1. Human Factors in ASAS as seen from the cockpit Capt. Bob Arnesen IFALPA - ECA

2. Background "Human factors" is an umbrella term for several areas of research that include human performance, technology, design, and human-computer interaction. It is a profession that focuses on how people interact with products, tools, procedures, and any processes likely to be encountered in the modern world. "Human factors" is an umbrella term for several areas of research that include human performance, technology, design, and human-computer interaction. It is a profession that focuses on how people interact with products, tools, procedures, and any processes likely to be encountered in the modern world.

3. The message  Simply put, human factors involves working to make the environment function in a way that seems natural to people.  Successful and safe design is human-centred design.

4. HF cornerstones Two general premises characterize the approach of the human-factors engineer in practical design work. Two general premises characterize the approach of the human-factors engineer in practical design work.

5. The first premise  Typically, design decisions cannot be made without a great deal of trial and error.  Problems are created for which there are no ready answers for.  The human-factors specialist is almost invariably forced to resort to trying things out with various degrees of rigour to find solutions.  Thus, while human-factors engineering aims at substituting scientific method for guesswork, its specific techniques are usually empirical rather than theoretical.

6. The second premise  The engineer must solve the problems of integrating humans into machine systems by rigorous scientific methods and not rely on logic, intuition, or common sense.  identify man-machine mismatches  find workable solutions to these mismatches through the use of methods developed in the behavioural sciences.

7. The conclusion 1. Don’t ever assume what pilots can and cannot do. 2. Pilots must be included in the research and development and testing phases. research and development and testing phases. 3. The testing must ultimately be carried out in environments as close to real life as possible. 4. The results of all R&D and testing must guarantee a high level of safety.

8. Safety and Pilot input Only pilots can give you the answers you need to hear about: Only pilots can give you the answers you need to hear about: 1.the consequences of re-defining the cockpit environment, 2.the procedures, 3.the workload and 4.the division of responsibility.

9. Cockpit environment  Is limiting in itself regardless of the size.  Pilot is forward facing with all attention focused on the aircraft trajectory.  Pilot has seat belt fastened and has limited reach.  Primary flight and navigation instruments are designed for forward facing.  Management of the flight not designed to permit long periods of heads down and away.

10. Most important of all  A modern commercial aircraft is designed and certified to be operated by two qualified pilots.  On any given flight you will have the flying pilot and the non-flying pilot, each with assigned duties and responsibilities for that role for the duration of the flight.  The flight is carried out based on this principle and is the basis for all good cockpit resource management.

11. The procedures  Procedures come from long experience and are all pre-defined. Pilots are not making up the rules as the fly along.  They follow published and established procedure whether it be company or state.  Procedures are tried and tested and designed for the safe completion of a flight.  Procedures are designed to pinpoint the information necessary to perform the task without overloading. Avoid multi-tasking.

12. The workload  If a pilot accepts the fact that he – as a human being - will make mistakes then good cockpit resource management is the management of both these errors and the consequences they have for the continuation of the flight.  The normal workload for a two man crew is most likely at an acceptable level when both pilots feel they have enough capacity to manage another major event while continuing to manage the flight and keeping to established procedure. Both pilots are still ”in the loop”. Comfort zone.

13. Out of the Loop  Anything that moves one or both of the pilots out of the loop or out of the comfort zone is negative and can affect the safety of the flight.  When implementing new procedures that pilots will be expected to perform as part of their normal duties the increase in workload must be identified and acknowledged.  Workload for performing normal tasks cannot be allowed to increase beyond a point where one or both pilots is fully consumed by the task.

14. Why We Get Increases in Workload 1. Too much information being presented on an instrument. Also how it is presented. Hard to identify and pick out what is the essential information. Cluttering. 2. Information required to perform the task being presented in different locations in the cockpit at the same time. 3. Too much time spent with heads down and away to complete the task.

15. Increases in Workload 4. Too many inputs on a typical CDU to enter and gain information necessary to perform the task. 5. Complicated and extensive issuance of instructions and clearances from ATC. 6. Typical software being outdated or not being up scratch to perform the task. Introduces a level of uncertainty.

16. Increases in Workload 7. Hardware designed to process and present the information being substandard and too slow, including the ADS-B link. present the information being substandard and too slow, including the ADS-B link. 8. Crew experience levels. Both onboard and generally within a company. 9. Aircraft unservicabilities. 10. Adverse weather. 11. Onboard events and communication with parties other than ATC. (VHF, HF, SATCOM, ACARS)

17. Responsibility  A clear definition of who is responsible for the management of the flight during its different phases is paramount to the safe execution of the flight. There can exist no doubt between the pilot and the ATCO as to who is responsible for separation.  Both the legal framework and all the necessary mechanisms to safely assume that responsibility must be in place first.

18. Responsibility  We have to recognize the fact that more responsibility means an increase in workload. The pilot, who traditionally only had to concern himself with the safe operation of his flight and seeing himself as part of the big picture, can be asked to assume responsibility for making decisions that affect the big picture. Other aircraft will ultimately be affected by the his decision.

19. Responsibility  We have to ask ourselves the question, in a highly regulated environment that demands the utmost of discipline and compliance with clearances and instructions, do we want pilots exercising autonomous responsibility at will?  Or are we willing to accept the fact that someone has to have responsibility for the big picture and that pilots, given the right tools, are capable of performing approved and tested procedures?

20. ASAS as a tool  A irborne S eparation A ssistance S ystem  The key word here is ”Assistance”.  ASAS can be a tool for the ATCO to manage his airspace and run an effective and safe flow.  ASAS can be a tool for the pilot to manage his flight in an optimum fashion when the opportunity arises.  Both individuals have clearly defined roles to play in safely managing the big picture.

21. Responsibility for Separation  In ICAO Annex 2 the following is written about the pilot and his legal responsibility:  ”Aircraft shall not operated in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.”  Pilots execute this responsibility every day in the form of see-and-avoid, right-way- rules, selection of flight levels, etc.

22. Responsibility for Separation  ASAS (some applications) can be seen as just one of many tools to perform this task.  Proximity avoidance based on a CDTI is fundamentally different from separation provisions.  The ASAS applications that go beyond “separation assistance” should be appropriately renamed.

23. Responsibility for Separation  The implementation of advanced airborne procedures together with any associated deviation from traditional separation provisions needs to be done on a “total system” basis, evaluating both the airborne and ground based components against the latest advances in human performance.  Given the complexity and density of the airspace today and in the future, IFALPA believes that separation responsibility should remain with ATC on the ground.

24. The Future Pilots can and are willing to live with change in the future. Change is one of the few constants in life that we must adapt to. We constantly live with advances in aviation which have all contributed to making aviation safer and more effective. Pilots can and are willing to live with change in the future. Change is one of the few constants in life that we must adapt to. We constantly live with advances in aviation which have all contributed to making aviation safer and more effective.

25. Human Factors in ASAS  In summary ASAS has potential if it is researched and tested in the proper fashion from the bottom up, from the lab, through the simulators and then real life in the cockpit, with the active participation of pilots.  The multitude of human factors involved in the R&D and testing prior to the actual certification cannot be pushed to the side.  Do not underestimate the amount of initial and re-current training that will be necessary.