Nietzsche contra liberalism on freedom Herman Siemens
Introduction In Nietzsche’s philosophy conflict, struggle and tension are essential and all-pervasive conditions for life How far can this position reasonably be taken? What are the ethical and political implications of Nietzsche’s ontology of conflict? Is there a way to acknowledge conflict and struggle as necessary to life and to affirm them for their valuable qualities without condoning oppression as a consequence?
Different interpretations of liberty There is a confrontation between the liberal and Nietzschean concepts of freedom Typical of liberalism is the negative concept of freedom as freedom from external obstacles that would inhibit or prevent me from doing what I want For Nietzsche, by contrast, obstacles, resistance, and antagonism are the sine qua non for the exercise of freedom.
What is liberalism? Liberalism can be identified above all with two values: a commitment to individuals as free and equal persons; and a commitment to individual diversity, closely linked to the values of pluralism and tolerance The problem of justifying the existence of a state has led liberals to formulate a contractarian justification of political authority: the legitimacy of the state resides in the free consent of individuals who come together (hypothetically) and transfer (some of ) their powers to the state in exchange for the freedom to pursue their own ends.
Reconciling value pluralism and conflict Another liberal commitment is that everyone has their own conception of what is good – that is, value pluralism This fits in nicely with Nietzsche’s philosophy, as Nietzsche is above all a pluralist However a problem for liberalism is in reconciling value pluralism with a desire to minimise conflict Mouffe argued that we must question whether you can genuinely value pluralism if you deny potential conflict
Nietzsche contra Rawls Nietzsche’s writings have some criticisms of Rawls’ veil of ignorance (Owen) Nietzsche shows that the conception of the self as an antecedently individuated subject is not a metaphysical truth Our capacities are socially constituted and the product of a long pre-history Owen argues that Nietzsche presents a positive viewpoint on this subject – that as our capacities are socially constituted, they (especially our capacities for ‘autonomous reflection’) are dependent on communal contestation
The functions of a strong, free human being Self-regulation: in the form of fear of all alien incursions, in the hatred towards the enemy, moderation etc. Overcompensation: in the form of acquisitiveness the pleasure of appropriation the craving for power Assimilation to oneself: in the form of praise reproach making others dependent on oneself, to that end deception cunning, learning, habituation, commanding incorporating judgements and experiences Secretion and excretion: in the form of revulsion contempt for the qualities in itself which are no longer of use to it; communicating [mittheilen] that which is superfluous Goodwill Metabolic power: temporary worship admiration making oneself dependent fitting in, almost dispensing with the exercise of the other organic functions, transforming oneself into an “organ,” being able to serve Regeneration: in the form of sexual drive, pedagogic drive etc.
These are NOT intrinsic to humanity These functions are the products of a long social history which Nietzsche goes on to recount They are not intrinsic to human beings as they are in liberal contract theory
Nietzsche’s political history In the first phase of Nietzsche’s story we are but organs of a larger, self-regulating social organism to which we belong (“society”/“the state”) – In this phase the actions of people are determined by the needs of the organism to which they belong In the second phase, sovereign individuals are formed when the organs cease to be organs and become instead autonomous organisms (in place of society or the state). This transition, Nietzsche argues, is made possible by a process of learning, assimilation, or incorporation – “When the ties of society break down,” the first experimental individuals assert themselves as sovereign. This process is described as the transformation of an organ into an autonomous organism
Criticisms of contract theory Society is not formed out of pre-existing individuals by way of a contract; rather, it is society that educates and forms individuals, so that they are the product of Society Since individuals are the product of the society or state to which they belong, the state cannot be understood as a threat to pre- existing individuals – In particular, the liberal concept of individual freedom as a primordial power or “natural right” of individuals in need of protection against the artificial construct of the state is ruled out Nietzsche’s socio-physiology forbids the abstraction of our capacity to reason from our affective, embodied existence. Not only are our “experiences and judgments” incorporated and learned from the state; so too are our very affects and drives This applies to Hobbes as well as liberal contract theory
Freedom to Nietzsche Nietzsche makes the bizarre, paradoxical claim that when deprived of limits, an individual cannot be free – but when ‘goals were nearer and closer at hand’ people were free For Nietzsche, freedom cannot be extracted from its context – ‘freedom for what?’ This is against liberalism because Nietzsche clearly values positive freedom, but also rules out the kind of abstraction involved in Rawls’ veil of ignorance Nietzsche’s concept of freedom requires the actual realisation of certain capacities, rather than the usual opportunity-concept of freedom of liberals
Why does freedom require conflict? In many versions of liberalism our capacity to realise freedom is simply assumed, and thought to be given only by external conditions According to Nietzsche’s exercise-concept of freedom, this cannot just be assumed This makes freedom a very complicated concept What counts as realising my freedom? Which of my capacities are desires is necessary to my self- realisation and which are not?
We are not free without conflict Nihilism is “a sign of insufficient strength to posit productively a goal again, a why? a belief for oneself.” Under nihilistic conditions we have lost the capacity to create goals for ourselves, and as such we need tensions and conflicts in order to realise the productive capacities essential to freedom Nihilism is just one condition in which this tension is necessary – ‘The better the state is organized, the lamer humanity. To make the individual uncomfortable: my task! Stimulus for the liberation of the single being in conflict!’