1. The multifactorial nature of theory of mind: A structural modelling study Larry Cashion Rachel Dryer Michael Kiernan School of Social Sciences & Liberal Studies Charles Sturt University Bathurst NSW Australia Presented at the 14th Australasian Human Development Association Biennial Conference Perth Western Australia July 2005

2. Presentation Plan  Theory of Mind and Classification  Current research study method  Age, gender, and the multifactorial nature of theory of mind  Conclusions and implications

3. Theory of Mind  The ability to attribute mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, and feelings, to others and oneself  The ability to perform social and laboratory tasks requiring theory of mind has also been called mentalising and mindreading

4. Classification in Theory of Mind  First-order theory of mind  Second-order theory of mind  Higher-order or advanced theory of mind

5. First-Order Theory of Mind  Unexpected locations  “Where will X look for the object?”  Unexpected contents  “What does X think is in the box?”  Appearance-reality  “ What is this object really?”

6. Second-Order Theory of Mind  Ice-Cream Van  “Where will X look for Y?”  Unexpected locations  “Where does Y think X will look for the object?”

7. Higher-Order Theory of Mind  Understanding mental states in motivating actions  “Does X mean what she says?”  “Why did Y do that?”  Reading complex mental states  “What is X thinking or feeling?”

8. Theory of Mind Modularity  Theory of Mind Module (ToMM)  Leslie (1987; Leslie & Roth, 1993)  ToMM neurologically separate from other cognitive and brain systems  Minimalist modularity  Baron-Cohen (1999)  Sub-modules of eye direction detection, intentionality detector, shared attention mechanism

9. False belief & Theory of Mind  False belief unrepresentative of theory of mind in general  Bloom & German (2000)  False belief as a highly complex cognitive function  Bloom & German (2000)

10. Competing Theory of Mind Models  3-factors  1st-, 2nd- & higher-order ToM  Common use in literature  2-factors  False belief tasks & other tasks  Bloom & German  1-factor  Theory of mind module  Leslie

11. Method I  Participants  216 school-aged children  Recruited from State Schools in NSW & Victoria  Years 1, 3, and 5  Screened using a modified version of the Social Communication Profile (Coggins & Olswang, 2001)  2 children eliminated from sample prior to testing  No adverse incidents  Ethics approval from CSU, and NSW & Victorian Departments of Education

12. Method II  First-order tests  Sally-Anne Task (unexpected locations)  Smarties Task (unexpected contents)  Second-order tests  Ice-Cream Van Task  Second-Order Sally-Anne Task  Higher-order tests  Strange Stories Test  Faux Pas Test  Eyes Test – Children’s Version

13. Methodological Issues  Memory prompts  No memory prompts or hints were provided to participants  Justification questions  Often absent from previous first- and second-order ToM research  Makes lower-order tasks more consistent with higher-order tasks  Ensures understanding, not just recognition

14. Hypotheses  Significant group differences  Older children will perform better than younger children  Significant gender differences  Females superior to males  3-factor model superior  Better fit than 1- and 2-factor models

15. Data Analysis  Categorical data  Chi-square ( χ 2 )  Continuous data  ANOVA + Tukey HSD  Structural Modelling  Mplus confirmatory factor analysis

16. Results I TaskYear 1Year 3Year 5 Sally-Anne Interpretation 72.9 90.1 89.3 Justification 65.7 83.1 89.3 Smarties Interpretation 87.1 94.4 100.0 Justification 71.4 87.3 98.7 Ice-Cream Van Interpretation 27.9 42.3 52.0 Justification 17.6 38.0 50.7 Sally-Anne 2nd-Order Interpretation 69.6 81.7 96.0 Justification 31.9 57.7 85.3

17. Results II TaskYear 1Year 3Year 5 Strange Stories (/8) Interpretation 4.70 5.25 6.05 Justification 2.29 3.25 4.09 Faux Pas (/10) Total 5.55 7.11 8.29 Eyes Test (/28) Total 15.02 16.90 18.77

18. Results III No gender differences for any task

19. Results IV Model χ 2 pdf CFI TLIWRMR No correlated terms 3-factor18.60.069110.9750.951.546 2-factor23.42.037130.9650.944.634 1-factor24.67.038140.9460.946.655 Sally-Anne Tasks correlated 3-factor 6.56.766101.0001.024.328 2-factor20.60.057130.9710.950.593 1-factor20.36.087130.9750.960.596 N = 216; all models use WLSM estimation & Santorra-Bentler scaled χ 2

20. Smarties Sally-Anne (1st-order) Sally-Anne (2nd-order) Ice-Cream Van Strange Stories Faux Pas Eyes 1st Order ToM 2nd Order ToM Higher Order ToM.59.88.48.83.66.65.54.37.76.81.34 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7.65.32.77.56.58.71.23

21. Summary of Results  Hypothesis 1 – age group differences supported  For all theory of mind tasks  Hypothesis 2 – gender differences not supported  For all theory of mind tasks  Hypothesis 3 – 3-factor model significant superiority supported

22. Implications I  Support for the multifactorial nature of theory of mind  Fits with current theory and use of ToM  Challenge to ‘male brain’ theory of Baron-Cohen  No gender differences detected  No interaction effects  Possible that gender effects were not evident because of prepubescent sample – but still fails to fit theory

23. Implications II  Challenge to current orthodoxy in theory of mind research  Assumptions of age – ability development of theory of mind were not supported  Knowledge that ‘something’ is going on is different from understanding what that ‘something’ is  Instruction sets and ‘memory prompts’ affect the ecological validity of ToM tasks and artificially inflate passing rates

24. Where Now?  Further examination of ‘memory prompts’ and instruction sets  Further research into the multifactorial nature of theory of mind using a larger array of tasks  Using the 3-factor model to examine the relationship with executive functioning

25. Contact Details Larry Cashion larry@cashion.net