Counter-UAV Challenges: Is GNSS Spoofing Effective?

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Counter-UAV Challenges: Is GNSS Spoofing Effective? Todd Humphreys Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, The University of Texas at Austin ION GNSS+ Hostile MAV Threats, Detection and Countermeasures | September 28, 2017

January 2015: A drone falls in Washington

2015 Congressional testimony available at radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu

New York Times, Sept. 23, 2017

New York Times, Sept. 23, 2017

New York Times, Sept. 23, 2017

Note that counter MAV is an extremely difficult, asymmetric problem: Expensive detection techniques and countermeasures can be easily and cost-effectively evaded by an adaptive adversary

Q: How effective is GNSS spoofing as a defense against hostile MAVs?

GNSS spoofing theory is straightforward

$60k Hornet Mini’s navigation system sensors: civil GNSS + baro + IMU + magnetometer

A. J. Kerns, D. P. Shepard, J. A. Bhatti, T. E A.J. Kerns, D.P. Shepard, J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, “Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing,” Journal of Field Robotics, 2014 Analysis of interplay between defender and attacker must consider full closed-loop system including: (1) vehicle dynamics (including state estimation and control), (2) defender’s detection strategy, (3) predictability of defender’s control actions, and (4) attacker’s state estimation system

With the most sophisticated techniques against a GPS-INS-guided UAV, covert control is possible

Crashing is much easier than control A.J. Kerns, D.P. Shepard, J.A. Bhatti, T.E. Humphreys, “Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing,” Journal of Field Robotics, 2014 Crashing is much easier than control

Q: Can collateral damage from spoofing be avoided?

Risk of affecting non-target GNSS users depends on transmitter gain pattern and ranging code alignment

Number of affected GPS L1 C/A signals in a plane intersecting the target UAV. If 𝑁 𝑀 is less than what is eliminated by RAIM in nearby receivers, no collateral spoofing will occur.

Probability of collateral degradation as a function of range to target and number of outliers RAIM can eliminate

Keep in mind that if hostile MAV shuts off GNSS when it arrives in restricted area, GNSS spoofing is ineffective as countermeasure.

Russia believes that GNSS spoofing is an effective counter-MAV technique

UT Austin MAV Arena: A playground for MAV security, perception, and control research

Custom-built MAVs with dual-antenna precise GNSS for controlled swarms

Precise Positioning Flight Demo