1. Professor of Economics Institute of Behavioral Science University of Colorado The New Institutional Economics: Its Roots, Growth and Future Lee J. Alston

2. What is the NIE? 1) Interdisciplinary 2) Comparative 3) Set of concepts, e.g., property rights, agenda control, credible commitment… 4) Different levels of analysis, e.g., causes and consequences of institutions

3. Government Informal Institutions (Norms of Society) Formal Institutions (Laws of Society) Property Rights Technology Transaction Costs Transformation Costs Costs of Internal Production Costs of Exchange Economic Performance Figure 1 Institutions and Economic Performance Contracts

4. Economic Performance Special InterestsCitizens/Consumers WinnersLosers ExecutiveLegislature Prime Minister President Committees Parties Laws JudiciaryBureaucracies Competent and Honest Independent and Honest Figure 2 The Determinants of Formal Institutions Government

5. Examples 1.Titles, Conflict and Land Use in the Brazilian Amazon Impact of Insecure Property Rights: i.Less site specific investment and lower land values i.Land conflict Level of analysis: the effects of “given” institutional constraints

6. What generates insecure property rights? Political stalemate between large landholders and the landless peasants’ movement. Constitutional provision allowing squatting on private land if land not “productively used” Land reform agency responds to the interests of squatters Courts adjudicate according to civil law which guarantees rights of private property holders Political conflict between goals of promoting efficiency through secure property rights and redistribution – Brazil has the highest level of land inequality in Latin America

7. NIE: What do we know? Contracting: linkages among institutions, property rights, transaction costs and contracts Political Economy: roles played by legislative institutions and special interests in shaping the laws of society Both have been absorbed into the mainstream of Neo-Classical Economics

8. NIE: What Don’t We Know? Staying Ahead of the Mainstream We know too little about the origins of norms and how they shape outcomes We need a better understanding of institutional path dependence in the presence of poor economic outcomes - the dynamics of institutional change

9. Why institutional path dependence? 1.Informational problems abound What can we learn from: - cognitive psychology and experimental economics? - empirical studies of insufficient political competition and insufficient media competition

10. Why Institutional Path Dependence? 2.Disapproval of the outcome but approval of the process that generated the outcome. Trapped? - role of political entrepreneurs 3.Serious collective action problems - role of political entrepreneurs 4.Insecure “political” property rights

11. Why Do We Want Insecure Political Property Rights? Transparent side-payments would undermine the legitimacy of government. Discourages politicians from making “bad” policy in order to be bought out.

12. Why Do We Want Secure Political Property Rights? It would enable more credible commitment among politicians It would stabilize policy - bright side and dark side of policy stability

13. Overcoming Institutional Path Dependence: Achieving Economic Development Political Entrepreneurship - Cardoso in Brazil vs Chavez in VZ - Someone who plays for the history books - Strong but checked executive powers? The Role of Crises - Gives more latitude for political entrepreneurship - Greater scope for action can be positive or negative

14. How do we make headway in the NIE? Continue what we are doing which requires insights from anthropology, economics, history, law, psychology, political science and sociology Orchestrated case studies over time of successful and unsuccessful institutional change such that we can begin to make some generalizations