1. Responsibility & Free Will
Section 4
The Future is Open

2. Three Stances
In matters of determinism & free will, three stances are possible:
(1) compatibilism (often held in the form of soft determinism)
(2) hard determinism
(3) indeterminism.
Note: (2) & (3) are contrary forms of incompatibilism.

3. Table of Stances Hard Determinism
Compatibilism, (usually held in the form of Soft Determinism)
Indeterminism (sometimes known as ‘Libertarianism’)
Determinism is true & incompatible with belief in free will.
Belief in free will is false, as is belief in moral responsibility.
Determinism & belief in free will are compatible.
Given Soft Determinism, both are true.
So free actions are determined.
Determinism & belief in free will are incompatible.
The former is false & the latter is true.
Free actions are not determined.

4. Compatibilism
The most cogent form of compatibilism represents actions as being caused by the agent’s character.
But this theory turns on the agent’s choices & thus fails to serve any determinism-friendly purpose.
For these reasons, & for others (see, for example, Sec. 3, this Chapter), compatibilism should be abandoned.

5. Hard Determinism Counter-intuitive.
Encounters general problems of determinism such as implying that we can discover what we’re going to do inferentially (rather than by decision).
As a form of determinism, it precludes its own rational adoption; hence there can be no case for adopting it.

6. To Consider
Consider the way in which determinism precludes its own rational adoption.
If it is true, then it cannot be adopted. What are the reasons for this?

7. Indeterminism
Forms of indeterminism involving unconstrained freedom are implausible.
Forms recognizing that free actions have necessary causal conditions but denying that they have sufficient causal conditions are more plausible.

8. Free Will & Evolution
Mary Midgley well argues that the emergence of powers of free agency can be facilitated by the evolution of social creatures with plural drives needing to integrate them into coherent actions, as in the Darwinism of Darwin.

9. Human Agents
While the behaviour of some animals may be voluntary, the development of self-awareness & language allows human agents to envisage options for action, together with diverse values or reasons for adopting them.

10. Free Agency & Darwinism
Thus the kind of inheritance ascribed to human beings by Darwin supplies a precondition of free agency, as it also does for the emergence of morality.

11. Conclusion
Affirming indeterminism on this basis doesn’t require us to choose between versions that explain free action by agents’ reasons (Lucas, Ward) & versions that appeal to agent-causation (Reid).
Indeed, these versions seem compatible.
Aristotle’s view of voluntary action requires qualification, but a qualified form of it is also compatible with these kinds of indeterminism.

12. To Consider
Appraise Midgley’s account of how Darwin’s understanding of our evolutionary heritage helps explain the emergence of free agency.

13. Finally…
Let’s return to the exercise from Sec. 3 (this Chapter, slide 16):
Consider whether to adopt
compatibilism, or…
kinds of determinism that reject belief in free action, or…
kinds of indeterminism that accept this belief.