1. Thought experiment Consider whether the person next to you might be a philosophical zombie. 1.List the evidence you have for thinking they have a mind. 2.Is the evidence conclusive? 3.If no, is it conceivable that they have no mind? 4.If so, is it physically and metaphysically possible?

2. Thought experiment Imagine you are God. You create a world exactly like this one (laws of nature, human brains, particles) After completing this, you decide you would like conscious beings in your world. Do you need to do anything more?

3. The zombie argument P1 – we can conceive of beings with the same physical properties as us but no consciousness Do you agree with premise 1?

4. Learning objective: To understand the objection that a zombie world is not conceivable, and to evaluate how convincing this objection is.

5. Objection 1 Objection – they are not conceivable When we think of 1+2 we must think of 3 But when we think of physical properties, must we also think of consciousness? The zombie argument says no. Therefore it is conceivable. The objection says that, despite appearances, zombies are actually not conceivable (we are not thinking clearly if we think they are)

6. In thinking that they are conceivable, where are we going wrong? Read lacewing 284 stop at 7 – therefore Is this objection convincing? What could the PD respond in defence of the zombie arg?

7. It comes back to whether there is qualia. If the zombie’s have physical and functional properties, that does not provide an analysis of how something feels/what it is like to experience something.

8. ‘Philosophical zombies are conceivable.’ Write a paragraph evaluating this statement

9. How does this objection compare to the objection of Mary’s room that all knowledge of physical things would include knowledge of qualia?

10. Orange book 244-246 What does Daniel Dennett think?