From Pyrrhonian Skepticism to Justification for Belief

 I. Rationality and Kant’s Ethics  II. Kant’s Metaphysics, Pyrrhonian Skepticism and the Equipollence of Animal Rationality II.1. Kant’s Antinomies II.2. Kant’s Synthetic A Priori Judgments  III. The Epoché Regarding Animal Rationality, Practical Reason, Morality and Belief  IV. The Categorical Imperative and Vegetarianism  V. Conclusion

 Practical Rationality and Theoretical Rationality Practical Rationality- goal oriented and problem solving Theoretical Rationality-abstract thinking  Korsgaard’s Interpretation of Kant Incentives-motivate acts Principles-guidelines for how to act Instincts-primitively and automatically intuited as appropriate given a particular incentive Rationality-ability to be aware of and question the principles grounding instinctual beliefs and actions Ethics-Reason and will; Legislate morality by questioning principles and acting based on questions

 The Categorical Imperative-universalize maxim (the statement of the principle from which one acts). First Formulation-Principle of Non-Contradiction: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become universal law.” Second Formulation-Principle of Rationality as End: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”

 Empirical evidence of animal behaviors is indicative of practical and theoretical rationality.  René Descartes-Animals are machines. Animals act merely on instinct, learned behavior, and/or mimicry because animals do not convey thought associated with theoretical rationality.  The problem of other minds. “How do we know other humans are rational?” We have objectively sufficient grounds for assenting to knowledge of human rationality because we can extrapolate our experiences onto other beings who have an extreme likeness to us.

 Grier-“Mathematical Antinomies”-thesis and antithesis as disjunctive and reduce both to the absurd.  Forster-Pyrrhonian skepticism invokes the epoché by offering equally plausible contradictory claims, i.e. equipollence.  The Thesis- “Animals are rational.”  The Antithesis- “Animals are not rational.”  Suspend judgment or false dichotomy?

 The thesis: Animals are rational. Humans are rational. Rationality is a cognitive faculty. Cognitive faculties give rise to specific behaviors. If both humans and animals are rational, then both humans and animals share some of the same cognitive faculties. If humans and animals share some of the same cognitive faculties, then they share some of the same specific behaviors. Specific behaviors are indicative of what a being is thinking. If humans and animals share some of the same specific behaviors, then humans would intuitively know what animals are thinking by observing animals’ specific behaviors that are the same as human behaviors. Humans study animal behaviors to try to determine what animals are thinking. Therefore, humans do not intuitively know what animals are thinking. Therefore, either humans are not rational or animals are not rational. Humans are rational. Therefore, animals are not rational.

 The antithesis: Animals are not rational. Humans are rational. Instincts are not rational. Animals act on instincts and humans act on instincts. Instincts are responses that are primitively and automatically intuited as appropriate given a particular incentive. Instincts are both inborn and learned responses to incentives. Instincts are automatic responses to incentives. Instincts are cognitive faculties; abilities of the mind. Rationality is the ability to be aware of and question the principles grounding one’s instinctual beliefs and actions. Rationality is both inborn and a learned behavior. Rationality is an automatic response to incentives (which rouses awareness and questioning of the grounds of principles). Rationality is a cognitive faculty; an ability of the mind. Rationality has the same primary characteristics as instincts and rationality fits the definition of instincts. Therefore, rationality is a type of instinct. Therefore, to act rationally is to act on instinct, but to act on instinct is to not act rationally. Therefore, either instincts are rational or rationality is not a type of instinct. Rationality is a type of instinct. Therefore, instincts are rational. If animals act on instincts and instincts are rational, then animals are rational. Therefore, animals are rational.

 Analytic A Priori, Synthetic A Posteriori, Synthetic A Priori.  Hanna-Synthetic A Priori Judgments-true based on intuitions of space and time. Propositions that can only be true in conjunction with human experience. Without human experience, these judgments would be “truth-valueless.”  False dichotomy-third option; propositions are synthetic a priori.  Propositions about animal rationality would be “truth-valueless” because humans are unable to experience as subjective observers via space and time animal cognitive faculties.

 Forster-Rescuing metaphysics and morality from Pyrrhonian skepticism. Sextus Empiricus-Suspend judgment on own epoché. Kant-What we do know is that we do not have objectively sufficient grounds for knowledge (probable to a moderate to high degree).  Williams-The Categorical Imperative as the supreme dictate over practical and theoretical reason.  Chignell-Moral grounds offer sufficient justification for belief when objectively sufficient grounds are absent.

 Active Maxim: “I will kill animals to eat them despite not knowing if they are rational.” Equipollence  Epoché  Passive Maxim: “I will not kill animals to eat them despite not know if they are rational.” Maxim able to be universalized as non- epistemic, subjectively sufficient, justified belief.

 Kant states doctrinal belief is purely theoretical but: “It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For here it is absolutely necessary that something must happen, namely, that I must in all points conform to the moral law. The end is here irrefragably established, and according to such insight as I can have, there is only one possible condition under which this end can connect with all other ends, and thereby have practical validity, namely, that there be a God and a future world […] I inevitably believe in the existence of God and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.” A828/B856  In regard to moral belief, Kant continues: “Thus even after reason has failed in all its ambitious attempts to pass beyond the limits of all experience, there is still enough left to satisfy us, so far as our practical standpoint is concerned. No one, indeed, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God, and a future life […] No my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say, ‘It is morally certain that there is a God, etc.’, but ‘I am morally certain, etc.” A829/B857