1. Seeking the Beijing Consensus in Asia: An Empirical Test of Soft Power Jiakun Jack Zhang, UC San Diego Annual Meeting of the Pacific Chapter of American Association for Public Opinion Research (PAPOR) San Francisco, 11 December 2014

2. Findings Few empirical tests exist to quantify the alleged expansion of Chinese soft power This paper makes first-cut effort at operationalizing soft power using public opinion data I find no evidence that favorable views of China are correlated with increased support for the China Model of development OR decreased support for democracy

3. Beijing Consensus China Model Soft power challenge: Economic and Ideological Focus: Ideological challenge to the Washington Consensus (liberal democratic order) Beijing Consensus = non-democratic version of state capitalism Soft Power = China’s influence measured by public opinion survey

4. Variables 2010 Asian Barometer Survey Independent Variables China’s Regional Influence China’s Country Influence China’s Future Influence Dependent Variables Development Preference (China Model) Democracy Preference

5. Asian Barometer Survey Part of the Global Barometer Survey network ABS researchers regularly collect nationally representative public opinion data from 13 East Asian countries on 22 topics Uses a standard survey instrument translated into local languages, administered through face-to-face interviews Average sample size of 1200 respondents Wave 3: data from Taiwan, Philippines, and Mongolia in 2010

9. Hypotheses H1a: Those who perceive China’s influence in the region as positive are more likely view China as a model for their own country’s development. (chinainf & devpref) H1b: Those who perceive China’s influence on their country as positive are more likely view China as a model for their own country’s development. (q161 & devpref) H1c: Those who perceive China’s influence as growing are more likely view China as a model for their own country’s development. (change & devpref) H2a: Those who perceive China’s influence in the region as positive are less likely to favor democracy. (chinainf & dempref) H2b: Those who perceive China’s influence on their country as positive are less likely to favor democracy. (q161 & devpref) H2c: Those who perceive China’s influence as growing are less likely to favor democracy. (change & devpref) China’s Influence Development Preference Democracy Preference

10. Logit Regression Results for Development Preference (1)(2)(3) EQUATIONVARIABLES Development Preference Regional Influence 0.478*** (For China Model ) (0.0893) Nationalism0.04530.01480.125* (0.0796)(0.0767)(0.0746) Education0.06420.1020.0620 (0.0916)(0.0880)(0.0845) Income-0.00211-0.01340.00746 (0.0630)(0.0610)(0.0597) Country Influence 0.412*** (0.0661) Future Influence 0.0339 (0.0800) Constant-1.741***-1.507***-3.114*** (0.385)(0.373)(0.287) Observations3,2763,5453,777 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 1: China vs. Non-China Table 2: US vs. Non-US (1)(2)(3) EQUATIONVARIABLES Development Preference Regional Influence 0.0476 (For US Model) (0.0486) Nationalism0.435***0.450***0.507*** (0.0461)(0.0449)(0.0430) Education-0.488***-0.437***-0.383*** (0.0535)(0.0508)(0.0479) Income-0.168***-0.181***-0.180*** (0.0379)(0.0367)(0.0356) Country Influence 0.266*** (0.0359) Future Influence -0.115** (0.0453) Constant-0.2090.452**-0.761*** (0.219)(0.215)(0.156) Observations3,2763,5453,777 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

11. Ordered Probit Regression Results for Democracy Preference (1)(2)(3) EQUATIONVARIABLES Democracy Preference Regional Influence 0.0907*** (4 variable) (0.0269) Education0.104***0.102***0.0940*** (0.0289)(0.0278)(0.0271) Income-0.0298-0.0351*-0.0463** (0.0198)(0.0192)(0.0187) Nationalism0.0698***0.0686***0.0807*** (0.0249)(0.0243)(0.0233) Country Influence 0.0705*** (0.0197) Future Influence 0.0129 (0.0250) cut1Constant-1.445***-1.512***-1.287*** (0.125)(0.122)(0.0931) cut2Constant-0.000476-0.06330.146 (0.122)(0.119)(0.0901) Observations3,0873,3283,509 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 : Large Democracy (1)(2)(3) EQUATIONVARIABLES Democracy Preference Regional Influence -0.0824*** (1 variable) (0.0248) Education0.0551**0.0564**0.0687*** (0.0262)(0.0252)(0.0245) Income-0.001490.01290.0198 (0.0181)(0.0175)(0.0171) Nationalism-0.0488**-0.0434*-0.0556*** (0.0230)(0.0224)(0.0215) Country Influence -0.0690*** (0.0181) Future Influence -0.000356 (0.0230) cut1Constant-0.003940.0983-0.113 (0.112)(0.109)(0.0823) cut2Constant0.933***1.025***0.819*** (0.113)(0.110)(0.0830) cut3Constant1.659***1.740***1.530*** (0.115)(0.112)(0.0854) Observations3,1433,3933,589 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 4 : Small Democracy

12. Conclusions Evidence for Beijing Consensus theory very weak: Affinity for Chinese influence had negligible impact on the respondent’s desire to adopt the China Model No relationship could be found between favorable attitudes towards China and preference for democracy Asia was easy case: if BCT fails in Asia it should fail elsewhere Alternative Explanations: hard power matters Future Extensions: Complete ABS surveys, Africa survey China’s Influence Development Preference? Democracy Preference?