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Presentation transcript:

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1 The Mathematics of Voting 1.1 Preference Ballots and Preference Schedules 1.2 The Plurality Method 1.3 The Borda Count Method 1.4 The Plurality-with-Elimination Method (Instant Runoff Voting) 1.5 The Method of Pairwise Comparisons 1.6 Rankings 2

Plurality Method Candidate with the most first-place votes (called the plurality candidate) wins Don’t need each voter to rank the candidates - need only the voter’s first choice Vast majority of elections for political office in the United States are decided using the plurality method Many drawbacks - other than its utter simplicity, the plurality method has little else going in its favor

Example 1.2 The Math Club Election (Plurality) Under plurality: A gets 14 first-place votes B gets 4 first-place votes C gets 11 first-place votes D gets 8 first-place votes and the results are clear - A wins (Alisha)

Majority Candidate The allure of the plurality method lies in its simplicity (voters have little patience for complicated procedures) and in the fact that plurality is a natural extension of the principle of majority rule: In a democratic election between two candidates, the candidate with a majority (more than half) of the votes should be the winner.

Problem with Majority Candidate Two candidates: a plurality candidate is also a majority candidate - everything works out well Three or more candidates: there is no guarantee that there is going to be a majority candidate

Problem with Majority Candidate In the Math Club election: majority would require at least 19 first-place votes (out of 37). Alisha, with 14 first-place votes, had a plurality (more than any other candidate) but was far from being a majority candidate With many candidates, the percentage of the vote needed to win under plurality can be ridiculously low

Majority Criterion One of the most basic expectations in a democratic election is the notion that if there is a majority candidate, then that candidate should be the winner of the election. THE MAJORITY CRITERION If candidate X has a majority of the first- place votes,then candidate X should be the winner of the election.

Violations A violation of the majority criterion occurs in an election in which there is a majority candidate but that candidate does not win the election (individual instance). If this can happen under some voting method, then we say that the voting method itself violates the majority criterion. Violations can happen, not that they must!

The Condorcet Criterion The plurality method satisfies the majority criterion-that’s good! The principal weakness of the plurality method is that it fails to take into consideration a voter’s other preferences beyond first choice and in so doing can lead to some very bad election results. To underscore the point, consider the following example.

Example 1.3 The Marching Band Election Tasmania State University has a superb marching band. They are so good that this coming bowl season they have invitations to perform at five different bowl games: the Rose Bowl (R), the Hula Bowl (H), the Fiesta Bowl (F), the Orange Bowl (O), and the Sugar Bowl (S). An election is held among the 100 members of the band to decide in which of the five bowl games they will perform. A preference schedule giving the results of the election is shown.

Example 1.3 The Marching Band Election

Example 1.3 The Marching Band Election Under the plurality method, Rose Bowl wins with 49 first-place votes Bad outcome - 51 voters have the Rose Bowl as last choice Hula Bowl has 48 first-place votes and 52 second-place votes Hula Bowl is a far better choice to represent the wishes of the entire band.

Example 1.3 The Marching Band Election Compare Hula Bowl to any bowl on a head- to-head basis, it is always preferred: Hula vs. Rose: 51 (48 + 3) to 49 Hula vs. Fiesta: 97 (4( + 48) to 3 Hula vs. Orange: 100 votes for Hula Hula vs. Sugar: 100 votes for Hula No matter which bowl we compare the Hula Bowl with, there is always a majority of the band that prefers the Hula Bowl.

Condorcet Criterion A candidate preferred by a majority of the voters over every other candidate when the candidates are compared in head-to-head comparisons is called a Condorcet candidate THE CONDORCET CRITERION If candidate X is preferred by the voters over each of the other candidates in a head-to- head comparison,then candidate X should be the winner of the election.

Violation of the Condorcet Criterion Example 1.3 illustrates a violation of the Condorcet criterion. The fact that this can happen using the plurality method means that the plurality method violates the Condorcet criterion. Just because violations of the Condorcet criterion are possible under the plurality method does not imply that they must happen.

Insincere Voting The idea behind insincere voting (also known as strategic voting) is simple: If we know that the candidate we really want doesn’t have a chance of winning, then rather than “waste our vote” on our favorite candidate we can cast it for a lesser choice who has a better chance of winning the election. In closely contested elections a few insincere voters can completely change the outcome of an election.

Example 1.4 The Marching Band Election Gets Manipulated It so happens that three of the band members (last column of Table 1-3A) realize that there is no chance that their first choice, the Fiesta Bowl, can win this election, so rather than waste their votes they decide to make a strategic move-they cast their votes for the Hula Bowl by switching the first and second choices in their ballots (Table 1-3B).

Example 1.4 The Marching Band Election Gets Manipulated

Example 1.4 The Marching Band Election Gets Manipulated This simple switch by just three voters changes the outcome of the election-the new preference schedule gives 51 votes, and thus the win, to the Hula Bowl. One of the major flaws of the plurality method: the ease with which election results can be manipulated by a voter or a block of voters through insincere voting.

Consequences of Insincere Voting Insincere voting common in real-world elections 2000 and 2004 presidential elections: Close races, Ralph Nader lost many votes - voters did not want to “waste their vote.” Independent and small party candidates never get a fair voice or fair level funding (need 5% of vote to qualify for federal funds) Entrenched two-party system, often gives voters little real choice