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Cyber-Identity, Authority and Trust in an Uncertain World Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University www.list.gmu.edu.

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Presentation on theme: "Cyber-Identity, Authority and Trust in an Uncertain World Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University www.list.gmu.edu."— Presentation transcript:

1 Cyber-Identity, Authority and Trust in an Uncertain World Prof. Ravi Sandhu Laboratory for Information Security Technology George Mason University

2 2 Outline Perspective on security Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Objective Model-Architecture Mechanism (OM-AM) Framework Usage Control (UCON) Discussion

3 PERSPECTIVE

4 4 Security Conundrum Nobody knows WHAT security is Some of us do know HOW to implement pieces of it Result: hammers in search of nails

5 5 Security Confusion INTEGRITY modification AVAILABILITY access CONFIDENTIALITY disclosure USAGE purpose electronic commerce, electronic business DRM, client-side controls

6 6 Security Successes On-line banking On-line trading Automatic teller machines (ATMs) GSM phones Set-top boxes Success is largely unrecognized by the security community

7 7 Good enough security Exceeding good enough is not good You will pay a price in user convenience, ease of operation, cost, performance, availability, … There is no such thing as free security Determining good enough is hard Necessarily a moving target

8 8 Good enough security EASY SECURE COST Security geeksReal-world users System owner whose security perception or reality of security end users operations staff help desk system solution operational cost opportunity cost cost of fraud

9 9 Good enough security In many cases good enough is achievable at a pretty low threshold The entrepreneurial mindset In extreme cases good enough will require a painfully high threshold The academic mindset

10 ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

11 11 MAC and DAC For 25 years access control has been divided into Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Discretionary Access Control (DAC) In the past 10 years RBAC has become a dominant force RBAC subsumes MAC and DAC

12 12 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) TS S C U Information Flow Dominance Lattice of security labels

13 13 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Information Flow Dominance Lattice of security labels S,{A,B} S,{A] S,{B} S,{}

14 14 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) The owner of a resource determines access to that resource The owner is often the creator of the resource Fails to distinguish read from copy

15 15 RBAC96 model ( Currently foundation of an NIST/ANSI/ISO standard) ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERSPERMISSIONS... SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES CONSTRAINTS

16 16 RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES least privilege separation of duties separation of administration and access abstract operations

17 17 HIERARCHICAL ROLES Health-Care Provider Physician Primary-Care Physician Specialist Physician

18 18 Fundamental Theorem of RBAC RBAC can be configured to do MAC RBAC can be configured to do DAC RBAC is policy neutral

19 OM-AM (Objective/Model- Architecture/Mechanism) Framework

20 20 THE OM-AM WAY Objectives Model Architecture Mechanism What? How? AssuranceAssurance

21 21 LAYERS AND LAYERS Multics rings Layered abstractions Waterfall model Network protocol stacks Napolean layers RoFi layers OM-AM etcetera

22 22 OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) What? How? No information leakage Lattices (Bell-LaPadula) Security kernel Security labels AssuranceAssurance

23 23 OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC) What? How? Owner-based discretion numerous ACLs, Capabilities, etc AssuranceAssurance

24 24 OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC) What? How? Objective neutral RBAC96, ARBAC97, etc. user-pull, server-pull, etc. certificates, tickets, PACs, etc. AssuranceAssurance

25 25 RBAC96 Model ROLES USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT PERMISSIONS-ROLE ASSIGNMENT USERSPERMISSIONS... SESSIONS ROLE HIERARCHIES CONSTRAINTS

26 26 Server-Pull Architecture ClientServer User-role Authorization Server

27 27 User-Pull Architecture ClientServer User-role Authorization Server

28 28 Proxy-Based Architecture ClientServer Proxy Server User-role Authorization Server

29 USAGE CONTROL (UCON)

30 30 The UCON Vision: A unified model Traditional access control models are not adequate for todays distributed, network- connected digital environment. Authorization only – No obligation or condition based control Decision is made before access – No ongoing control No consumable rights - No mutable attributes Rights are pre-defined and granted to subjects

31 31 OM-AM layered Approach ABC core models for UCON

32 32 Prior Work Problem-specific enhancement to traditional access control Digital Rights Management (DRM) mainly focus on intellectual property rights protection. Architecture and Mechanism level studies, Functional specification languages – Lack of access control model Trust Management Authorization for strangers access based on credentials

33 33 Prior Work Incrementally enhanced models Provisional authorization [Kudo & Hada, 2000] EACL [Ryutov & Neuman, 2001] Task-based Access Control [Thomas & Sandhu, 1997] Ponder [Damianou et al., 2001]

34 34 Usage Control (UCON) Coverage Protection Objectives Sensitive information protection IPR protection Privacy protection Protection Architectures Server-side reference monitor Client-side reference monitor SRM & CRM

35 35 Building ABC Models Continuity Decision can be made during usage for continuous enforcement Mutability Attributes can be updated as side- effects of subjects actions

36 36 Examples Long-distance phone (pre-authorization with post-update) Pre-paid phone card (ongoing-authorization with ongoing-update) Pay-per-view (pre-authorization with pre- updates) Click Ad within every 30 minutes (ongoing- obligation with ongoing-updates) Business Hour (pre-/ongoing-condition)

37 37 Beyond the ABC Core Models

38 38 UCON Architectures We narrow down our focus so we can discuss in detail how UCON can be realized in architecture level Sensitive information protection X CRM First systematic study for generalized security architectures for digital information dissemination Architectures can be extended to include payment function

39 39 Three Factors of Security Architectures Virtual Machine (VM) runs on top of vulnerable computing environment and has control functions Control Set (CS) A list of access rights and usage rules Fixed, embedded, and external control set Distribution Style Message Push (MP), External Repository (ER) style

40 40 Architecture Taxonomy VM: Virtual Machine CS: Control Set MP: Message Push ER: External Repository NC1: No control architecture w/ MP NC2: No control architecture w/ ER FC1: Fixed control architecture w/ MP FC2: Fixed control architecture w/ ER EC1: Embedded control architecture w/ MP EC2: Embedded control architecture w/ ER XC1: External control architecture w/ MP XC2: External control architecture w/ ER

41 41 Conclusion Perspective on security Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Objective Model-Architecture Mechanism (OM-AM) Framework Usage Control (UCON) Discussion

42 42 Radical Shifts: get real Focus on what needs to be done rather than how it is to be done real-word business requirements rather than hypothetical academic scenarios the 80% problem rather than the 120% problem soft and informal rather than hard and formal constructing the policy rather than auditing the policy constructive safety via policy articulation and evolution rather than post-facto algorithmic safety ordinary consumers as end-users and administrators rather than techno-geeks or math-geeks


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