Religious Moralism – Divine Command Theory Adam Moore

Definition of Divine Command Theory (DCT) Extensional Equivalence Thesis: An action is morally right if, and only if, God wills (commands, approves of) it and morally wrong if, and only if, God forbids (disapproves of) it. Dependency Thesis God’s willing (commanding, approving of) an action is the reason that a morally right action is morally right and God’s forbidding (disapproving of) an action is the reason that a morally wrong action is morally wrong.

Critical Evaluation of Divine Command Theory The Euthyphro Argument The “Abraham Argument”

The Euthyphro Argument Euthyphro’s Thesis: An act is pious (holy) if, and only if it is loved by the gods. Socrates’ Question: Are pious actions (i) Loved by the gods because they are pious (these actions are pious first and then loved) or, (ii) Pious because they are loved by the gods (these actions are made pious because the gods have picked them).

The Euthyphro Argument (cont’d.) Socrates’ Criticism: If (i), the gods’ love is based on piety, not vice versa. (Not analogous DCT…the gods love pious actions because the actions are pious independent of their love) If (ii), then to understand piety, we must ask “Why do the gods’ love what they love?”

The Euthyphro Argument (cont’d.) “Why do the gods love what they love?” If there is a reason, then this is what makes actions pious (not the gods’ love). If not, then the gods’ love is capricious and it doesn’t provide a good reason for us to act.

Structure of Argument Socrates’ Question Euthyphro’s Dilemma

1. Does God command X because X is right? Or 2. Is X right because God commands X? The first option is not DCT. The second makes morality arbitrary etc….

The “Abraham Argument” The Story of Abraham and Isaac Problem: Would anything whatsoever be right, if commanded by God? The Sacrifice of Abraham by Rembrandt van Rijn (1635), in the Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia

The Abraham Argument (Cont’d.) An Extreme Case: Imagine that God commands us to do whatever we can to cause the eternal and universal suffering of all creatures. DCT’s Reply: God wouldn’t command such a thing.

The Abraham Argument (Cont’d.) The Critic’s Rejoinder: The fact that God would not command us to cause universal and eternal suffering is not relevant. The issue is what would be morally required if God were to command this. Perhaps God would not command such a thing, but the reason He would not cannot be that it would be morally wrong or that suffering is morally bad.

Other Worries "I contend that we are both atheists Other Worries "I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." -- Stephen F. Roberts The theory is not user friendly, –i.e. it is not manageable. To use the theory we must know what God commands or forbids. Reply: sacred texts, tradition, revelation, - tells what God commands Objection: the Bible is unclear e.g. Do not steal. Is this absolute? What of the golden rule and the sadist? How do we know that these sacred texts are divine? What of false prophets –e.g. David Koresh?

Conclusion By rejecting DCT we can (theists and atheists alike) focus on justifying moral theories and principles via reason and argument. The theist may claim that by doing this we are peering into the mind of God and trying to discover the reasons He accepts for moral rightness and wrongness. The atheist – who believes that morality exists – will omit the “God stuff” and use what nature/evolution gave us (reason, arguments etc.)