few elements of the God of Theology: Theologians play the “perfections” game. They always include moral perfection in the mix. They always specify God as unique. They never equate God with the universe (God has to be transcendent). Broad doesn’t think much of the “perfections” stuff and notes that if we jettisoned it, we’d be closer to the Popular God. To tie it all in to his theory of person, Broad then notes that not all groups of interrelated persons are the God of Theology. It comes down to the character of the unity (Olympus v. The Trinity). A bit more on Theology

A bit less on Philosophy The wideness of the God of philosophy is due to the willingness of philosophers to break the fourth theological principle and identify God with the universe. Broad identifies three different versions of this: Deism: God has existential independence, the universe doesn’t. Pantheism: the universe is a basic structure, articulated as a manifold; the unity of this structure with its articulation is God. (Idealism): “the universe is in reality purely mental” and this ideal reality is God. To the extent that all of these views seem to reserve some (small) space for a distinction between God and the universe, philosophy would not be able to completely leave behind the concept of the personal God. A bit less on Philosophy

Ultimately, however, Broad sees little value in the God of philosophy. “I think that we ought to confine the word ‘God’ to the theological and the popular senses of it; and that, unless we have reason to believe in the existence of a God or Gods in one of these senses, we ought not to say that we believe in the existence of God at all” (193c1). So, if we’re going to believe in God, it has to be a personal God in the sense specified. Who Needs Philosophy?

Of course, we still have to decide if we are going to believe. Broad tackles the epistemological question with the same conceptual analytic zeal that he addressed to the concept ‘personal God.’ As Broad analyzes it, there are three possible grounds of belief in God: Direct knowledge Proof by argument Authority It’s a big ‘if’

Broad identifies two forms of this claim to direct knowledge. The first relies on the self-evidence of claims to God’s existence (‘it’s just obvious’). The second relies on some form of supersensible perception. Though either of these two sorts of claims is conceivable (and may in fact be common), Broad doesn’t think they are worthy of much consideration. They both seem on their face dubious as justifications for belief. Direct Knowledge

Arguments for God’s Existence Broad makes the typical distinction between deductive and inductive arguments for God’s existence. Examples of the former include the ontological and cosmological arguments (both fallacious according to Broad, though the it is less obviously the case with the cosmological argument; however, the cosmological argument doesn’t justify belief in a personal God). Examples of the latter are the argument from design, the moral argument and the argument from religious experience, all of which fail as well in justifying belief in a personal God. Arguments for God’s Existence

The appeal to authority as a justification for belief in a personal God is of a piece with all other appeals to authority. Such appeals are appropriate and acceptable as justification only when they meet two conditions: If there is a consensus among the experts and I lack the training or technical skill necessary to appreciate the matter for myself. The testimony is offered by a known, reliable, trustworthy source. There are significant questions about any authority that could be appealed to when the question is about belief in a personal God. There is no consensus and we have plenty of reason to be suspicious of the testimony. Authority

Whether or not there is a personal God in the sense specified by Broad, he concludes that, “we have no good reason to believe in the existence of such a being” (198c2). Interestingly, he counts this as a strike against the God of theology, but not the Popular God. Of course, the Popular God is not necessarily monotheistic, but, “the only reason against being a polytheist is that there is no reason for being one” (Ibid.). So?