Strong performers and successful reformers in PISA 2012

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Strong performers and successful reformers in PISA 2012 Lessons for Sweden I want to start with a brief overview of the objectives and origins of PISA, then show you where the US stands and what the most effective school systems show can be achieved, and conclude with what all of this means for education policy. I need to remind you that the material remains under embargo until next Tuesday. Andreas Schleicher Stockholm, 18 February 2014

What do 15-year-old Swedes know… …and what can they do with what they know? Of the 65 countries in PISA 40 improved at least in one of the three subjects – Sweden saw a decline

2012 Strong socio-economic Socially equitable impact on student High student performance 2012 Shanghai-China Strong socio-economic impact on student performance Socially equitable distribution of learning opportunities Strength of ESCS on performance (% variance explained) and maths perf 2012 Low student performance

2012 Strong socio-economic Socially equitable impact on student performance Socially equitable distribution of learning opportunities Strength of ESCS on performance (% variance explained) and maths perf 2012

Strength of ESCS on performance (% variance explained) and maths performance 2012 Size of bubbles shows spending levels

Contribution of various factors to upper secondary teacher compensation costs, per student as a percentage of GDP per capita (2004) Percentage points The red dot indicates classroom spending per student, relative to the spending capacity of countries, the higher the dot, the more of its GDP a country invests. High salaries are an obvious cost driver. You see Korea paying their teachers very well, the green bar goes up a lot. Korea also has long school days, another cost driver, marked here by the white bar going up. Last but not least, Korea provides their teachers with lots of time for other things than teaching such as teacher collaboration and professional development, which costs money as well. So how does Korea finances all of this? They do this with large classes, the blue bar pulls costs down. If you go to the next country on the list, Luxembourg, you see that the red dot is about where it is for Korea, so Luxembourg spends roughly the same per student as Korea. But parents and teachers in Luxembourg mainly care about small classes, so policy makers have invested mainly into reducing class size, you see the blue bar as the main cost driver. But even Luxembourg can only spend its money once, and the result is that school days are short, teacher salaries are average at best and teachers have little time for anything else than teaching. Finland and the US are a similar contrast. Countries make quite different spending choices. But when you look at this these data long enough, you see that many of the high performing education systems tend to prioritise the quality of teachers over the size of classes.

Ratio of teachers' salary to earnings for full-time, full-year workers with tertiary education aged 25-64 (2011 or latest available year) EU/US

Strength of ESCS on performance (% variance explained) and maths performance 2012 Size of bubbles shows spending levels

2003 - 2012 Shanghai Singapore Singapore Germany, Turkey and Mexico improved both their mathematics performance and equity levels Singapore Liechtenstein, Norway, the United States and Switzerland improved their equity levels (no change in performance) Singapore Brazil, Italy, Macao-China, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Thailand and Tunisia improved their mathematics performance (no change in equity) Strength of ESCS on performance (% variance explained) and maths performance 2012 Size of bubbles shows spending levels

Math teaching ≠ math teaching PISA = reason mathematically and understand, formulate, employ and interpret mathematical concepts, facts and procedures

Students' exposure to word problems Fig I.3.1a Formal math situated in a word problem, where it is obvious to students what mathematical knowledge and skills are needed

Students' exposure to conceptual understanding Fig I.3.1b

Students' exposure to applied mathematics Fig I.3.1c

Relationship between mathematics performance and students' exposure to applied mathematics Fig I.3.2

The dream of social mobility In some countries it is close to a reality

Percentage of resilient students Fig II.2.4 Socio-economically disadvantaged students not only score lower in mathematics, they also report lower levels of engagement, drive, motivation and self-beliefs. Resilient students break this link and share many characteristics of advantaged high-achievers. More than 40% resilient Between 20%-40% of resilient students Less than 20%

The share of immigrant students in OECD countries increased from 9% in 2003 to 12% in 2012… …while the performance disadvantage of immigrant students shrank by 11 score points during the same period (after accounting for socio-economic factors)

Change between 2003 and 2012 in immigrant students' mathematics performance – before accounting for students’ socio-economic status Fig II.3.5

It is not just about poor kids in poor neighbourhoods… …but about many kids in many neighbourhoods

Variation in student performance as % of OECD average variation Variability in student mathematics performance between and within schools Fig II.2.7 Variation in student performance as % of OECD average variation Performance differences between schools Between-school differences are still small in Sweden, but they increased from 831 index points in 2003 to 1042 index points in 2012 58% of between-school differences are explained by social factors OECD average Performance variation of students within schools OECD average

Percentage of top performers in mathematics in 2003 and 2012 Fig I.2.23 Across OECD, 13% of students are top performers (Level 5 or 6). They can develop and work with models for complex situations, and work strategically with advanced thinking and reasoning skills

Excellence matters Evolution of employment in occupational groups defined by problem-solving skills (9) Does this matter? Yes, it does. When you look at the evolution of employment by those problem-solving skills, you can see that there has been a significant decline in employment by people with basic problem-solving skills. There has been little change in employment among the low-skilled. But there has been significant growth in employment among great problem-solvers. What you see here is the hollowing out of labour-markets. Those who have great skills are fine, and will be better and better off. The people most at risk are not the poorly-skilled but white-collar workers with so-so-problem-solving skills, because their skills can increasingly be digitised, automated or outsourced. Those at the low end of the spectrum keep their jobs but are seeing declining wages. That's because you cannot digitise your bus driver or outsource your hairdresser to India.

Catching up with the top-performers High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Catching up with the top-performers Low feasibility High feasibility Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Commitment to universal achievement High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

High impact on outcomes Must haves A commitment to education and the belief that competencies can be learned and therefore all children can achieve Universal educational standards and personalization as the approach to heterogeneity in the student body… … as opposed to a belief that students have different destinations to be met with different expectations, and selection/stratification as the approach to heterogeneity Clear articulation who is responsible for ensuring student success and to whom Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Countries where students have stronger beliefs in their abilities perform better in mathematics Fig III.4.5 Sweden (Fig. II.4.5)

Motivation to learn mathematics Fig III.3.9 Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements: B UK

Perceived self-responsibility for failure in mathematics Fig III.3.6 Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements: B US

The parent factor Students whose parents have high educational expectations for them tend to report more perseverance, greater intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics, and more confidence in their own ability to solve mathematics problems than students of similar background and academic performance, whose parents hold less ambitious expectations for them.

High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Clear ambitious goals that are shared across the system and aligned with high stakes gateways and instructional systems Well established delivery chain through which curricular goals translate into instructional systems, instructional practices and student learning (intended, implemented and achieved) High level of metacognitive content of instruction … Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Most schools look at students’ past academic performance when considering admission Fig IV.1.6 B

Capacity at the point of delivery High impact on outcomes Capacity at the point of delivery Attracting, developing and retaining high quality teachers and school leaders and a work organisation in which they can use their potential Instructional leadership and human resource management in schools Keeping teaching an attractive profession System-wide career development … Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Teacher shortage is more of concern in disadvantaged schools Fig IV.3.5 Disadvantaged and public schools reported more teacher shortage Advantaged and private schools reported more teacher shortage B

Incentives, accountability, knowledge management High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Incentives, accountability, knowledge management Aligned incentive structures For students How gateways affect the strength, direction, clarity and nature of the incentives operating on students at each stage of their education Degree to which students have incentives to take tough courses and study hard Opportunity costs for staying in school and performing well For teachers Make innovations in pedagogy and/or organisation Improve their own performance and the performance of their colleagues Pursue professional development opportunities that lead to stronger pedagogical practices A balance between vertical and lateral accountability Effective instruments to manage and share knowledge and spread innovation – communication within the system and with stakeholders around it A capable centre with authority and legitimacy to act Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

School autonomy for curriculum and assessment Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with standardised math policies Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's extent of implementing a standardised math policy (e.g. curriculum and instructional materials) Score points

Across all participating countries and economies Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with more collaboration Fig IV.1.17 School autonomy for resource allocation x System's level of teachers participating in school management Across all participating countries and economies Score points

School autonomy for curriculum and assessment Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with more accountability arrangements Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's level of posting achievement data publicly Score points

Change between 2003 and 2012 in using student assessment data to monitor teachers Fig IV.4.19 Percentage of students in schools that use assessment data to monitor teachers:

Quality assurance and school improvement Fig IV.4.14

Investing resources where they can make most of a difference High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Investing resources where they can make most of a difference Alignment of resources with key challenges (e.g. attracting the most talented teachers to the most challenging classrooms) Effective spending choices that prioritise high quality teachers over smaller classes Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Money makes a difference – but only up to a point Fig IV.1.8 Cumulative expenditure per student less than USD 50 000 Cumulative expenditure per student USD 50 000 or more

Among high-income countries high-performers pay teachers more Fig IV.1.10 Per capita GDP less than USD 20 000 Per capita GDP over USD 20 000 In 33 countries schools where a higher share of principals reported that teacher shortages hinder learning tend to show lower performance Among low-income countries a host of other resources are the principal barriers

Countries with better performance in mathematics tend to allocate educational resources more equitably  Fig IV.1.11 Adjusted by per capita GDP 30% of the variation in math performance across OECD countries is explained by the degree of similarity of educational resources between advantaged and disadvantaged schools OECD countries tend to allocate at least an equal, if not a larger, number of teachers per student to disadvantaged schools; but disadvantaged schools tend to have great difficulty in attracting qualified teachers. Greater equity Less

Coherence of policies and practices High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Coherence of policies and practices Alignment of policies across all aspects of the system Coherence of policies over sustained periods of time Consistency of implementation Fidelity of implementation (without excessive control) Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits CAN Low impact on outcomes

Commitment to universal achievement High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

Curriculum, instruction and assessment What it all means Average education systems High performers Student inclusion Some students learn at high levels All students need to learn at high levels Curriculum, instruction and assessment Routine cognitive skills, rote learning Learning to learn, complex ways of thinking, ways of working Teacher quality Few years more than secondary High-level professional knowledge workers I want to conclude with what we have learned about successful reform trajectories In the past when you only needed a small slice of well-educated people it was efficient for governments to invest a large sum in a small elite to lead the country. But the social and economic cost of low educational performance has risen substantially and all young people now need to leave school with strong foundation skills. When you could still assume that what you learn in school will last for a lifetime, teaching content and routine cognitive skills was at the centre of education. Today, where you can access content on Google, where routine cognitive skills are being digitised or outsourced, and where jobs are changing rapidly, the focus is on enabling people to become lifelong learners, to manage complex ways of thinking and complex ways of working that computers cannot take over easily. In the past, teachers had sometimes only a few years more education than the students they taught. When teacher quality is so low, governments tend to tell their teachers exactly what to do and exactly how they want it done and they tend to use Tayloristic methods of administrative control and accountability to get the results they want. Today the challenge is to make teaching a profession of high-level knowledge workers. But such people will not work in schools organised as Tayloristic workplaces using administrative forms of accountability and bureaucratic command and control systems to direct their work. To attract the people they need, successful education systems have transformed the form of work organisation in their schools to a professional form of work organisation in which professional norms of control complement bureaucratic and administrative forms of control. Work organisation ‘Tayloristic’, hierarchical Flat, collegial Accountability Primarily to authorities Primarily to peers and stakeholders

Thank you ! Find out more about PISA at www.pisa.oecd.org All national and international publications The complete micro-level database Email: Andreas.Schleicher@OECD.org Twitter: SchleicherEDU and remember: Without data, you are just another person with an opinion Thank you !