1. National Series Lecture 1 Introduction Libya
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
National Series Lecture 1 Introduction Libya
This lecture illustrates the current state of international life science developments, the dual-use nature of biotechnology and an outline of the following lectures, with a view to clarifying the scope of the lecture series in terms of “What we should know” (learning outcomes) and “What we can do” (how we can make policy contributions through the responsible conduct in research).
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2. Outline Where we are in the early 21st century
Outline of the following lectures
What we should know (learning outcome)
What we can do (policy contribution)
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3. What is “Life Science”?
“Any field of science that is leading to or has the potential to lead to an enhanced understanding of living organisms, especially human life.”
E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, aerosol technology, chemistry and mathematics
(National Research Council, 2006: 27)
Applied in:
Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and National security studies
Notes: Biotechnology, as part of the life sciences, is one of the most rapidly-growing areas of cutting-edge science and engineering in the early 21st century. This rapid growth and technological advancement has offered great social benefits globally, for example in improvements to Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and National security.
This suggests that the profound majority of scientific research cannot and should not be stopped or impeded. Indeed, the capacity of the life sciences to respond to many of the interlinked and interconnected challenges to security and stability, such as poverty, the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Avian Influenza and climate change, enable life science research to promote the globalisation of safe, secure and peacefully orientated biotechnology.
Ref:
National Research Council (2006) Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 3

4. Biotechnology: An integral part of national strategy in the 21st Century
A growing market in Biotechnology: the pharmaceutical market
(National Research Council, 2006: 85)
Region
Annual Worth
Share
North America
$204 Billion
51%
Europe
$102 Billion
25%
Japan
$47 Billion
12%
Asia, Africa, Australia
$32 Billion 8%
Latin America
$17 Billion 4%
Notes: The life sciences are among the most rapidly increasing scientific and technology areas in the 21 century in terms of the size of industry, the number of scientists involved and the amounts of private investment being put into Research and Development (R & D). As you can see on this slide, this industry is truly global. The industry has become deeply integrated into the recent national strategies of many governments world wide.
The Asia-Pacific region offers a useful glimpse into the capacity for growth in this area. One global market research firm, Frost & Sullivan (2010), reported that Asia-Pacific healthcare revenue represented 23.2 percent of the global market ($ 247 billion USD) in 2009, and by 2015 the region could optimistically contribute up to 40 percent.
Ref:
National Research Council. (2006) Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Ernst & Young. (2011) Beyond borders Global biotechnology report 2011 [online]. Available from:
Frost & Sullivan. (2010). Generics and biopharma poised for growth in Asia [online]. Available from: [Accessed 25 October 2011].
Similar results in number of researchers and the amount of private investment for R&D in the life sciences
Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East
(Ernst&Young 2011, Frost&Sullivan 2010)

5. Libya: Science outlook
“Libya is still in the first phase of biotechnology development. Existing activities are on improved crop and animal organisms using conventional methods of breeding. Research in the field of modern biotechnology (especially at the DNA level) is limited to institutional activities by researchers and graduate students.
Biotechnology applications in Libya started only at the end of the nineties the public sector has not been able during the past three decades to carry out its role in the introduction and application of modern biotechnology”
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

6. Libya: Science outlook
“Individual initiatives in certain research centers such as the Center for Industrial Research, Center for Agricultural Research, and some colleges of the universities of Elfatih and Gar younis, failed to establish a strong foundation for the advancement in this new area of modern biotechnology.
The private sector had not been present and demonstrated its inability to 5 accommodate various areas of traditional and modern Biotechnology. This might be due to the lack of full understanding of this type of technologies and the lack of desire to invest in areas by the private sector.”
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

7. Libya: Science outlook
“The establishment of the Research Centre for Biotechnology in 2000 was the starting point for the transfer and adoption of modern Biotechnology in Libya. This was subsequently followed by the emergence of related activities gradually in other Research Centers and Universities.
This led to the state recognition of the importance of modern Biotechnology in various sectors of the economy especially with regard to food security, medicine, but the safety measures and the risk assessment mechanisms are still at a very modest level.”
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

8. Libya: Science outlook
The Libyan Funds-in-Trust is a self-funding activity implemented with funds provided by the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahirya for the establishment of a Libyan Cell and Molecular Biology Centre.
Main objectives of the project are:
Capacity-building: strengthening of training and research in contemporary cell and molecular biology in Libya through linkage with other networks of selected existing institutions and specialized international bodies such as the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB);
Organization of training courses;
Exchange of personnel, fellowships, expert services and research teams;
Acquisition of equipment as support facilities and exchange of information.
(UNESCO 2012)
Notes:

9. Libya: Setting National Priorities in Biotech
National priorities for the use of modern biotechnology include:
Capacity building to provide technically skilled human resources in the field of modern biotechnology.
Development of policies and programs for modern biotechnology and its safe applications in the fields of agriculture, health and environmental protection.
Enactment of laws, regulations and legislation related to the use of biotechnology.
Cooperation with international and global organizations such as UNEP, UNESCO and FAO to develop training programmers in the field of cells and molecular biology and improvement of plant production and protection of the environment.
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

10. Libya: Bioethics and Biosafety
National Standing Committee for Biological Ethics and Biosafety
The committee is entrusted with the following tasks:
Rating, follow-up and documentation of scientific research and equipments used in Biotechnology research and direct it into peaceful areas.
Follow-up research in the area of bioethics of cloning and proposal of laws and principles to regulate it.
Defend the point of view of the Great Jamahiriya with respect to the ethics of the scientific research on cloning in the local and international scientific forums.
Spreading of awareness in the area of research ethics in the scientific side of cloning, and the preparation and documentation programmes on research ethics.
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

11. PubMed search with “Libya”
Notes:.
US National Library of Health-NIH. (2012) MubMed. Available from:

12. Libya:Promoting Medical Industry
Public Company for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies
The Company was established for the purpose of medicines production in addition to supplies of different forms of pharmaceutical and medical supplies as well as different kinds of products which may cover commodities needed for public health in the Jamahiriya market and also for export of large quantities.
The company has restrictions for dealing with dangerous microorganisms and very seriously focused on what was in the Libyan legislation especially with respect to health care and medical insurance, according to the laws and resolutions in force.
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

13. Libya: Major Universities in Biotech
University of Elfatih: There are some activities related to biotechnology in some colleges such as the College of Science, agriculture, pharmacy, veterinary medicine. These colleges teach biotechnology related courses such as microbiology, immunology, genetics and molecular biology, and aquaculture.
University of Omar Mukhtar: The research unit of biotechnology conducts Microbiology research in fungi fingerprinting protein, as a Master's degree for postgraduate students. The study have been confirmed and adopted as a new method in fungi taxonomy.
University of Sabha: Biotechnology research was is done at the Faculty of Sciences and work is focused on DNA isolation from organelles (such as Mitochondria)
(Environment General Authority Libya, 2008)
Notes:

14. Why do we care? Should this be an issue for us?
The dual-use nature of science and technology:
“Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.”
“…Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?”
Matthew Meselson: Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard University
(Meselson, 2000: 16)
Hostile
Peaceful
Ref: Science has been a salient matter of politics in recent history. This is due to the dual-use nature of science. In a traditional sense, dual-use refers to the possibility whereby peacefully developed scientific research can be applied for military purposes. However, the definition of dual use is now expanded to include the potential for hostile use in the non-military context as well (accidental release and terrorism scenarios).
One of the clearest examples of how an epistemic community and civil society networks affected the security-science dialogue on the issue of dual-use is the work of the anti nuclear movement after the Second World War.
In the final year of the 20th Century, a Harvard molecular biologist Mathew Meselson stated that:
Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.
Alarmingly, he further continued:
“Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?”
Such considerations must be addressed today by both the science and the policy communities.
Ref:
Meselson, M. (2000) Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology CBW Conventions Bulletin 48,

15. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000
Ability
“Our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance”
“We will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it”
Dilemma
“…[This has a] Vast potential for beneficial application and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.”
Notes: “…During the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it - including the processes of cognition, development, reproduction and inheritance…”
“…Movement towards such a world would distort the accelerating revolution in biotechnology in ways that would vitiate its vast potential for beneficial application and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.”
Ref:
Meselson, M. (2000) Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology CBW Conventions Bulletin 48,

16. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000
Notes: “At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that will test whether biotechnology, like all major predecessor technologies, will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes or whether instead our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.”
Ref:
Meselson, M. (2000) Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology CBW Conventions Bulletin 48,
“At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that will test whether biotechnology…”
Will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or
Our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.

17. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 1972
Article I
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
This applies not only to states but also to non-state actors
Notes: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, is commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). This was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons. It opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975.
Key Provisions of the BTWC oblige State Parties:
Article I Never under any circumstances to acquire or retain biological weapons Article II To destroy or divert to peaceful purposes biological weapons and associated resources prior to joining Article III Not to transfer, or in any way assist, encourage or induce anyone else to acquire or retain biological weapons Article IV To take any national measures necessary to implement the provisions of the BWC domestically Article V To consult bilaterally and multilaterally to solve any problems with the implementation of the BWC Article VI To request the UN Security Council to investigate alleged breaches of the BWC and to comply with its subsequent decisions Article VII To assist States which have been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the BWC Article X T To do all of the above in a way that encourages the peaceful uses of biological science and technology.
Ref:
United Nations. (2012) The Biological Weapons Convention [online] Available from:

18. Science and Security: Dual-Use
The need for a broader conceptualisation of dual-use
Biological agents and toxins can be used for hostile purposes without weaponization and technology is typically diffused globally for peaceful purposes
Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or terrorist acts (non-state level) in parallel to military application (state level),
The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life sciences by both states and non-state actors
Notes: A major challenge for today’s international community is to find effective ways to raise awareness among scientists about their social responsibilities to minimise the potential for the destructive use of the life science research in which they are engaged.
The life sciences differ from nuclear science developments in that they are conducted around the world in commercial and academic laboratories rather than those belonging to national governments (National Research Council 2006).
In addition to this wider scale of practice, the actual speed of scientific advancement and the resulting security implications are “possibly too fast for any State, organization or individual to cover alone” (Millet 2010, p. 29).
Moreover, there are critical ambiguities surrounding the boundaries between defensive and offensive biological programmes that can be used to blur issues of legality (although it is clear under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that the development of all biological weapons is illegal, as is their production, acquisition, transfer, retention, stockpiling and use).
Finally, in order to address the concerns of scientists, approaches aiming to promote a culture of biosecurity-based social responsibility need to be mindful to “ensure a focus on the highest-risk research and avoid unnecessary restrictions or censorship” over scientific freedom (Smith et al. 2010, p. 137).
Remember that dual-use refers to the possibility whereby peacefully developed scientific research can be applied for malign purposes, such as biowarfare and bioterrorism and can be undertaken on the small scale as well as the large scale.
Ref:
National Research Council. (2006) Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Millet, P. (2010). The Biological Weapons Convention: Securing biology in the twenty-first century. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 15(1),
Smith, G., Davison, N., & Koppelman, B. (2010). The role of scientists in assessing the risks of dual-use research in the life sciences. In J. L. Finney & I, Slaus. (Eds.) Assessing the threat of weapons of destruction: The role of independent scientists (pp ), (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 61), Amsterdam: IOP Press.
Dual-use: traditional concept
Military
Civilian
Dual-use: broader concept
Peaceful
Non-peaceful

19. Libya and international regimes
WMD
In 2003, then Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Qadhafi renounced all of his regime's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, after more than three decades of extensive efforts to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. agreeing to disclose and dismantle all WMD programs in 2003, Qadhafi's government cooperated with American and British experts to do so, with dismantlement of the nuclear program completed and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2004.
BTWC
Accession (19 Jan 1982)
“Tripoli's BW efforts remained limited in size and never progressed beyond the research and development stages; according to one Libyan official, they never even progressed beyond the planning stages. Following Libya's renunciation of WMD in 2003, U.S. and UK inspectors found no evidence indicating an offensive biological weapons program.
(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)
Notes: Ratification or accession signifies an agreement to be legally bound by the terms of the Convention. Though accession has the same legal effect as ratification, the procedures differ. In the case of ratification, the State first signs and then ratifies the treaty. The procedure for accession has only one step—it is not preceded by an act of signature.
Both ratification and accession involve two steps. First, the appropriate national organ of the country—Parliament, Senate, the Crown, Head of State or Government, or a combination of these—follows domestic constitutional procedures and makes a formal decision to be a party to the treaty. Second, the instrument of ratification or accession, a formal sealed letter referring to the decision and signed by the State’s responsible authority, is prepared and deposited with a relevant UN body.
Directly cited from
Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2012) Country profiles [online] Available from:

20. Libya and international regimes
CWC
Accession (1 June 2004); Entry into force (2 May 2004)
Libya no longer possesses an offensive chemical weapons program, but prior to renunciation of its WMD programs, Tripoli possessed a moderately capable chemical weapons arsenal. In the 1980s, Libya constructed three chemical weapons research, development, and production facilities at Rabta, Tarhuna, and Sebha.
Libya became a party to the CWC in February 2004 and submitted a report to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in which it declared 23 metric tons of mustard agent and 1,300 metric tons of nerve agent precursor chemicals — an inventory miniscule in size compared with prevailing public U.S. intelligence assessments.
(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)
Directly cited from
Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2012) Country profiles [online] Available from:
Notes: Ratification or accession signifies an agreement to be legally bound by the terms of the Convention. Though accession has the same legal effect as ratification, the procedures differ. In the case of ratification, the State first signs and then ratifies the treaty. The procedure for accession has only one step—it is not preceded by an act of signature.
Both ratification and accession involve two steps. First, the appropriate national organ of the country—Parliament, Senate, the Crown, Head of State or Government, or a combination of these—follows domestic constitutional procedures and makes a formal decision to be a party to the treaty. Second, the instrument of ratification or accession, a formal sealed letter referring to the decision and signed by the State’s responsible authority, is prepared and deposited with a relevant UN body.

21. National Series: Lecture Outline
2. Biosecurity Threats 3. The Web of Prevention 4. National Measures 5. Responsibility of Scientists
Notes: The National Series incorporates 5 lectures in total, including the Introduction (Lecture 1).
The rest of the lectures are as follows on this slide.
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22. Reviewing threats (Lecture 2)
Natural outbreaks of infectious disease
Safety/accidental risks at laboratories
Manmade threats: warfare, crime and terrorism
Unpredictable future of the life sciences
Notes: The world needs to maintain scientific advancement (development) alongside the diffusion of highly-advanced life science technology which has been accelerating, raising proliferation concerns and increasing the risk of accidents alongside the imminent threats of infectious diseases.
Lecture 2 aims to develop an understanding of a wide range of biological risks and threats by taking an all-hazards approach (dealing with both manmade and natural biological threats). For this purpose, the lecture consists of structure outlined on this slide.
‘No single focal point’ of threats
Potential actors, material and information, which can be related to dual-use issues, exist at international, regional, national, local and individual levels.

23. The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3)
To address natural outbreaks of infectious disease
Public health preparedness and response planning
To address safety/accidental risks
Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an accidental release into the environment and unauthorized access
To address manmade threats
Strong international arms control agreements with effective national implementation
Internationally coordinated export controls
Intelligence
Biodefense
To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences
Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology developments
Responsible conduct in research through education
Notes:
Lecture 3 aims to develop an understanding of a multifaceted construct of national and international measures to prevent, mitigate and respond to the wide range of biological risks and threats (described in Lecture 2) by taking an all-hazards approach (dealing with both manmade and natural biological threats).
The concept of the WoP extends the scope of biosecurity beyond the laboratory to a wider security framework taking an all-hazards approach against both natural and manmade threats in the public arena.
Natural disease outbreaks
We need to clarify and enhance public health preparedness and to develop effective (well-informed) response planning
Safety/accidental risks
Not only do we need to take biosecurity beyond the laboratory door, we also need to consider the security of information as well as well as the security of pathogens. This could be information about methodology, techniques, skill-sets, and some of the outcomes of research.
Manmade threats
We need to support and respond to strong international arms control agreements with effective national implementation, including legislation against bioterrorism and biocrimes (e.g. the Geneva Protocol 1925, Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the UN Security Council Resolution 1540);
We need to implement and support internationally coordinated export controls (e.g. the Australia Group);
We need to boost and share intelligence;
we need to actively engage in biodefence;
Unpredictable future of life science research
Oversight: we need to review, debate and respond to security-sensitive science and technology developments;
Responsible conduct in research: we need to enhance and support education and capacity-building among and for life scientists.
There have been efforts to conceptualise a multifaceted approach comprising several practical measures through what is termed the Web of Prevention (WoP). For the conceptual evolution of the WoP in literature, see Feaks, D., Rappert, B., & McLeish, C. (2007).
Feaks, D., Rappert, B. and Mcleish, C , “Introduction: A Web of Prevention,” in Brian Rappert and Catriana Mcleish, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Science and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007) pp

24. Web of prevention Public health measures Laboratory measures
International prohibition regime
Export control
Intelligence
Biodefense
Oversight and review of Sci-Tech
Responsible conduct
Natural threats
Safety risks
Manmade threats
Notes:
Disease Surveillance, Detection and Diagnosis: Effective mechanisms to detect, monitor and respond to disease outbreaks minimise the utility of biological and toxin weapons by enhancing society’s resilience to the effects. This serves the added benefit of also improving public health provision for any natural outbreaks of disease; the public health response remains the response for dealing with both deliberate and natural outbreaks.
Biosafety and Biosecurity: these two measures contribute to ensuring scientific research is conducted safely and securely and only for peaceful purposes. In practice, biosecurity normally includes the following: physical security, personnel security, material control and accountability, transfer security, information security, and, underlying many of the above principles, some form of structured programme management.
International & National Prohibitions: International prohibitions such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as national measures, function to deter and dissuade individuals from contributing to the construction and development of biological and toxin weapons.
Export Controls: Export controls are designed to prevent the transfer of dual use equipment, agents and expertise internationally and to “ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons”. This relates to physical materials and goods rather than intellectual knowledge and information – there is no realistic way in which information can be contained in the same way as physical materials or goods, but this has an impact on dual use proliferation and security that must be recognised.
Effective Intelligence: Effective intelligence, wisely interpreted, is essential for founding good policy and ensuring the effective understanding of emerging challenges.
Oversight of Research: Oversight of dual use research (i.e research which serves, or could serve) both a benign and a malign purpose) is important in minimising the assimilation of biological and toxin weapons in states’ military arsenals and in minimising the risk of smaller-scale hostile activity.
Education & Codes of Conduct: Education and codes function to raise awareness of the Biological Weapons Convention amongst the scientific community and to deter those with the capacity to contribute to biological weapons. They also serve to raise awareness of dual use risks in general, highlighting the need to secure information as well as pathogens.
Ref:
University of Bradford. (2009) Lecture No.21. Education Module Resource. Available from:
Governance of science

25. National implementation (Lecture 4)
To National Context
These internationally recognised, agreed and adopted norms need to be implemented as a policy process by states.

26. National implementation (Lecture 4)1
International agreements 2
Signature and ratification by states 3
National measures in states
Legislation, regulation, order or other forms of governance
Notes: National implementation is a process to domestically implement the norm of an international treaty/agreement in a form of legislation, regulation, order and other measures within a specific legal and political system of a state.
Lecture 4 aims to develop our understanding of the national implementation measures of the key factors of the Web of Prevention (discussed in Lecture 3). It specifically illustrates how internationally agreed norms can be integrated into the policy processes of individual countries.

27. Worldwide engagement of life scientists with the WoP will:
The need for responsible conduct in research (Lecture 5)
Worldwide engagement of life scientists with the WoP will:
Effectively strengthen biosecurity measures by requiring the engagement of practicing scientists
Prevent unnecessary restriction of scientific freedoms
Engagement of informed life scientists about biosecurity issues is key to successful security
Notes: In recent years it has become increasingly clear that both governments and scientific communities are concerned that the rapid advances being made in the life sciences can be misused in highly destructive bioterrorism and biowarfare scenarios. With a view to mitigating the possibilities of the hostile uses of the life sciences, awareness-raising among life scientists is an urgent international issue.
Accordingly, there is a need for better collaboration between scientific communities and policy makers. For this very reason, there is also a need for education specifically designed to better inform scientists’ and policy-makers’ understanding of how the potential for the misuse of the life sciences and related technologies can be recognised and prevented.
Such biosecurity education should incorporate themes such as, inter alia, the potential for dual-use risks in contemporary life sciences; the responsible conduct of research and ethical approaches among life scientists; the history of biological-warfare programmes and biological terrorism; the role of international prohibition regimes and their national implementation; the intersection of public health and national security; and the building of an effective set of preventative policies to ensure the security of benign developments in the life sciences.
However, there is a major dilemma between the needs of the freedom of science and the restriction of freedom in scientific activities and the publication of results (Miller and Selgelid 2007).
Ref:
Miller, S. and Selgelid, M. J., Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological science, Science and engineering ethics. 13 (4),
Smith, G., Davison, N., & Koppelman, B. (2010). The role of scientists in assessing the risks of dual-use research in the life sciences. In J. L. Finney & I, Slaus. (Eds.) Assessing the threat of weapons of destruction: The role of independent scientists (pp ), (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 61), Amsterdam: IOP Press.
Education of, and capacity building among, scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for successful security
Uninformed scientists = no effective science policy inputs to the WoP 27

28. Biosecurity: Definition issues
The term “biosecurity” has been conceptualised differently across various scientific and professional disciplines
Areas: The term has been used in ecology, agriculture, food supply, arms control and public health contexts, with different meanings and conceptualisations
Policy processes: these overlap with interdisciplinary areas such as biosafety, counter-terrorism, agricultural biosecurity and biodiversity
Linguistic: In addition to these conceptual complications, “biosecurity” has also experienced linguistic complications
(Fidler and Gostin 2007, Sunshine Project 2003, Barletta 2002)
Notes: The term “biosecurity” has been conceptualised differently across different scientific and professional disciplines. One study shows that the term has been used in ecology, agriculture, food supply, arms control and public health with different meanings and conceptualisations.
Therefore, when it comes to policy making in biosecurity, this level of activity (policy-making) overlaps with interdisciplinary areas such as biosafety, counter-terrorism, agricultural biosecurity and biodiversity.
In addition to these conceptual complications, biosecurity has also experienced linguistic complications. Although biosecurity and biosafety are different terms in English, when translated into Spanish, French and other Romance languages they are expressed through only one single word. This has significant implications for both scientific activity and policy making activities. It is important to be able to distinguish between the two concepts of biosafety and biosecurity.
At BDRC we see biosafety as relating to the containment of pathogens and toxins within the laboratory or transport settings, as regulated under biosafety guidelines and governance regimes.
We see biosecurity as a concept that encompasses biosafety, while adding the security of information related to dual use work or potential dual use work, and of other materials such as means of production, storage and stockpiling of agents and information of potential biohazards that could be used for hostile purposes.
Ref:
Sunshine Project. (2003) ‘Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Biological Weapons’, Background Paper on Three Agreements on Biotechnology, Health, and the Environment, and Their Potential Contribution to Biological Weapons Control, October, Available from
Fidler, D. and Gostin, L. L. (2007) Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law, CA: Stanford University Press.
Barletta, M. (2002) Biosecurity Measures for Preventing Bioterrorism. CNS Publications, Available from

29. National Series: WoP = Biosecurity Education = Biosecurity Competency
Notes: In this lecture series (the National Series), efforts to develop a web of preventive policies are broadly envisaged as biosecurity. This is represented as a combination of national and international efforts to mitigate and respond to the potential for the destructive use of the life sciences, to accidental risks and to natural threats of diseases, all of which, together, may be broadly conceptualised as biosecurity.
We suggest that such biosecurity education should incorporate themes such as, inter alia, the potential for dual-use risks in contemporary life sciences; the responsible conduct of research and ethical approaches among life scientists; the history of biological-warfare programmes and biological terrorism; the role of international prohibition regimes and their national implementation; the intersection of public health and national security; and the building of an effective set of preventative policies to ensure the security of benign developments in the life sciences.
We suggest that engagement with these elements and an understanding of them are essential components of life scientists’ biosecurity competency.

30. References
The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.
References (Lecture 1)
Barletta, M. (2002) Biosecurity Measures for Preventing Bioterrorism. CNS Publications, Available from
BWPP. (2011) BioWeapons Monitor, Berlin: Druckpunkt Druckerei & Repro GmbH, Berlin. Available from:
Ernst & Young. (2011) Beyond borders Global biotechnology report 2011 [online]. Available from:
Feaks, D,. Rappert, B., and Mcleish, C. (2007) “Introduction: A Web of Prevention,” in Brian Rappert and Catriana Mcleish, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Science and the Governance of Research, London: Earthscan, 2007.
Fidler, D. and Gostin, L. L. (2007) Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological Weapons, Public Health, and the Rule of Law, CA: Stanford University Press.
Frost & Sullivan. (2010). Generics and biopharma poised for growth in Asia [online]. Available from: [Accessed 25 October 2011].
Nuclear Threat Initiative. (2012) Country profiles [online] Available from:
Meselson, M. (2000) Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology CBW Conventions Bulletin 48,
Miller, S. and Selgelid, M. J., Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the biological science, Science and engineering ethics. 13 (4),
Millet, P. (2010). The Biological Weapons Convention: Securing biology in the twenty-first century. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 15(1),
National Research Council (2006) Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
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