MICE Safety Review Meeting 4th Oct 2011 PJ Warburton - Daresbury Lab MICE Hydrogen Safety Functions IEC61508 Compliance & Emergency Procedures MICE Safety Review Meeting 4th Oct 2011 PJ Warburton - Daresbury Lab

IEC 61508 Functional Safety of electrical / electronic / programmable electronic safety – related systems Functional safety is part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment operating correctly in response to its inputs Neither safety nor functional safety can be determined without considering the systems as a whole and the environment with which they interact Safety – The freedom from unacceptable risk of harm

SIL Rating Tolerable Risk 10-5 Fatalities per Year From RAL Safety How Safe is H2 System 10-4 10-3 10-2 SIL 1 PFD 10-1 SIL 2 PFD 10-2 SIL 3 PFD 10-3

IEC 61508 Compliance Process LOPA Study conducted Nov 2010 based on HAZOP Report from Serco June 2006 Panel consisted of representatives from FSC, MICE project at RAL & DL and RAL Safety Identified 2 Systems requiring SIL Functions Plus 2 to be considered but not requiring formal SIL Ratings

SIL Rated Safety Functions Following LOPA study the following events were found to require SIL rated safety systems Buffer Tank Over Pressure Leading to a release of hydrogen and ignition leading to multiple deaths Build up of impurities in Cryostat (Ins Vac) Build up of impurities over a period of time, pressurisation and heating of hydrogen leading to a rupture & Explosion leading to multiple deaths

Not Quite SIL Rated Hydride Bed Over Pressure Following LOPA study the following events were found Not to require SIL rated safety systems Hydride Bed Over Pressure Over heating of Metal Hydride Bed Leading to a release of hydrogen and ignition leading to multiple deaths Temperature Rise in Absorber Volume Causing pressurisation and heating of hydrogen leading to a rupture & Explosion leading to multiple deaths Same outcome as Buffer Tank Over Pressure

Buffer Tank Over Pressure Build up of pressure causing leaks in pipework and Hydrogen to escape SIL 1 Required PFD 1.00E-01 (1 out 10) Solution detect the H2 before it reaches explosive levels Install a gas Detection System alarm 50% LEL 2 Detectors / Beacons per location on separate loops Detection system subject to annual checks PFD Achieved 1.51E-02 (<2 out 100) = SIL 1 PFD = Probability of Failure on Demand H2 LEL = 4%

SIL Block Diagram

Build up of impurities in Cryostat (Insulation Vacuum) Over time Cryostat insulation vacuum may build up impurities. - O2 Leaking In – H2 Leaking Out Depending on Temperature / Pressure an Explosive atmosphere may form Temp & Level Sensors are Ex i Heaters are not so operation needs to be prevented if vacuum is not good – below 10-3

Build up of impurities in Cryostat (Insulation Vacuum) SIL 2 Required PFD 6.73E-03 (~7 out 1000) Solution interlock heater power supply Use 1 Set Point on existing Vac Gauge & Controller Additional Set Point from new Vac Gauge & Controller Guard Line A & B Relays to turn of heater power supply Hardwired I/L Guard Line A & B inputs also into PLC for Software I/L PFD Achieved 3.76E-03 (~4 out 1000) = SIL 2

SIL Block Diagram

Emergency Actions Return hydrogen to Bed if possible Vent hydrogen to atmosphere via vent line IF PLC goes off Vacuum pumps stay on Hydride Bed set to ‘chill’

Questions