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INFS 767 Fall 2003 The RBAC96 Model Prof. Ravi Sandhu George Mason University.

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Presentation on theme: "INFS 767 Fall 2003 The RBAC96 Model Prof. Ravi Sandhu George Mason University."— Presentation transcript:

1 INFS 767 Fall 2003 The RBAC96 Model Prof. Ravi Sandhu George Mason University

2 2 © Ravi Sandhu AUTHORIZATION, TRUST AND RISK Information security is fundamentally about managing authorization and trust so as to manage risk

3 3 © Ravi Sandhu SOLUTIONS OM-AM RBAC PKI and others

4 4 © Ravi Sandhu THE OM-AM WAY Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism What? How? AssuranceAssurance

5 5 © Ravi Sandhu LAYERS AND LAYERS Multics rings Layered abstractions Waterfall model Network protocol stacks OM-AM

6 6 © Ravi Sandhu OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) What? How? No information leakage Lattices (Bell-LaPadula) Security kernel Security labels AssuranceAssurance

7 7 © Ravi Sandhu OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC) What? How? Owner-based discretion numerous ACLs, Capabilities, etc AssuranceAssurance

8 8 © Ravi Sandhu OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC) What? How? Policy neutral RBAC96 user-pull, server-pull, etc. certificates, tickets, PACs, etc. AssuranceAssurance

9 9 © Ravi Sandhu ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC) A users permissions are determined by the users roles rather than identity or clearance roles can encode arbitrary attributes multi-faceted ranges from very simple to very sophisticated

10 10 © Ravi Sandhu WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC? RBAC is a framework to help in articulating policy The main point of RBAC is to facilitate security management

11 11 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES least privilege separation of duties separation of administration and access abstract operations

12 12 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb. 1996 Policy neutral can be configured to do MAC roles simulate clearances (ESORICS 96) can be configured to do DAC roles simulate identity (RBAC98)

13 13 © Ravi Sandhu WHAT IS RBAC? multidimensional open ended ranges from simple to sophisticated

14 14 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC CONUNDRUM turn on all roles all the time turn on one role only at a time turn on a user-specified subset of roles

15 15 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS RBAC0 BASIC RBAC RBAC3 ROLE HIERARCHIES + CONSTRAINTS RBAC1 ROLE HIERARCHIES RBAC2 CONSTRAINTS

16 16 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC0 ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERSPERMISSIONS... SESSIONS

17 17 © Ravi Sandhu PERMISSIONS Primitive permissions read, write, append, execute Abstract permissions credit, debit, inquiry

18 18 © Ravi Sandhu PERMISSIONS System permissions Auditor Object permissions read, write, append, execute, credit, debit, inquiry

19 19 © Ravi Sandhu PERMISSIONS Permissions are positive No negative permissions or denials negative permissions and denials can be handled by constraints No duties or obligations outside scope of access control

20 20 © Ravi Sandhu ROLES AS POLICY A role brings together a collection of users and a collection of permissions These collections will vary over time A role has significance and meaning beyond the particular users and permissions brought together at any moment

21 21 © Ravi Sandhu ROLES VERSUS GROUPS Groups are often defined as a collection of users A role is a collection of users and a collection of permissions Some authors define role as a collection of permissions

22 22 © Ravi Sandhu USERS Users are human beings or other active agents Each individual should be known as exactly one user

23 23 © Ravi Sandhu USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT A user can be a member of many roles Each role can have many users as members

24 24 © Ravi Sandhu SESSIONS A user can invoke multiple sessions In each session a user can invoke any subset of roles that the user is a member of

25 25 © Ravi Sandhu PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT A permission can be assigned to many roles Each role can have many permissions

26 26 © Ravi Sandhu MANAGEMENT OF RBAC Option 1: USER-ROLE-ASSIGNMENT and PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT can be changed only by the chief security officer Option 2: Use RBAC to manage RBAC

27 27 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC1 ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERSPERMISSIONS... SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES

28 28 © Ravi Sandhu HIERARCHICAL ROLES Health-Care Provider Physician Primary-Care Physician Specialist Physician

29 29 © Ravi Sandhu HIERARCHICAL ROLES Engineer Hardware Engineer Software Engineer Supervising Engineer

30 30 © Ravi Sandhu PRIVATE ROLES Engineer Hardware Engineer Software Engineer Supervising Engineer Hardware Engineer Software Engineer

31 31 © Ravi Sandhu EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Employee (E) Engineering Department (ED) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Engineer 1 (E1) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Director (DIR) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Engineer 2 (E2) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

32 32 © Ravi Sandhu EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Employee (E) Engineering Department (ED) Project Lead 1 (PL1) Engineer 1 (E1) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Engineer 2 (E2) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

33 33 © Ravi Sandhu EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 (PL1) Engineer 1 (E1) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Director (DIR) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Engineer 2 (E2) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

34 34 © Ravi Sandhu EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY Project Lead 1 (PL1) Engineer 1 (E1) Production 1 (P1) Quality 1 (Q1) Project Lead 2 (PL2) Engineer 2 (E2) Production 2 (P2) Quality 2 (Q2) PROJECT 2PROJECT 1

35 35 © Ravi Sandhu RBAC3 ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERSPERMISSIONS... SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES CONSTRAINTS

36 36 © Ravi Sandhu CONSTRAINTS Mutually Exclusive Roles Static Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles Dynamic Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles in the same context

37 37 © Ravi Sandhu CONSTRAINTS Mutually Exclusive Permissions Static Exclusion: The same role should never be assigned both permissions Dynamic Exclusion: The same role can never hold both permissions in the same context

38 38 © Ravi Sandhu CONSTRAINTS Cardinality Constraints on User-Role Assignment At most k users can belong to the role At least k users must belong to the role Exactly k users must belong to the role

39 39 © Ravi Sandhu CONSTRAINTS Cardinality Constraints on Permissions-Role Assignment At most k roles can get the permission At least k roles must get the permission Exactly k roles must get the permission


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