WORKING DRAFT HFCV GTR Work assigned on page 20:

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Student Book © 2004 Propane Education & Research CouncilPage Placing Appliances into Initial Operation Knowing the proper techniques and.
Advertisements

Draft Deliberative Document1 of 15 Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety Research to Support Rulemaking/GTR Objectives September 2008 SGS
European Commission HFCV GTR – 3 rd SGS meeting Washington D.C., May 2008 Enterprise and Industry Directorate General Update on EU Regulation on.
Research Activities of HFCV in Korea Speaker : Economy : The Republic of Korea.
Why Wear Seat Belts? Why wear seatbelts?.
Natural Gas Odorization Transmitted by the expert from JAPAN SGS January, 2008 Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicles GTR (HFCV): 2nd Meeting of the.
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. Applicability Each standard of this part applies to all motor vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment manufactured.
Thirty Eight APEC Transportation Working Group Meeting, Bali, Indonesia 1 – 5 July 2013 Thirty Eight APEC Transportation Working Group Meeting, Bali, Indonesia.
Head Restraint GTR Status to AC th Session of WP.29 March 2007 Informal document No. WP , March 2007, agenda item II
1 Frontal Accident Research Data in Japan Frontal Accident Research Data in Japan JASIC 29 January 2014.
Research Activities of HFCV Rule-making in Korea Sept. 24 ~ 26, th HFCV-SGS Meeting Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, Korea Transportation.
Health and Safety. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 An Act to make further provision for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work,
Pole Side Impact GTR: Assessment of Safety Need: Initial Data Collection Robert Hogan Department of Infrastructure and Transport PSI
Development of a Technique for HFCV Safey Assessment
GIDC DEGREE ENGINEERING COLLEGE BRANCH- CIVIL ENROLLMENT NO PATEL SHARADKUMAR KIRITBHAI SHARMA TANISHQ SHAH ASHIT.
HVAC523 Basic Subsystems.
Placing Vapor Distribution Systems and Appliances into Operation MODULE 8 System Tests.
TÜV SÜD Automotive GmbH SGS HFCV, Japan, 24th – 26th September 2008 GTR-Development for H2- and FC-Vehicles a TÜV SÜD - opinion SGS
GRPE GRPE CGH 2 Experts (A sub-group of the GRPE Informal Group “Hydrogen/Fuel Cell”) JASIC Presentation At The GRPE CGH 2 Experts Meeting.
Presented to: By: Date: Federal Aviation Administration AIRWORTHINESS General Aircraft Combustion Heaters.
Research Activities of HFCV in Korea May 26 ~ 29, th HFCV-SGS Meeting Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, Korea Transportation Safety.
ERT 312 SAFETY & LOSS PREVENTION IN BIOPROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT Prepared by: Miss Hairul Nazirah Abdul Halim.
ERT 322 SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION RISK ASSESSMENT
2.3.8 Student Book © 2004 Propane Education & Research CouncilPage Performing Pre-Unloading Cargo Tank Emergency Discharge System & Delivery Hose.
Damage Mitigation Braking System
Car Crash Lab A long term project to summarize our mechanics unit!
DEVELOPING FIRE TESTS FOR FCV AND HYDROGEN VEHICLES Glenn Scheffler Consultant for the US Department of Energy August 2010 DEVELOPING FIRE TESTS FOR FCV.
Accident Scene Safety Module 1 – Vehicle Safety Section 1 - Driving Safety.
3.4.3 Student Book © 2004 Propane Education & Research CouncilPage Bulk Plant Emergency Shutdown Equipment and Periodic Examination Methods One.
Traffic Accidents caused by Lane Departure in Japan  Data of Traffic Accidents around Japan Transmitted by the expert from Japan Informal document GRRF
International Conference on Hydrogen Safety 2011 – San Francisco, 12 Sept 2011 Risk informed separation distances for hydrogen refuelling stations Frederic.
© 2006 PSEN Conference Review Driving Emergency Vehicles.
06/01/20161 Benny Hoff TÜV NORD Sweden AB AFS 2002:1 Use of pressure equipment.
December 2015 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Transmitted by the expert from JapanGRSP Rev.1 (58th GRSP, 8-11 December 2015,
Recent and future research for the fire safety of hydrogen-fueled vehicles in JARI Appearance of Hy-SEF.
Department of Transportation U.S. DOT National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Research & Development/Studies SGS-1-2.
CPNZ Basic Training 011 – Vehicle Accident ‘Crash Plan’
EVS GTR – TF3 Presentation on EVSTF-07-12e "JRC proposal for a 60 minutes observation time for electrolyte leakage – post-crash" V. Ruiz, N. Lebedeva,
Pedestrian Safety Request For Clarification Of Test Procedures 49 th Session of UNECE GRSP, Geneva, 16 – 20 May 2011 Informal document GRSP (49th.
VALVES IN PIPE LINES.
ROAD SAFTEY -School Presentations-
Automotive Engines Theory and Servicing
Task Force 3: Electrolyte leakage
Task Force 3: Electrolyte leakage
Unit 5 Forces and Motion.
WORKING DRAFT HFCV GTR Work assigned on page 20:
Electric Vehicles Safety Global Technical Regulation
HOS1010C - Introduction to Horticulture
Staff Family Day: understanding safe road use
Understanding safe road use
Using State Data to Assess Vehicle Performance
Staying in Compliance: Spill and Overfill
Technical Feasibility
Study of CNG Bus Rollover Test
Early airbags required the installation of several bulky accelerometers made of discrete components mounted in the front of the car, with separate electronics.
The Safe Use of All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs)
Fuel Supply System Service
JASIC Japan ______ 61st GRSP Session May 2017
CDL TESTING --- Training Tips Brought to You by NYAPT
Manual Handling Regulations 1992
Safety Audit Components
Risk informed separation distances for hydrogen refuelling stations
Risk informed separation distances for hydrogen refuelling stations
Harmonization of Crash Regulations in Korea
Lesson 13.4 COLLISIONS Most drivers encounter “near miss” situations or actual collisions during their lives. The copyright holder has not granted permission.
Boiler Safety Valve Regulations
Automotive Engines Theory and Servicing
Risk Management Student Powerpoint
Click anywhere to get started…
Fluid Power System Electrical Control
Presentation transcript:

WORKING DRAFT HFCV GTR - 8-11-09 Work assigned on page 20: SGS 7 - 10 WORKING DRAFT HFCV GTR - 8-11-09 Work assigned on page 20: Japan will provide a risk assessment to justify all three following components for each container: main shut off valve, a container check valve (=container non-return valve) and a container safety valve (= pressure relief device) Report by Japan:  Crash test conditions (speeds, impact points, impact directions) represent those that are statistically most likely to be encountered in crashes based on data on many traffic accidents in various regions. These conditions are representative from the standpoint of occupant protection and do not fully address all the conditions from the standpoint of fuel leakage. To avoid the risk of hydrogen leakage to the most possible extent, it is essential to include both crash test procedures (performance requirement) and the “main shut off valve, PRD, and container non-return valve shall be mounted directly on each container” provision (installation requirement).  In Japan, fuel leakage in crashes is tested in four directions: front, offset, side, and rear. The front, offset, and side crash tests are conducted primarily for the purpose of occupant protection (fuel leaks are checked at the same time), whereas the rear crash test is conducted solely for the purpose of fuel leak check. Comparison of impact directions between these tests and actual traffic accidents that occurred in Japan in 2005 shows that the tests cover 80% of the actual directions, but not all. When a crash occurs at a speed higher than the test speeds or when actual impact points differ from those in the crash tests even if the speed is lower than the tests, it is possible that hydrogen will leak in an amount that exceeds the limit. This clearly indicates that the crash tests cannot cover all the real-world accidents. Some provision other than crash testing is necessary for addressing real-world crashes around fuel containers that cannot be fully covered by the crash tests; in particular, for avoiding, to the most possible extent, the risk of hydrogen leakage at high-pressure portions where there is no way to stop a leak once it occurs.  The real-world safety should come first. If the performance requirement is not sufficient, we should supplement it with an effective installation requirement and/or functional requirement.

Analysis of the Collision Direction Based on Traffic Accident Data (2005 Japan) Fatalities  ( n = 2,712 ) The injured  ( n= 701,981) 1,474 (54.4%) 61 (2.2%) 242 (8.9%) 269 (9.9%) 357 (13.2%) 227 (8.4%) 32 (1.2%) 26 (1.0%) other 24 (0.9%) 122,428 (17.2%) 341,825 (48.1%) 46,739 (6.6%) 42,396 (6.0%) 63,535 (8.9%) 4,6445 (6.5%) 23,086 (3.2%) 19,590 (2.8%) other 4,937 (0.7%)

Impact Directions in Tests and Actual Traffic Accidents  Fuel leakage in crashes is tested in the three directions (front, offset, and side), plus the fourth direction (rear), as indicated by squares below. Comparison of directions between these tests and actual traffic accidents shows that the tests cover 80% of the actual directions, but not all. R L FR F FL B BR BL

(with a non-return valve) Risks in Using One Main Shut off Valve, Container Non-Return Valve and/or Pressure Relief Device in Common on More than One Container  In the case of multiple containers linked together, for example, such as the one in the photo below, if they are designed to have only one main shut off valve or have only one container non-return valve, and especially if the container non-return valve is installed far from the containers (as shown in the figure below), hydrogen will leak when a pipe breaks or a joint becomes loose in a crash, etc. There is absolutely no way to stop this leak. To avoid these risks, the installation requirement “main shut off valve, PRD, and container non-return valve shall be mounted directly on each container” is inevitable. Source: Dynetek Main shut off valve Pressure relief device (PRD) Container non-return valve Overflow prevention valve H2 To the 1st. Pressure regulator Receptacle (with a non-return valve)