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Nico Yturriaga September 27, 2014. Why Necurs?  Infected 80,000+ during December 2012  Tagged as “Rootkit for Hire”  In the wild.

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Presentation on theme: "Nico Yturriaga September 27, 2014. Why Necurs?  Infected 80,000+ during December 2012  Tagged as “Rootkit for Hire”  In the wild."— Presentation transcript:

1 Nico Yturriaga September 27, 2014

2 Why Necurs?  Infected 80,000+ during December 2012  Tagged as “Rootkit for Hire”  In the wild

3 What is a Rootkit?  Stealthy type of software  Activated at boot up  Removal can be complicated or practically impossible

4 Necurs is...  Obfuscated / Encrypted  Protective to itself and components  Able to Prevent AV Installation

5 Basic Flow

6 The Components  The Dropper (Executable.exe)  Infection Symptoms, The Executable, Rootkit Installation  The Rootkit (Driver.sys)  The Driver, Access Denial, AV and Application Blocking

7 Infected by Necurs? The Dropper  Windows Platform (32 bit / 64 bit)  Query ‘Syshost32’ Service.

8 Query ‘Syshost32’ Service The Dropper - Symptoms

9 Infected by Necurs? The Dropper  Windows Platform (32 bit / 64 bit)  Query ‘Syshost32’ Service.  ‘Syshost.exe’ in Device Manager

10 ‘Syshost.exe’ in Device Manager The Dropper - Symptoms The Dropper Executable

11 Infected by Necurs? The Dropper  Windows Platform (32 bit / 64 bit)  Query ‘Syshost32’ Service.  ‘Syshost.exe’ in Device Manager  Parse “HKLM\ System\ CurrentControlSet\ Services”

12 Parse “HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\ Services” The Dropper - Symptoms

13 Infected by Necurs? The Dropper  Windows Platform (32 bit / 64 bit)  Query ‘Syshost32’ Service.  ‘Syshost.exe’ in Device Manager  Parse “HKLM\ System\ CurrentControlSet\ Services”  Verify Driver File Access Denial

14 Verify Driver File Access Denial The Dropper - Symptoms 16 characters length of driver file name [a-f, 0-9]

15 Infected by Necurs? The Dropper  Windows Platform (32 bit / 64 bit)  Query ‘Syshost32’ Service.  ‘Syshost.exe’ in Device Manager  Parse “HKLM\ System\ CurrentControlSet\ Services”  Verify Driver File Access Denial

16 The Executable The Dropper  Sample was obtained June 2014.  MD5 : 917406e5d63a4538e7a4e28f5dd13bef  Obfuscated and will eventually decrypt a new file : 39db776b96383b491362d7f003a1ffd0

17 Rootkit Installation The Dropper NO

18 Privilege Escalation The Dropper  Vulnerability listed as CVE-2010-4398  allows local users to gain admin privileges  bypass the User Account Control (UAC)

19 Rootkit Installation The Dropper NO

20 Rootkit Download The Dropper  Manipulate Windows Firewall by netsh.exe  Decrypt a List of IP addresses

21 Rootkit Installation The Dropper NO

22 Rootkit Installation The Dropper  Create System file

23 Rootkit Installation The Dropper  Load Rootkit as a Service

24 The Driver The Rootkit  MD5 : eaa43802c3801389911b6ad35c0ee71  Sample was Downloaded June 2014  Obfuscated and will eventually decrypt a new file : 787328fa36df1ce151eebf44fe07c0a6  16 characters file name [0-9, a-f] “.sys” extension

25 The Driver The Rootkit  Registry Entry at “\REGISTRY\MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services”

26 The Driver The Rootkit  Registry Entry at “\REGISTRY\MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services” SERVICE_BOOT_START

27 The Driver The Rootkit  “\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControl Set\Control\ServiceGroupOrder”

28 The Driver The Rootkit  Registry Entry at “\REGISTRY\MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services”  Able to load in Safe Mode  Load before other Drivers

29 Driver – Dropper Communication The Rootkit  Create device object "NtSecureSys" and a Symbolic link "\??\NtSecureSys" o 0x22000C – Request Rootkit File Path o 0x220010 – Request Rootkit Registry Path o 0x220018 – Update the rootkit driver file by a supplied buffer o 0x22001C – Uninstall the Rootkit o 0x22002C – terminate a process using a supplied process name

30 Access Denial The Rootkit  Registry - CmRegisterCallback API

31 Access Denial The Rootkit  Registry CallBack Flow YES NO

32 Access Denial The Rootkit  File Access - Filesystem

33 Access Denial The Rootkit  FileSystem Filter Flow NO YES

34 Access Denial The Rootkit  Process / Thread  API ObRegisterCallbacks  NtOpenProcess, NtOpenThread [SSDT]

35 Access Denial The Rootkit  Process / Thread Call Back NO YES NO YES

36 Application Blocking The Rootkit  Black and White Listing Capabilities  Values at “\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ CurrentControlSet\Services” Not Blacklisted / To White list Blacklisted

37 Application Blocking The Rootkit  API PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine Black

38 Application Blocking The Rootkit

39 GameOver Zeus Resurrected as of July 2014 Used to install CryptoLocker ransomware. Blamed for more than $100 million theft from banks, businesses and consumers worldwide.

40 Removal Tips Use a Boot CD e.g. [Hiren’s] Demonstration

41 References http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-zeus- gameover-with-necurs.html http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-zeus- gameover-with-necurs.html http://www.f- secure.com/weblog/archives/00002717.html http://www.f- secure.com/weblog/archives/00002717.html http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi- bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-4398 http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi- bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-4398 http://www.infosecurity- magazine.com/view/29806/necurs-rootkit-not-new-but- spreading-fast-warns-microsoft http://www.infosecurity- magazine.com/view/29806/necurs-rootkit-not-new-but- spreading-fast-warns-microsoft krebsonsecurity.com/tag/gameover-zeus/ MSDN Peter Ferrie http://pferrie.host22.com/papers/


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