Dynamics of Competition Between Incumbent and Emerging Network Technologies Youngmi Jin (Penn) Soumya Sen (Penn) Prof. Roch Guerin (Penn) Prof. Kartik.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
On the Economic Viability of Network Architectures Roch Guerin, Kartik Hosanagar University of Pennsylvania & Andrew Odlyzko, Zhi-Li Zhang University of.
Advertisements

The Implications of Convergence on Spectrum Management Mike Goddard Director, Spectrum and International Policy Radiocommunications Agency, UK.
An Introduction to... Evolutionary Game Theory
1 Product Innovation and Marketing Strategy l Adoption of innovations: l Demand Side Perspectives l Strategic or Firm Side Perspectives l Product Lifecycle.
Exploring the Adoption of New Network Technologies & Architectures Roch Guérin Dept. Elec. & Sys. Eng University of Pennsylvania FIND Meeting, April 7,
Network Externalities What is a network externality? –When a person buys a good or service, he becomes part of a network. –Thus the network increases in.
Lecture 8 Strategy and Analysis in using NPV The NPV analysis then gives a precise formula for deciding whether or not to proceed with the investment.
Basic Oligopoly Models
Lecture 2: Porter’s Five Forces ©2009 by Marvin Lieberman How Competition Shapes the Creation and Distribution of Economic Value Introduction to Business.
EVALUATING A COMPANY’S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
11 PERFECT COMPETITION CHAPTER.
CHAPTER 9 Basic Oligopoly Models Copyright © 2014 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior written.
Quality of Service in IN-home digital networks Alina Albu 23 October 2003.
CS 268: Future Internet Architectures Ion Stoica May 1, 2006.
Tussle in cyberspace: Defining tomorrow ’ s internet D.Clark, J.Wroclawski, K.Sollins & R.Braden Presented by: Ao-Jan Su (Slides in courtesy of: Baoning.
Distributed Rational Decision Making Sections By Tibor Moldovan.
-1- Entrance of Cable TV Service Provider into Broadband Internet Service Market : Service Bundling and Role of Access Charge By Jae-Hyeon Ahn, Jungsuk.
1 Course outline II n Product differentiation n Advertising competition n Compatibility competition Heterogeneous goods.
CS 268: Future Internet Architectures Ion Stoica May 6, 2003.
Differentiating products in order to overcome Bertrand paradox n With homogeneous goods, competition can be quite intense: Even in a market with only two.
Presented By: Lindsey Moore John Limberg Matt Martinez Joseph Morgan.
ECP 6701 Competitive Strategies in Expanding Markets
BPT 3113 – Management of Technology
Thesis Proposal On Economic Viability and Choices of Networked Systems & Architectures Soumya Sen 31st March 2010, Thesis Proposal.
Internet Infrastructure and Pricing. Internet Pipelines Technology of the internet enables ecommerce –Issues of congestion and peak-load pricing –Convergence.
Introduction to Game Theory and Strategic Interactions.
Soumya Sen, K. Yamauchi, Roch Guerin and Kartik Hosanagar ESE, Wharton University of Pennsylvania 11.
08 Network Effects 5 Aaron Schiff ECON Reading: Cabral, Ch 17.
Tussel in Cyberspace Based on Slides by I. Stoica.
Essentials of Health Care Marketing 2nd Ed. Eric Berkowitz
On the Adoption Paths and Competition of Network Applications Soumya Sen ESE, UPenn March 4, 2009.
Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium is defined in terms of strategies, not payoffs Every player is best responding simultaneously (everyone optimizes) This.
EC941 - Game Theory Prof. Francesco Squintani Lecture 5 1.
Welcome to MT140 Introduction to Management Unit 2 Seminar – Foundations of Management.
OBJECT ORIENTED SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND DESIGN. COURSE OUTLINE The world of the Information Systems Analyst Approaches to System Development The Analyst as.
 All companies have to adapt to change  Driving forces that affect an industry environment:  External Forces + New Competitive Change = Change in an.
Copyright © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Strategic Management: Text and Cases, 4e 5 Business-Level Strategy.
Introduction to Game Theory application to networks Joy Ghosh CSE 716, 25 th April, 2003.
MAP: Multi-Auctioneer Progressive Auction in Dynamic Spectrum Access Lin Gao, Youyun Xu, Xinbing Wang Shanghai Jiaotong University.
1 Dynamics of Competition Between Incumbent and Emerging Network Technologies Youngmi Jin (Penn) Soumya Sen (Penn) Prof. Roch Guerin (Penn) Prof. Kartik.
Raphael Amit & Paul Schoemaker – 1993, SMJ STRATEGIC ASSETS AND ORGANIZATIONAL RENT.
Aemen Lodhi (Georgia Tech) Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA)
Pricing: Understanding and Capturing Customer Value
Monopolistic Competition Topic 7(a). Contents 1. Characteristics of MC 2. Short run profit maximisation 3. Long run equilibrium 4. Assessment of MC 5.
Formulating a Simulation Project Proposal Chapter3.
Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Contract-Theoretic Modeling Approach Lin Gao, Xinbing Wang, Youyun Xu, Qian Zhang Shanghai Jiao Tong University,
CSMAC Spectrum Sharing Sub- Committee Discussion Materials March 2012.
1 Objectives and Strategy. 2 Product Life Cycle ODI Dell FedEx Jones Blair AA.
Geneva, Switzerland, 11 June 2012 Socio-Economic Aware Design of Future Network Technology (Y.FNsocioeconomic) Martin Waldburger, University of Zurich,
On the Economic Viability of Network Architectures Roch Guerin, Kartik Hosanagar (University of Pennsylvania) Andrew Odlyzko, Zhi-Li Zhang (University.
Information Theory for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (ITMANET): The FLoWS Project Competitive Scheduling in Wireless Networks with Correlated Channel State Ozan.
Soumya Sen Dept. of Electrical & Systems Engineering University of Pennsylvania Joint Work with: R.
Proposing A Normative Basis For the S-Shaped Value Function Malcolm E. Fabiyi.
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics Chapter 2 © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western.
Modeling the Economics of Network Technology Adoption & Infrastructure Deployment Soumya Sen 24 th September, Princeton University.
Kaplan University AB140 Introduction to Management Welcome to our Unit 2 Seminar Foundations of Management.
© 2010 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
Chapter 2: The Role of Economics
Ch. 5: Business Strategies in Different Industries Cristian Marsico - Larry Griffin - Beau Gould Teresita Pinon.
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics Chapter 2 © 2007 Thomson Learning/South-WesternCallan and Thomas, Environmental Economics and Management,
New York Computer Science & Economics Day, Nov 9, Dynamics of Network Technology Competition The Role of Gateways Soumya Sen Dept. Elec. & Sys.
Soumya Sen Dept. of Electrical & Systems Engineering University of Pennsylvania Joint Work with: R.
Final Project Presentation Plan of the presentation.
1 st December’09, ReArch, CoNEXT1 Shared Versus Separate Networks The Impact of Reprovisioning Soumya Sen (ESE) Roch Guerin (ESE) Kartik Hosanagar (Wharton)
Offshoring, Firm Heterogeneity and the Labor Market: Some Testable Implications Devashish Mitra (Syracuse University) Priya Ranjan (University of California.
Formulate the Research Problem
Pricing Strategy.
2016 International Conference on Grey Systems and Uncertainty Analysis
Soumya Sen Dept. of Electrical & Systems Engineering
Strategic Information Transmission
Presentation transcript:

Dynamics of Competition Between Incumbent and Emerging Network Technologies Youngmi Jin (Penn) Soumya Sen (Penn) Prof. Roch Guerin (Penn) Prof. Kartik Hosanagar (Penn) Prof. Zhi-Li Zhang (UMN)

Motivations  Success of new network designs depend not only on their technical advantages, but also on economic factors Many network technologies have initially failed to widely deploy  Ex: IPv6, multicast, various QoS services. Relevant in the context of competing network solutions (Ex: IPv4 vs. IPv6) and “clean slate” proposals for new Internet architectures (of NSF FIND).  Connectivity is a salient feature of network technologies. User’s choice of the technology depends on the number of other users reachable This network externality produces unique dynamics arising from the path dependence and time sequence of the user adoption process Converters can provide connectivity across technologies and thus become strategic tools to influence adoption levels  Our Objective is to develop a model that:  Allows us to understand both individual-level decision making and systems-level dynamics in a two technology competition setting.  Accounts for how user choice for technology is affected by the relative intrinsic merits of the competing technologies, individual user’s affinity for each of them, network externality associated with subscription size, converter efficiency and price.

Technology Adoption Model  User technology adoption model: Utility functions combines user preference, technology quality, network externalities and price  U i ( ,x i ) =  q i + x i - p i, i = {1,2} Utility functions in presence of converters:  U 1 ( ,x 1 ) =  q 1 + (x 1 + α 1 β x 2 ) – p 1  U 2 ( ,x 2 ) =  q 2 + (β x 2 + α 2 x 1 ) – p 2 Rational and incentive compatible decision process  Users adopt a technology only if they derive positive utility from it  Users adopt the technology that provides the highest utility  Basic parameters  : individual user preference (uniformly distributed in [0,1]) q i : intrinsic benefit of technology i (q i >0)  q 2 > q 1 (Entrant has a higher intrinsic quality than the incumbent) x i : fraction of technology i adopters (0  x i  1, i=1,2; x 1 + x 2  1)  Linear network externality (Metcalfe ’ s Law)  α 1 and α 2 denote converter efficiencies p i : price of technology i, i={1,2} (p i >0) β captures the relative difference in the magnitude of network benefits of the two technologies. Maximum network benefit derived by technology 1 adopters is normalized to one. All benefits and costs are expressed in the same unit.  Conjoint Analysis can be used to estimate various parameters

Problem Definition  User’s choice (rational decision)  Adoption indifference points  Denote as H i (x,t) the number of users who derive positive and higher surplus from technology i than its competitor at time t (i=1,2), where x=(x 1,x 2 ) At equilibrium H i (x*) = x i *, i=1,2  We need to characterize H i (x,t), i=1,2, and their evolution over time Establish relation between H i (x,t) and (technology) indifference points that correspond to changes in user adoption decisions Derive explicit functional expressions for H i (x,t) Specify (technology) adoption dynamics

Problem Formulation  Characterizing H i (x,t)  Diffusion dynamics: Current adoption level at time t are announced to all users. Users learn about new levels and react to it at different times, hence the diffusion is assumed to proceed at some constant rate γ<1. Users compute their surplus from the technologies and make their choice based on the relative positions of the indifference points that determine the expression of H i (x(t)) Hi(x(t)) governs the evolution of the trajectory that result in new adoption levels, affecting the positions of the indifference points which in turn determine the expression for Hi(x(t)) to be used for further evolution of the diffusion trajectory.

Solution Outline  Functional form for H i (x) changes depending on the relative position of the indifference points of technology adoption  We can have Nine different combinations of H 1 (x) and H 2 (x), each corresponding to a different “region”. Each “region” boundary can be characterized  In each region we solve H i (x*) = x i *, i = 1,2  Identify the portion of the trajectory that lies in its associated region, where it exits it, and connect trajectory segments together

Impact of Pricing  Entrant technology needs to consider carefully: Sensitivity to price changes  Small variation in price can affect outcomes drastically  Stability characterization helps to improve understanding of sensitivity Account for its growth rate relative to the Incumbent’s  Initial diffusion in the market is not predictive of eventual success  Technologies may coexist even in absence of converters.

Multiple equilibria cases  More complex behaviors arise when multiple equilibria exist: Final equilibrium attained depends on the Incumbent’s initial market penetration.  Important consideration for the entrant to make entry (introduction time) decisions  Important to characterize: The combinations of multiple equilibria that may exist together The ‘basins of attraction’ and their associated boundaries where the system will stabilize. The initial penetration levels that produce different outcomes We have formal characterization for these.  Examples illustrate interesting behaviors produced in presence of multiple equilibria and the dependence of the outcome on the Incumbent’s initial market penetration

Conclusions  Interactions of competing technologies with network externalities can give rise to a wide range of outcomes based on Pricing, technology quality, level of penetration of the incumbent, etc.  Our model can help to: Characterize systems level dynamics from the individual level decisions with explicit characterization of:  Equilibria, Trajectories, Basins of attraction in cases with multiple equilbria Explore how small changes in system parameters can affect individual decisions and ultimately lead to very different outcomes Provides a framework to develop insight of what to watch for or take into account when assessing how to best introduce new network technologies We also have generalized results for our system in presence of converters and identified interesting effect on outcomes Future Directions  Time-varying technology quality and price It gets better and cheaper over time How does each technology react to maximize its chances of survivals and/or its profit  Profit model and profit maximization strategies  Validation Identify existing/ongoing deployment scenarios on which to try to apply this, i.e., examples of prices, costs, qualities, etc