1. Today’s Readings -Hardin, G. 1968. Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162:1243- 1248. -Berkes et al. 2006. Globalization, Roving Bandits and Marine Resources. Science 5767. 1557-1558

2. Managing Common Pool Resources Lecture 7: Natural Resource Management

3. Management -Actively making decisions about -“Commons Management” is really “people management” -Question about how to influence behaviors of resource use

4. Managing Common Pool Resources Lecture 7: Natural Resource Management

5. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

6. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.

7. Common-Pool Resources (CPR) A type of good consisting of a natural resource system (e.g. fresh water, a forest or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Collectively owned and not individually owned

8. What are the commons, how should they be managed and by whom? Garret Hardin and his notion (1968) –Problem definition and solution The Old Commons/The New Commons Elinor Ostrom and her notion (1970s-) -- Problem definition and solutions Cooperation and establishing Rules and Behaviors

9. Learning Goals Describe competing theories to solving the problem of the commons (and their history) Explain mechanisms for commons management Evaluate the role of incentives in policy development in the context of CPR

10. Garrett Hardin Garrett Hardin 1915-2003 Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor, UC Santa Barbara “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968; “Living on a Lifeboat” 1974 “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

11. Garrett Hardin Garrett Hardin 1915-2003 Ecologist, microbiologist, Professor, UC Santa Barbara “Tragedy of the Commons” 1968; “Living on a Lifeboat” 1974 “Tragedy of the Commons” reprinted in over 100 anthologies; tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science Environmental/Resource problems were tied to directly to overpopulation of the earth!

12. The Old Commons Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons).

13. The Old Commons Tragedy of the commons: every farmer will tend to maximize their own profits by increasing their herd or increasing their gathering of resources without regard to the long-term depletion of the land. This is rational because the benefit to the individual farmer (of, for example, grazing one more animal on the commons) is larger than that farmer’s share of the overall depletion of the shared resource (i.e. the commons). Individual benefit > overall resource decline

21. Each actor has 2 interests; individual interest and collective interest

22. Exam Results

24. Normally Distributed?

25. Points to date If this were your entire score you’d probably get The exercises, mid-term and paper suggest you have Because we still have a few exercises, more material and the final exam … Obviously, improvements can be garnered by Top fifth A, A- A very good familiarity/founda tion Don’t be lulled into a false sense of security Reading up Showing up Speaking up Writing up Second fifth B+, B A pretty good familiarity/founda tion Middle fifth B-, C+, C A sufficient familiarity/founda tion Lots of room to move Fourth fifth C-, D+ A basic familiarity/founda tion Bottom fifth D, D-, FSome familiarity/founda tion Don’t give up You have time and opportunities to rebound

26. Complaints Department Pass back exams at the end of class Take note of what you felt was incorrectly marked wrong Go to office hours and bring evidence from notes or lectures of why you were correct

27. Paper Assignment A common-pool resource (CPR) is a type of good consisting of a natural or human-made resource system (e.g. an irrigation system or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use. Because of difficulties associated with the exclusion of potential beneficiaries, several scholars have defined the overuse of CPR as a “tragedy” especially as global populations and resource consumption continue to rise. To address these issues, scholars have proposed competing management schemes which all seek to maintain/sustain CPR and reduce costs associated with these unique resources. Please describe competing theories of common- pool resource management. Include in your description (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom); (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”) (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

28. What to include (1) major scholars who have contributed to this field of research (e.g. Hardin versus Ostrom); (2) differences in how the tragedy of the commons is defined (e.g. what is considered to be the “root” of the problem”) (3) potential solutions based on different problem definitions (4) two examples of CPR and the communities that manage them that might be appropriate for different types of resource management arrangements (private property, community-based management, government management, etc.)

29. Basics Length 20-25 pages

30. Basics Length 20-25 pages (APRIL FOOLS!)

31. Basics Length 4-5 pages 5 Peer review citations (journal articles): –Additional Ostrom and Hardin article not included. Include 2 examples of CPR that are/could be sustainably managed under different CPR management arrangements

32. “tragedy” example: fisheries - Fish are commonly held good - Fish provide15% protein for 3 billion people worldwide - Generally agreed that overfishing is taking place Worm et al. Science, 2006 Fig. 1. Global loss of seafood species. Shown is the current trend in fisheries collapses (data points, based on United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization data base), and extrapolated to 2050 (solid line)

33. Roving Bandits: Mobile agents can take advantage of resources then move on before the locals can respond… Globalization, Roving Bandits, and Marine Resources (Berkes et al 2006, Science) “tragedy” example: fisheries

34. Who owns what part of which ocean? Early and mid-20 th Century: 3 miles out was considered marine domain 1945 Truman extends US jurisdiction to continental shelf (fishing and oil resources; 1947 first oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico) UN: Law of the Sea (1973-1982) enforced 1994 EEZ 0 – 200 nautical miles (Exclusive Economic Zones) Nations can manage their business, environment, and marine resources US has signed by not ratified b/c of International Seabed Authority (which would establish authority to regulate seabed mineral exploration)

35. Who owns what part of which ocean?

36. Roving Bandits: The internet has fueled the ease at which bandits can roam… “tragedy” 2.0 Kaiser’s Spotted Newt

38. Hardin’s Problem Definition Hardin’s main concerns: Self Interest (with a biological basis) and Overpopulation “Freedom to breed is intolerable” Overpopulation harms the world as a whole. The more people there are, the fewer resources there are available to each person. As long as we have a welfare state, people will continue to have more children than is good for society. Rational agents maximize their own good (more children), when the cost to them is relatively low because the cost is shared in common with society as a whole.

39. …but what about conscience and education?

40. Conscience, education, etc., won’t work, he says, because it is in one’s self-interests to breed. Hardin: contends that individual conscience will not solve the tragedy of the commons because: 1) It discriminates against people of good conscience, and tends to eliminate them from the population.It won’t work in the long run. Nature’s revenge. People without conscience with outbreed the others, and population will increase again eventually. 2) It is not psychologically healthy to force people to act against their own interests on the basis of conscience.

41. The only “rational” solution Rights and freedoms must be restricted for the good of everyone! Mutual coercion to solve population problem (government regulation on number of offspring allowed) and other problems of the commons which are externally imposed. Enclose the commons as private property which will give incentive to the right holder to maintain the resource for his/her benefit.

42. “Tragedy” can only be solved by taking one of two roads Privatization of common property Central Authority Common property

43. Only have a personal interest That support the private good (“protect what is mine”) Protects the resource Promote the sustainability and augmentation 1. Private Property (Personal Incentive)

44. 2. Institutional Management Institutions  Rules  Behaviors  Limit Only have a personal interest Has no self interest That support the private good (“protect what is mine”) That support the public good (“protect what is everyone’s) Protects the resource Promote the sustainability and augmentation 1. Private Property (Personal Incentive)

45. Rules and Behaviors Harvesting Limitations on Ocean fisheries Time: Season Limitations Space: Marine Protected Areas/Closures Resource Type: Size Total Allowable Catch: Weight Technology: Only Specified Types

46. Sitka Herring Fisheries “Last season the fishery had five openings from March 22 to April 2, the shortest was 15 minutes and the longest two hours and 30 minutes, for a total of seven hours of fishing and a total catch of 14,776 tons of herring.” www.JuneauEmpire.com December 18 th 2009 Klas Stope

47. You can only fish during the season

49. You can only fish during the season and during that season you can only be out for 3 days at a time

51. Rules and Behaviors Harvesting Limitations on Ocean fisheries Time: Season Limitations Space: Marine Protected Areas/Closures Resource Type: Size Total Allowable Catch: Weight Technology: Only Specified Types Public Transit as a Commons Monetary: NJ Transit- Peak Travel time tickets are 15% more expensive

52. The New Commons The tragedy of the commons is a metaphor for anything held in common, used by all freely. Everyone will maximize his own benefit to the detriment of the whole. Modern “commons” include: The sea -- overfishing The air, the land, rivers -- pollution The public noise level -- sound pollution National parks – overuse The earth itself (energy, food supply, living standards) -- overpopulation

53. Healthcare

54. Under the OLD system where people were not required to have healthcare: Who benefited? Who are the costs placed upon?

55. Healthcare Under the NEW system where people are required to have healthcare: Who benefits? Who are the costs placed upon?

56. Elinor Ostrom Elinor Ostrom 1933-2012 Nobel Prize in Economics 2009 Political Scientist, Indiana University and Arizona State University In 1973 began investigating collective action, trust, and cooperation, specifically in the study of common pool resources. tremendously influential in ecology, population studies, economics, political science

57. https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=D1xwV2UDPAg

58. Ostrom’s Problem Definition “ Tragedy” is really a problem with “Open-access” but people have been managing themselves for 1000s of years. Yes, there are private benefits which do cause public costs…but Hardin over-simplied, you must evaluate 1. The nature of the resource 2. Nature of the community and their arrangements “Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better”

59. The solution to the “tragedy” The evolution of complex management arrangements and cooperative behavior. There are many ways that people organize to use resources in a renewable manner.

60. The solution to the “tragedy” The evolution of complex management arrangements and cooperative behavior. There are many ways that people organize to use resources in a renewable manner.

61. The solution to the “tragedy” “Though many animals display cooperative behavior, human cooperation is distinct” - Complex communication - Trust and reciprocity - Highly adaptable to fit solution to problem context E.O. Wilson, biologist, Harvard University

62. Cooperation yields rules which guide behaviors that are in the interest of the individual, the community and the resource (however size of the community and the ability to exclude interlopers matters) Rules which are internally developed are more likely to be followed, trusted, and match the resource and community need. There must be monitors and sanctions for those who violate the rules (negative incentives) The solution to the “tragedy”

63. “Tragedy” can only be solved by taking one of two roads Privatization of common property Central Authority Common property Community creating norms by way of institutions in multiple ways through cooperation

64. Institutions  Rules  Behaviors  Limit Have both a personal and public interest and match the social and environmental conditions That support both the private and public good (“protect what is ours”) Protects the resource Promote the sustainability and augmentation through internally consistent rules which match social and environmental conditions

65. Prisoners Dilemma Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The police admit they don't have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other, by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. Here's how it goes: (a) If A and B both betray the other, each of them serves 2 years in prison (b) If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison (and vice versa) (c) If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge)

66. Betray Silent Silent Betray Prisoner B Prisoner A 1y 3y free 2y free

67. Benefits to cooperation and benefits to defect https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3Uos 2fzIJ0

68. Benefits to cooperation and benefits to defect https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3 TWZE8

69. Cooperation Cooperation at the regional level can often take the form of common endeavors leading to common property There are clear advantages to common property: risk sharing. The example of pools of water under properties defined at the surface is relevant. For each individual owner of the surface properties, digging a well might not be worth it because of the risks associated with the prospect of not finding any water under a particular property Risk sharing in a common property arrangement tremendously increases the possibility of deriving benefits from digging wells in a coordinated fashion. In fact, the greater the number of participants in the risk sharing operation, the lower the costs associated with the enterprise and thus the higher the benefits for each individual owner: Insurance Even risk- averse individual owners have an incentive to enter such an insurance scheme, which renders the costs of risk bearing negative

70. Rules and Behaviors Mekong River Basin: Rice fields may become common property for fishing during the peak flood, reverting to private lands as the water recede.

71. 8 “Design Principles” (Ostrom 1990) 1.Clarify defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties); 2.Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources are adapted to local conditions; 3.Collective-choice arrangements allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process; 4.Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators; 5.There is a scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules; 6.Mechanisms of conflict resolution are cheap and of easy access; 7.The self-determination of the community is recognized by higher level authorities 8.In the case of larger common-pool resources, organizations in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local governance at the base

73. Is this a positive application to tragedy of the commons?

74. What is the difference?