Analysis of BFD Security According to KARP Design Guide draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-01 draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-01 Manav Bhatia Dacheng Zhang Mahesh.

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Presentation transcript:

Analysis of BFD Security According to KARP Design Guide draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-01 draft-ietf-karp-bfd-analysis-01 Manav Bhatia Dacheng Zhang Mahesh Jethanandani 1

Agenda Why KARP Analysis Existing algorithms Recommended algorithms Impact Conclusions Questions Last presented at IETF 87 (Berlin) 2

Why? BFD used for liveliness check IP BFD Next hop liveliness check IS-IS, OSPFv2, RIPv2 LSP BFD MPLS(-TP) End-to-end tunnel check 3

Why (cont.)? BFD used for liveliness check In lieu of routing protocols “hellos” 3 x 30 sec Something shorter Across AS boundaries eBGP 4

KARP Analysis of BFD KARP threat analysis [RFC 6862] Replay Protection 32 bit sequence number Incremented every 3.3 ms in Meticulous mode 24 weeks Weak authentication algorithms MD5 or SHA-1 based DoS attacks Authentication packet send at a short interval 5

Existing Authentication Mechanisms [RFC5880] describes five authentication mechanisms Authentication Mechanisms FeaturesSecurity Strength Simple Password Password transported in plain text weak Keyed MD5 sequence member required to increase occasionally Subject to both intra and inter -session replay attacks Keyed SHA-1 Same as Keyed MD5 Meticulous Keyed MD5 sequence member required to increase monotonically Subject to inter-session replay attacks Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 Same as Meticulous Keyed MD5 6

Recommended Authentication Algorithms SHA-2 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 HMAC FIPS-198 GMAC 7

Impact of Authentication Requirement BFD session in software BFD session is offloaded (hardware assist) BFD session is implemented in hardware 8

Impact of Authentication BFD in software CPU 500 MHz – Dual Core Cavium Meticulous algorithm No hardware support for authentication Entirely in software SHA-256 and HMAC 9

Impact of Authentication BFD in software (cont.) Time interval 10 ms 30 ms detection No authentication 16 sessions (tx + rx) With authentication in software 2 sessions (tx + rx) (prediction) Time interval of 1 s. 3 s detection No authentication 1K sessions (tx + rx) With authentication 125 sessions (tx + rx) (prediction) 10

Impact of Authentication BFD with hw assist Meticulous algorithm SHA-2 and HMAC No hardware support for authentication Hardware does tx and rx Packet constructed in software FSM in software 11

Impact of Authentication BFD offloaded to hardware (cont.) Time interval 3.3 ms 10 ms detection No authentication 2K sessions (tx + rx) With authentication in software 1 sessions (tx + rx) (prediction) Time interval of 10ms. 30 ms detection No authentication 8K sessions (tx + rx) With authentication 2 sessions (tx + rx) (prediction) 12

Impact of Authentication BFD implemented in hw Meticulous algorithm SHA-1 “Hardware support” for authentication Hardware manages entire session in hardware Including FSM 13

Impact of Authentication BFD implemented in hw (cont.) Time interval 3.3 ms 10 ms detection No authentication 128 sessions (tx + rx) With authentication in software 16 sessions (tx + rx) Time interval of 10ms. 30 ms detection No authentication 800 sessions (tx + rx) With authentication 100 sessions (tx + rx) GMAC 14

Conclusions Carefully evaluate why and where Be willing to pay for it In performance By adding hardware auth support 15

Questions? 16