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1 Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Environment Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns Supervisor: Prof. Jan van Vuuren.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Environment Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns Supervisor: Prof. Jan van Vuuren."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Evaluation of TEWA in a Ground Based Air Defense Environment Presenters: Basie Kok, Andries Heyns Supervisor: Prof. Jan van Vuuren

2 2 Overview Context and motivation Evaluation Overview Modelling TEWA components Simulation evaluation of TEWA Proposed measures of performance Demonstration Status / Further Work

3 3 Context and Motivation Forms part of TEWA program underway at the University of Stellenbosch. Aim: To evaluate a fully fledged TEWA system in a GBADS environment. High-stress environments of particular interest in GBADS application Collaborators: RRS, IMT, UDDC, CSIR… –Duvenhage B & le Roux WH, A Peer-to-Peer Simulation Architecture, Proceedings of the 2007 High Performance Computing and Simulation Conference, pp. 684-690, 2007. –le Roux WH, Implementing a Low Cost Distributed Architecture for Real-Time Behavioural Modelling and Simulation, Proceedings of the 2006 European Simulation Interoperability Workshop, Stockholm, pp. 81-95, June 2006. –Roux J & van Vuuren JH, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, Orion Journal of Operations Research, Submitted June 2007. Evaluation of TEWA models to date an imperative step in producing an effective system: –Investigation of computational costs (i.e. line of sight calculations) –Effectiveness and relevance of various model sub-components Prototype testing often infeasible due to high cost. Evaluation of large complex systems in the design phase often involves simulation: –Repetition (statistical certainty) –Variation (realistic scope traversal)

4 4 Evaluation Overview Objectives: –Demonstrate workability of system –Evaluate performance of various TE and WA methodologies in different contexts –Evaluate system performance as a whole and identify focus areas for future development Overview: 1.Model TEWA components Threat evaluation models Combining threat lists Weapon assignment models 2.Simulate scenarios using repetition and statistical variation Robustness of components Performance of components 3.Performance measure analysis

5 5 1. Modelling TEWA Threat Evaluation (TE) Flagging Models / Qualititive Deterministic / Quantitive –Projected Passing Distance –Bearing towards Assets –Course towards Assets (2D & 3D) –Time to asset Probabilistic [Jacques du Toit & Willa Lotz, Jaco Roux & Jan van Vuuren] Weapon Assignment (WA) Rule Based / Heuristic [Francois du Toit & Cobus Potgieter] Mathematical / Computational [Grant van Dieman]

6 6 TE: Flagging Models Provide information regarding major changes in attributes of monitored threats: –Speed (Afterburner) –Altitude (Pitch) –Course (Maneuvers) Binary output Calibration options: –Absolute –Dynamic

7 77 TE Models Course Projected Passing Distance Course Variation Bearing Estimated Time-To-Weapon-Release (TTWR) Determine threat values between 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum)

8 8 TE Model Threat Lists Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1 2 3 4 Course a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1a0.9 2c0.8 3b0.4 4d0.0

9 9 TE Model Threat Lists Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1 2 3 4 PPD a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1a0.8 2c0.7 3b0.1 4d0.0

10 10 TE Model Threat Lists Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1 2 3 4 Course Variation a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1c0.9 2a0.4 3d0.3 4b0.0

11 11 TE Model Threat Lists Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1 2 3 4 Bearing a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1b0.9 2a0.4 3c0.2 4d0.1

12 12 TE Model Threat Lists Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1 2 3 4 TTWR a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1b0.9 2c0.7 3a0.6 4d0.1

13 13 Combined Asset Threat List RankAircraftThreat Value 1d0.8 2b0.5 3c0.3 4a0.1 RankAircraftThreat Value 1d0.9 2b0.7 3a0.4 4c0.1 RankAircraftThreat Value 1c0.8 2a0.7 3d0.6 4b0.2 RankAircraftThreat Value 1a0.9 2c0.8 3b0.6 4d0.0 RankAircraftThreat Value 1a0.8 2c0.7 3b0.5 4d0.0 CoursePPDCVBearingTTWR RankAircraftThreat Value 1a0.8 2c0.7 3b0.5 4d0.0 Asset

14 14 Asset Threat Lists Asset a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1a0.8 2c0.7 3b0.5 4d0.2

15 15 Asset Threat Lists Asset a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1a0.9 2c0.7 3d0.3 4b0.1

16 16 Combined System Threat List RankAircraftThreat Value 1d0.9 2c0.7 3d0.3 4b0.1 RankAircraftThreat Value 1a0.8 2c0.7 3b0.5 4d0.2 Asset aAsset b RankAircraftThreat Value 1a0.9 2c0.7 3d0.3 4b0.2 System

17 17 System Threat Lists System a d c b Threat Rank AircraftThreat Value 1a0.9 2c0.7 3d0.3 4b0.2

18 18 Combination Procedures Maximize Agreement Heuristic, Distance-Based Solution, Additive Model, Analytic Hierarchy Process Adapted from inustrial applications to be applied to TEWA TE model importance and Asset priorities taken into account by weighting Aim to maximize flexibility to satisfy end-user requirements

19 19 2. Simulation of TEWA Constructive discrete event simulation –Hill RR, Miller JO & McIntyre, Applications of discrete event simulation modelling to military problems, Proceedings of the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference, 2001. –Clymer JR, System design and evaluation using discrete-event simulation with artificial intelligence, Proceedings of the 1993 Winter Simulation Conference, 1993. System components –Defended Assets –Weapon sensors & effectors –Terrain –Monitored Threats (Fixed wing aircraft) System track (3D) Attack technique [Jacques du Toit & Willa Lotz]

20 20 System Infrastructure

21 21 3. Performance Measures Asset preservation Resource utilisation –Weapon cache / asset preservation ratio Threat evaluation accuracy –Intent vs action –Estimated capability vs actual capability Assignment optimality –Temporal optimality –Weapon allocation optimality –Weapon assignment optimality Expert analysis Challenges: –Performance measures difficult to quantify!

22 22 Demonstration

23 23 HMI

24 24 Status / Further Work TE: Flagging model and deterministic model infrastructure implemented for multiple assets and multiple aircraft. Threat list generation and system threat calculation implemented. Probabilistic threat models, WA, and discrete event simulation of multiple aircraft and multiple assets in various attack scenarios will follow thereafter in order to evaluate TEWA models.

25 25 References Duvenhage B & le Roux WH, A Peer-to-Peer Simulation Architecture, Proceedings of the 2007 High Performance Computing and Simulation Conference, pp. 684-690, 2007. le Roux WH, Implementing a Low Cost Distributed Architecture for Real-Time Behavioural Modelling and Simulation, Proceedings of the 2006 European Simulation Interoperability Workshop, Stockholm, pp. 81-95, June 2006. Roux J & van Vuuren JH, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, Orion Journal of Operations Research, Submitted June 2007. Hill RR, Miller JO & McIntyre, Applications of discrete event simulation modelling to military problems, Proceedings of the 2001 Winter Simulation Conference, 2001. Clymer JR, System design and evaluation using discrete-event simulation with artificial intelligence, Proceedings of the 1993 Winter Simulation Conference, 1993.


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