Improving Reliability of Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems Eric Lazarus 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Pro-DRE Pre-DRE technology has huge error rates Accessibility No time to wait for security Easier to count electrons Adding paper will Not add security Make the system less trusted by the public Add cost and complexity These systems are not worse than older technology 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Anti-DRE You cant trust computers You cannot test them You cannot reliably inspect them The current generation is not architected for verifiability or security It would not be hard to do better with crypto, paper ballots, etc. (Study AutoMark!) Small conspiracy theory Bathtub problem 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Anti-DRE: Points of Vulnerability Software Developed (Very High) Terminal Built (High) Software “Built” (Very High) Terminal Shipped (High) Software Certified (Low) Terminal Stored (High) Software Shipped (High) Terminal Software Refreshed (Very High) Terminal Tested (Low) Each technology is different but there are big vulnerabilities at each stage of the process which are not addressed. Ratings reflect my concern areas. Terminal Shipped to Polling Place (High) Terminal Stored at Polling Place (Medium) Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium) Terminal Setup at Polling Place (Medium) Polling (Medium) Poll Closing (Low) Votes Transmitted (High) Votes Tallied (Medium) Tallies Transmitted (Low) 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Pro-DRE: The real problems are… Voter Registered Voter Roll Maintained Roll Manipulation Voter Informed of Voting Location Intimidation Voter Checked In Vote Recorded Ballot Box Stuffing Vote Tallied Result Reported Results Audited Result Certified 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Assessment of arguments? Which have merit? Which don’t? How do we create public trust given the debate? 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Election Practices Report Card What do you like? What do you not like? What is confusing? 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

BC Neutral on DRE/VVPT Question Assuming that you are using DRE machines, what can you do? 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Project Goals Bring together the civil rights and computer security community Develop recommendations that would improve the situation – 2004 only 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Recommendations Independent security team Assessment cover Hardware Design Hardware/Firmware Configuration Software Design Software Configuration Election Procedures Physical Security 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Recommendations Implement the critical recommendations Provide thorough training Parallel testing Permanent independent technology panel Standard audit procedures to verify correct operation and uncover security breaches Incident reporting 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Recommendations for 2004 Not bad idea for 2006… We hope that we can exceed this standard FOR MORE INFO... www.votingtechnology.org 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Best thing that can be done 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Outside Expert Engaged an expert in computer security 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Pre-Election Logic & Accuracy Testing User interface testing! Automatic self-test scripts Test audio and other accessibility interfaces. Test all ballot positions in all languages. Test intensively by hand some machines in a realistically simulated election Explain all pre-election testing to those who have come to observe 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Parallel testing “Parallel testing” during Election Day, simulating a real election (poll opening, voting, and poll closing) on a few machines randomly selected from polling places on Election Day. 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Seals Seal with numbered tamper-evident seals and log all physical (paper and electronic) polling place records; then check and log seal numbers when received from polling place. Logged, numbered, tamper-evident seals to prevent use of the voting machines between the time they pass pre-election testing and the poll-opening process. Machine has a unique secure key/password. 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Incident Handling and Reporting Keep sufficient paper ballots on hand at each polling place to ensure no voter is turned away due to system failures. Forward incident reports to the responsible state official(s) and to the Federal Election Commission or to the Election Assistance Commission. Incident reports available to news media and the public 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Brennan Center for Justice Questions? 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice

Interesting things to discuss What do poll watchers need to know? How do we apply the BC recommendations at this point? Tricks for dry run of the election 9/18/2018 Brennan Center for Justice