1. Employing Terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and International Conflict To Achieve Social Influence

2. Reasons To Avoid This Topic Too controversial Traditional social psychology topics like conformity, attribution, aggression, etc. Less time can be spent talking about research from my laboratory There are many topics that I and other persons know more about

3. Reasons To Examine This Topic The importance of the topic suggests that social psychologists should have been studying this for years Social psychologists have skills and have developed a knowledge base not available to politicians, journalists, historians, etc Chance to talk about where we are going rather than where we have been

4. Premises We Will Adopt No moral judgment is implied in the labels ‘terrorist,’ ‘guerrilla,’ and ‘state.’ These simply describe activities that individuals and organizations employ to gain social influence. Terrorist, guerrilla and state organizations form a continuum. Larger organizations retain all the capacities of the smaller organizations, but smaller organizations lack some of the capacities of larger organizations.

5. Premises We Will Adopt Conceptual structures are best formed by allowing permeability between disciplines. Our structure will take from psychology, history, philosophy, art, politics, etc. No new forms of social interactions have occurred since 09-10-01. Thus, while we will not avoid discussing the present international climate, analysis of the current political situation is unlikely to yield any new principle of social influence.

6. Organizations: Definitions State-A organizational unit or group of allied units that maintain a military force capable of fighting conventional battles. Guerilla-A permanent or semi-permanent military organization that is not sufficiently strong to confront the military of a state in a conventional battle. Terrorist-A relatively small organization that is not sufficiently strong to maintain an identifiable group for an extended time.

7. Organizational Goals States: To 1) maintain their group in power and 2) dispense resources among the supporters of the government. Guerillas-To become a state Terrorists-To become a guerilla organization and eventually a state.

8. Theme 1: The Villa

9. Theme 1: My Friend’s Father What had produced the metamorphosis from executioner to kind father Was the image of the kind father a ruse Did the kind man and executioner co-exist concurrently

10. Theme 2: Beautiful Art Michaelangelo Jack Kerouac: On the Road

11. Theme 2: On The Road Hitchhiking as a vocation Blizzards and the failed photo essay Rescue in Ames Exit on Powell Street

12. Theme 2: Reappearance of Our Rescuer “What A Long Strange Trip It Must Have Been” What social experiences led Kaczynski to renounce a successful career to become a techno-terrorist? Do ‘monsters’ have redeeming qualities

13. Theme 3: A Contrast of Leadership The impracticality of Pope John XXIII Vatican Deathwatch: The morality of states JFK at the Ambassador’s Residence

14. Theme 3: JFK in Berlin Rudolph Wilde Platz June 26, 1963

15. Theme 3: Arlington Gawking at the procession Dreams unfulfilled, a lack of closure

16. Theme 3: Arthur Schlesinger Advisor to President Kennedy A Thousand Days Age of Jackson The Age of Roosevelt

17. Theme 3: Schlesinger’s Analysis A sit-about Christmas: Schleisinger envisions the 21 st century 20 th Century marked by great ideological conflicts: WWI, WWII, the Cold War Triumph of Democracy: Destruction of empires, colonialism, fascism and Communism

18. Theme 3: Schlesinger’s Analysis Triumph of democracy creates a power vacuum Power vacuum allows expression of old hatreds Creates an international environment dominated by: Genocide Terrorism

19. Reign of Terror French Revolution: 1793-1794 Origin of the term “terrorist.”

20. Jewish Terrorists: Zealots They believed that they served God by killing God’s enemies Assassinated Jews who collaborated with the Romans Simon the Zealot and Judas Iscariot may have been Zealots. Destroyed by Roman 10 th Legion in 66 AD at Masada

21. American Terrorist: John Brown Pottawatomie Creek Harpers Ferry

22. American Terrorists: Klu Klux Klan Racist-protestant group established in southern US after the Civil War Undergone many changes throughout its history Still active in US

23. American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh Gulf War veteran Oklahoma City Bombing

24. American Terrorist: John Allen Muhammad Gulf War Veteran With John Lee Malvo killed 10 and wounded 3 in DC area sniper case

25. American Terrorist: Ted Kaczynski Former Berkeley professor Wrote Industrial Society And Its Future

26. Palestinian Terrorists: Hamas Arose during Intifada of 1987 Has conducted suicide bombings against Israel Strongly opposes Yasir Arafat

27. Peruvian Terrorists: Shining Path Peruvian communist group founded in 1970 Turned to terrorism in the 1980s Led to deaths of approximately 25000 persons Once several thousand strong now greatly weakened

28. Italian Terrorists: Red Brigades Formed in 1969 to break Italy from western alliance Assassinated Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 Kidnapped US Army General Dozier in 1981 Now fewer than 50 members

29. Research Model: Predictors of Organizational Success Correlate 1 +..... + Correlate n = Goal (success, failure) For instance, Strong Ideology +..... + Attack State Symbols = Goal

30. Components of Our Analysis Organizations: States, guerillas, terrorists Citizens: Opponents and supporters of the state Infrastructure and Resources: Food, transportation, airports, etc. Communication Network: Television, radio, internet, word of mouth

31. Principles Guiding Our Analysis No moral assessment is implied in labeling a group a terrorist, guerilla or state organization. These groups are simply mechanisms for gaining social influence Terrorist, guerilla and state organizations have existed and will exist throughout history Terrorist, guerilla and state organizations have different goals and employ different strategies Larger organizations use strategies of smaller organizations but smaller organizations are rarely capable of using strategies of larger organizations

32. Terrorism: Opponents of the State 1.It is hypothesized that successful terrorists gain converts from those already opposed to the state by e spousing a well-defined ideology.

33. Terrorists: Opponents of the State 2. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists gain converts from those already opposed to the state by attacking symbols of the state.

34. Terrorists: Opponents of the State 3. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists gain converts from those already opposed to the state by playing the ‘Elephant Gun and Fly’ game.

35. Terrorists: Opponents of the State a.Curtailing liberties and establishing “protections.” b.Encouraging the view that the terrorists threaten the state’s existence. c.Inviting the state to “wallow in the mud” and engage in barbaric reprisals. d.Depriving the state of the moral high ground. 4. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists gain converts from those already opposed to the state by producing an aggressive response by the state.

36. Terrorists: Supporters of the State 1. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists use the supporters of the state as tools for gaining the attention of the opponents of the state.

37. Terrorists: Supporters of the State 2. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists make few attempts to gain the hearts and minds of those supporting the state. 3. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists create general anxiety; they make supporters see a terrorist under every bed.

38. Terrorists: Communication Networks 1. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists use state networks to broadcast their attacks and spread their ideology.

39. Terrorists: Communication Networks 2. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists maintain a loose network where every terrorist knows just enough to do his or her job.

40. Terrorists: Resources and Infrastructure 1. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists employ the state’s resources and infrastructure as targets, as a means of gaining attention.

41. Terrorists: Resources and Infrastructure 2. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists use attacks to gain attention and avoid efforts to destroy state. 3. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists draw significant attention to themselves despite their small numbers and limited resources.

42. Terrorists: Resources and Infrastructure 4. It is hypothesized that successful terrorists establish a financial support network to obtain weapons and to support members under cover.

43. Terrorism: A Few Concluding Thoughts (1) 1.Terrorism is a strategy for the weak attacking the strong. Exclusive reliance on terror as a tactic means that the state is confronting a small and weak organization. 2.Many states have been weakened by an over reaction to terrorism. 3.No state has ever been destroyed by a terrorist organization.

44. Terrorism: A Few Concluding Thoughts (2) 4. Organizations that rely exclusively on terrorism are not a threat to the survival of the state. They are a confined nightmare. 5. Terrorist organizations will be defeated if they cannot develop into a guerilla organizations.

45. The Goals of States The goals of a state organization are to 1) maintain their group in power and 2) dispense resources among the supporters of the government.

46. Two Strategies for Maintaining State Power 1. It is hypothesized that successful states protect against threats to their power from within the system (e.g., other politicians, rival groups, unfavorable press, dissidents) by magnifying the perceived threat posed by terrorist, guerilla and other state organizations. 2. It is hypothesized that successful states protect against threats to their power from outside the system by minimizing or nullifying the threat posed by terrorist, guerilla and state organizations.

47. Magnifying Threat: Opponents of the State 1. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to curtail the liberties and silence the government’s opponents. a. Dissention in the Civil War, suspension of habeas corpus b. Reichstag Fire produces the ‘Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State.’

48. Magnifying Threat: Opponents of the State 1. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to curtail the liberties and silence the government’s opponents. c. Eugene Debs imprisoned under Espionage Act for anti-War speech in 1918 d. Debs quote-”While there is a lower class, I am in it; while there is a criminal element, I am of it, and while there is a soul in prison I am not free.”

49. Magnifying Threat: Opponents of the State 1. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to curtail the liberties and silence the government’s opponents. e. House on Un-American Activities Committee f. Arthur Miller’s “The Crucible”

50. Magnifying the Threat: State Supporters 1. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to portray the leader as the embodiment of patriotism to the government’s supporters.

51. Magnifying Threat: State Supporters 2. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to gain supporters from those generally opposed to the government. a. Lincoln 1864: “Don’t change horses in midstream.” b. Roosevelt 1940 and 1944

52. Magnifying Threat: State Supporters 2. It is hypothesized that magnifying external threat(s) enable(s) successful states to gain supporters by from those generally opposed to the government. a. Lincoln 1864: “Don’t change horses in midstream.” b. Roosevelt 1940 and 1944