1. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Advanced Train Operation PTC and CBTC

2. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 It is the author’s intention that the information contained in this file be used for non-commercial, educational purposes with as few restrictions as possible. However, there are some necessary constraints on its use as described below. The materials used in this file have come from a variety of sources and have been assembled here for personal use by the author for educational purposes. The copyright for some of the images and graphics used in this presentation may be held by others. Users may not change or delete any author attribution, copyright notice, trademark or other legend. Users of this material may not further reproduce this material without permission from the copyright owner. It is the responsibility of the user to obtain such permissions as necessary. You may not, without prior consent from the copyright owner, modify, copy, publish, display, transmit, adapt or in any way exploit the content of this file. Additional restrictions may apply to specific images or graphics as indicated herein. The contents of this file are provided on an "as is" basis and without warranties of any kind, either express or implied. The author makes no warranties or representations, including any warranties of title, noninfringement of copyright or other rights, nor does the author make any warranties or representation regarding the correctness, accuracy or reliability of the content or other material in the file. Copyright Restrictions and Disclaimer Presentation Author 2 Nicholas Columbare Solution Director ALSTOM 1025 John Street West Henrietta, N.Y., 14586 585-279-1465 Nicholas.Columbare@ALSTOM.com Strategy and Solution Portfolio

3. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 3 Efficiently transport passengers / freight from point A to point B enforcing : Safety Train schedules Under whatever the conditions: ∙ Traffic density to meet throughput needs ∙ Perturbations, failures, and degraded modes A B Train Control Basic Objectives

4. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 4 Environmental conditions, the mass of the train, and increasing speeds make it more and more difficult to operate safely without the assistance of technology. Braking distance: If a car can stop in 75m (dry weather) at 90kph, a high speed train like the ALSTOM TGV will take 3200m at 300kph… Why is there a need for train control

5. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 5 Train Control Signaling Signaling is fail-safe: –“A fail-safe device is one that, in the event of failure, responds in a way that will cause no harm to other devices or danger to personnel” Safety is ensured but there is a compromise between: −System “fail-safe” capability −Operating procedures (especially in case of signaling override and manual operation) Safety measures are usually detrimental to traffic performances, and must be balanced against system reliability and availability.

6. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Why Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) and Positive Train Control (PTC)? Equivalent or better safety Improved performance Increased reliability Higher system throughput & capacity Improved schedule adherence & reduced variability in system performance 6 Traditional systems in North America have been based on block signaling systems designed 30 - 100 years ago Technology for ETCS (European Train Control System functionally similar to PTC) has been available since the 1990’s in Europe CBTC Technology was first deployed in Asia in the early 2000’s CBTC and PTC systems can offer improvements over block signaling :

7. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Line capacity and Safe Braking Distance 7 Rolling stock acceleration and braking performanceMaximum authorized train speedTrain detection granularityDriver reaction time Safe braking distance Line capacity is the maximum number of trains that can be transported on a line past a fixed point during a set time period. A signaling system influences capacity by regulating Dwell time in stations Minimum train separation required for safety The minimum train separation is dictated by the safe braking distance of a train e.g. the distance needed to safely stop prior to a safety hazard

8. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Block Signaling Movement authorities communicated via signals to driver Subject to human error / variability Safe breaking distances designed to worst case scenario not current conditions Block Signaling without Automatic Train Protection (ATP) Movement authorities communicated via frequency pulse modulated signals through track circuit blocks Fail-safe, onboard computers stop train within safety zone Safe distance between two trains will be the worst case braking distance based speed Block Signaling with cab signal and ATP 8 Code 40/00 mph 00/00 Speed Code transmission Braking speed curve Track Circuit Stopping point Code O mph SPEED CODE Track Circuit

9. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Distance to Go and Positive Train Control 9 Reference: United States of America. Federal Railway Administration. January 5, 2011. U.S. Code Title 49: Transportation. Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems Target speed and distance transmission Stopping point 60 mph Distance to Go braking speed curve Track Circuit Movement authorities communicated based on track conditions ahead and civil speed restrictions Fail-safe Permits precision stopping Eliminates overlap block behind each train Distance to Go Mandated by Law to reliably and functionally prevent: Train-to-train collisions Over speed derailments, including enforcement of: Civil engineering speed restrictions, slow orders, speed restrictions over switches Incursions into established work zone limits without appropriate authority The movement of a train through a main line switch in the improper position Positive Train Control

10. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 ACSES – PTC on the North East Corridor 10 ACSES - Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System Enforces stops, permanent and temporary speed limits. Uses braking profiles for warning and enforcement Receives intermittent line data from transponders Radio used for dynamic wayside system status updates ACSES on the North East Corridor is currently applied as an overlay to a block signaling system with cab signaled speed codes Train detection (track occupancy logic) Interlocking logic Broken rail detection Onboard enforcement of “signal” speed. http://transportationfortomorrow.com/final_report/volume_3_html/05_field_hearings /content19ab.htm?name=1106_newyork_presentation_panel2

11. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Positive Train Control Transponders Communications Based (220Mhz TDMA Radio) Onboard Controller Central Safety Server Wayside Interface Units 11 Interlocking (external system)

12. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Architecture Overview 12 Onboard receives precise location data and civil speed from transponders. Wayside Interface Units and Safety Server send interlocking status to Onboard via data radio Onboard enforces limits and braking profile Dispatchers may enter specific speed restrictions ACSES:

13. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Transponder Transmission Subsystem 13 Transponder Civil Speed Restriction Data Positive Train Stop Target Location Data Address of wayside equipment

14. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Train to Wayside Communication 14

15. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Vital Safety TSR Server to Manage Temporary Speed Restriction Data: 15 TSR – Train Speed Restriction

16. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 PTC Interoperability Issues 16 http://nec.amtrak.com/content/nec-and-connecting-commuter-rail-services High need for interoperability between railroads which operate on territories with diverse PTC solutions

17. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 ACSES Technical Challenges on NEC 17 Implemented as a mandated safety system, future system optimizations? Ongoing implementation of new radio band (900 Mhz to 220 MHz) and communication system Evolving the system to incorporate new products and advancing technologies

18. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 DISTANCE TO GO Target speed and distance transmission Stopping point 60 mph Distance to Go braking speed curve Track Circuit Gain 18 From Block Signaling to CBTC Moving Block Additional Gain Protection Envelope CBTC MOVING BLOCK 80 mph Stopping point Moving Block braking speed curve Movement Authority Code 40/00 mph 00/00 Speed Code transmission Braking speed curve Track Circuit Stopping point Code O mph SPEED CODE Track Circuit

19. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Communication Based Train Control 19 Protection Envelope CBTC MOVING BLOCK 80 mph Stopping point Moving Block braking speed curve Movement Authority Reference: IEEE Standard for Communications- Based Train Control (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements. IEEE Std. 1474.1, Page 1-28, 2005 Movement Authority precision is increased by absolute train detection envelopeSafe braking distance is based on current train speed and location Per IEEE: System shall provide high-resolution train location determination, independent of track circuits continuous, high-capacity, bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications Automatic Train Protection (ATP) functions shall provide fail-safe protection against Collisions, excessive speed, and other hazardous conditions Automatic Train Operation (ATO) functions shall control basic operations within the protection limits imposed by ATP. Communication Based Train Control

20. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 20

21. 21 ALSTOM URBALIS TM – More than 25% of radio based CBTC deployments worldwide A leader’s experience in radio CBTC : Today, Operators trust URBALIS radio CBTC for 49 metro lines spanning driverless or manned systems, new lines or signaling renovation.

22. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Automatic Train Protection – ATP 22 Maximum speed Train Speed (Manual Driving) 0 km/h If Train Speed then Emergency Brake = ON Else If Train Speed then Warning Sound = ON End ATP = Supervision of Train Speed Warning curve >Emergency Brake Speed, > Warning Speed Emergency Brake curve 120 km/h

23. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Automatic Train Operation – ATO 23 Warning curve Emergency Brake curve Maximum speed 0 km/h Train Speed (Auto Driving) Traction and Braking of the train is not managed by the driver, but by the ATO train equipment (Automatic Pilot) ATO = Drives the Train 120 km/h ATO: reduces system variability while allowing for power consumption optimization

24. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 24 Transponders Communications Based (2.4, 5.8, 4.9 Ghz) Onboard Controller Centralized Zone Controller Wayside Interlocking Control Centralized Interlocking processor Communication Based Train Control

25. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 CBTC General Architecture Interlocking I/O Station Maintenance ATC Onboard Controller ATC Zone Controller Interlocking Controller Interlocking Controller DCS – GIGABIT NETWORKS RADIOS ATS & SCADA PIS & Security ATS & SCADA PIS & Security ATS: Automatic Train Supervision PIS: Passenger Information System SCADA: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition ATC: Automatic Train Control

26. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Zone Controller Moving Block Operation 26 Automatic protection A Braking curve The Zone Controller calculates Movement Authority based on train location and track database and transmits it to the trains Onboard controller calculates braking curve and precise location Direction of traffic Train speed Movement Authority Location Movement Authority B ATC Zone Controller Train Y … Train B Train A … Train X Trackside beacons contain static location information In between beacons odometers and high performance slip/slide algorithms are used to calculate location

27. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Interlocking: the logic and the track product information 27 Signal Switch Machine Track Circuits Interlocking (Logic) Conditions “IN” Conditions “out” - track circuit occupancy - switch position - switch machine move - signal changes Interlocking Controller Interlocking Controller Interlocking I/O

28. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Control Center for decision support 28 Energy, Ventilation, Ancillaries Passenger information Train interface Mass transitSuburban Signalling Security (CCTV,…) ATS & SCADA PIS & Security ATS & SCADA PIS & Security

29. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Security and Information 29 Audio & visual information or emergency messages through WiFi communication Visual travel information or emergency messages through displays Event detection, monitoring through video surveillance Fire Detection Audio travel information or emergency messages through public address Audio & visual information or emergency messages through kiosk Emergency call point/intercom People and assets protection through intrusion detection & access control ATS & SCADA PIS & Security ATS & SCADA PIS & Security

30. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Security and Information – Trainborne 30 Video Surveillance Passenger Emergency Intercom Audio Announcement Passenger Information Infotainment/Advertisement Internet PIS & Security

31. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Data Communication System Complete redundancy for robust availability 31 ATS & SCADA PIS & Security ATS & SCADA PIS & Security Interlocking Controller Interlocking Controller ATC Zone Controller Double Radio Cell Double Radio cell Double Radio Cell AP Station Optical fiber Redundant Backbone Transmission Network AP Switch Router Redundant Access Point Station 1 Station 2 400m to 1600m (*) Backbone AP

32. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Innovation in CBTC: Increasing the simplicity of the system through train-oriented architectures 32 ATS Interlocking Train Zone Controller ATS Train Infrastructure Controller Several information paths and models to be reconciled One consistent information path Train movementRoute request Location EoA Block status, overlap release… Train movement Location Track resource request / release “Wayside-centric” CBTC system “Train-centric” CBTC system -No need to synchronize Interlocking and ATC -Design can be focused on headway, flexible operation, and robust performance. Object Controller

33. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 System Optimization 33 “Wayside-centric” CBTC system Preceding Vehicle Following Vehicle End of Authority Locatio n report MA Cyclic communication with ATC Zone Controller Train-to-Train communication Preceding Vehicle Following Vehicle “Train-centric” CBTC system MA Location report & commitment Location request ATC Zone Controller From System Theory A technical system throughout its life tends to become more reliable, simple, and effective moving towards a more Ideal state: Transfer functions to the working element which produces the final action

34. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 Conclusions 34 Advanced train control design and deployment requires a multidiscipline effort to successfully balance safety, performance, and system reliability. The increasing complexity of train control systems requires an engineering community that can create holistic solutions that match the magnitude of the challenges presented by the transportation industry. Transportation solutions are a means of improving the quality of life of people living in high density urban centers.

35. © American Public Transportation Association - 2015 THANK YOU