1. Migration and Inequalities
Projekt współfinansowany ze środków Unii Europejskiej w ramach Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego
Migration and Inequalities
Marek Nowak PhD
Institute of Sociology AMU
On the base on: (Post)transformational Migration. Inequalities, Welfare State and Horizontal Mobility (M. Nowak, M. Nowosielski ed.)

2. Why emigrate the: banal answer…
„The role of economic scarcity in fostering migration was especially underlined by the neoclassic theory of push factors and pull factors. Perceived inequalities, such as the lack of a proper job (in relation to others) or bad living conditions (more generally), can play the role of push factors that make people migrate (Lee 1966)”.

3. What does ‘push factor’ mean?
„… focus more on relative deprivation, exacerbated by inequality, as a basic determinant of people’s mobility”

4. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in PPS (Purchasing Power Standard) Index in 2011 (EU-27 = 100)
GDP (gross domestic product) is an indicator for a nation´s economic situation. It reflects the total value of all goods and services produced less the value of goods and services used for intermediate consumption in their production. Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing power standards) eliminates differences in price levels between countries, and calculations on a per head basis allows for the comparison of economies significantly different in absolute size.

5. What does ‘pull factors’ means?
Attracting selected groups of the labor force because of local/regional economic demand.

6. What can sociologists suggest?

7. “Structural conditions” are only a part of the story of migration, particularly because differences and inequalities are social facts, elements of the shape of modern open societies”.

8. „From one side, inequality can be seen as a basic element of competitive society (a sine qua non of capitalist maximalization). From another, it can call up pictures of barriers developing between people—as a consequence of the vertical division of labour, and with the consequence that vertical mobility tends to decrease as result of social barriers—and of a gulf between the “top” and the “bottom” of the society”.

9. What could influence the migration behavior?
The politics which could decrease or increase the tension to emigrate;
The construction of welfare relation (the welfare policy);
Past experiences related to horizontal mobility (as the cultural framework of mobility - generally).
Acceptability of migrations a strategy (which is a part of the social context)
The intensity of social change - deregulation (in the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century).

10. Situational context of Central European migration…

11. The system’s transformation within the context of increasing push factors in Central and Eastern Europe.
“the governments of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia were each spending on average about 10–15 percent of their GDP annually on pensions and other social security benefits [...]. This level of expenditure matched or even exceeded that of the more developed western countries, many of which had been struggling to control government spending and to reform their social security systems for more than two decades” (Inglot 2008).

12. The key moment of the Polish transformation process could be the second part of the 90s of the 20th century (1998), where began the fast reorientation of the Polish system of production towards the west European direction (the so called: Russian crisis ). This could be an important moment for explaining the factors of the mass emigration in the years

13. Subsidiarisation as a context of inequalities and migration
„In some cases there was even a kind of a social engineering effort to build the democratic state’s new institutions from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. In both the east and the west, the key notion in this process may be described as an aspect of liberal subsidiarization processes. Which means, it’s worth repeating, bringing responsibility for functions down to a lower level of authority and to the local community”.

14. „In the Polish case, and less so in the case of the Czech Republic, the darker sides of the […] transformation included the dynamic growth of unemployment (in Poland in the first decade of the twenty-first century, ten years after the start of the transformation, more than 20% of labour force was unemployed), and growing differentiation (asymmetric increases in different social segments, and in different positions in class structure) (Tomescu-Dubrow 2007). ”

15. „Looking at the basic indicator of social inequality—the Gini coefficient—at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the processes of social transformation did not have the same trajectories and consequences in all the involved countries and societies. Although states such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland now have a relatively high Gini coefficient […] far above the European average, the position of the Czech Republic is different”.

16. Finally, we observed the different trajectories of „social polarization” (inequalities) in consequence of the deregulation and marketisation in different national/social contexts. These tend to affect the different scale of international labor flow (hipotesis).

17. The Polish case

18. Migration ‘before’ accession to the UE
Before accession, in the terminology of Grabowska-Lusińska and Okólski, there was an “incomplete migration” which was invisible from one side, and which from the other side represented a sort of “refrigerator” of a segment of labour power endangered by unemployment (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009, pp. 39). They mentioned three main types of migration: (a) circulation migrations; (b) a short period migration; (c) long term migration (emigration in formal nomenclature).

19. Polish migration ‘after’ the accession to the EU
The migration and emigration (more than 12 months abroad) was much more often, much longer, much more legal, much more common…

20. The ‘typical’ Polish migrant to the UK or Ireland [after 2004]:

21. Polish migrant to the UK or Ireland [after 2004]: relatively young (based on Polish legal statistics, BAEL/OBM data), having in the case of pre-accession migration an average age of 32 years, or in later waves a little more than 31 years; more likely to be a man than a woman (183 men to every 100 women); possessing greater experience in the labour market (relative to the demographic structure of Polish society) than that of the average 20–29 year-old (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009, pp. 97).”

22. The reality of migration processes in different countries of the region seemed to be different.

23. Finally…
The migration factors seems to not belong to the one simple „scheme” of social reaction, which suggests both: social and cultural answers (than just simply the material deprivation picture). Reconceptualisation tends to move from „structural condition” (of the differences in income) to the „processual” relations based on socio-cultural facts. Possible elements of an explanation might consider the questions of how market-oriented were particular post communist societies, and how successful was the “gestalt switch”. As we know from social surveys, respondents’ orientations are sometimes very different, and may change over time.

24. The way in which we could conceptualized motives of emigration…
We can describe two aspects which may have an influence on the social mobility: 1) the personal aspect, which relates to individual rationality, individual motives, the individual condition of the person, as well as the person’s social attitudes, education, life expectations, and so on; and 2) the structural aspect (i.e. what are called “push factors” in the theory of migration behaviour), which in the case of Central and Eastern Europe can be very close to the concept of Durkheim-Merton anomy, or Sztompka’s transformational sociocultural trauma (Sztompka 2000), and which describes common labour relations, typical social mobility patterns, and institutional design.

25. The Eurequal project
“The purpose of Eurequal was to create and disseminate knowledge that would facilitate the achievement of greater social equality between individuals, social cohesiveness in societies, democratic and market development, and the broader integration of Europe”.

26. The main questions of Eurequal
How can we adequately measure the multifaceted character of social inequality?
What are the factors at the individual level that are most associated with the patterns of social inequality?
What characteristics of the economic, political and institutional arrangements of nations have the greatest positive and negative impact on social inequality?

27. What are the consequences of social inequality for individual and household economic behaviour, in particular for intra and inter-generational social mobility?
What are the consequences of social inequality for political attitudes, especially towards other social groups, and for political behaviour?
What are the consequences of social inequality for economic growth, democratic consolidation and international integration?

29. Table 2. Average answers to the question of the acceptability of emigration (five point Likert scale, from “definitely accepted” to “definitely not accepted”).  
Country/ descriptive statistics
Average
Standard deviation
Pearson correlation*
Belarus
2.73
1.776
0.386**
Bulgaria
2.47
1.479
0.236**
Czech Republic
2.21
1.282
0.115**
Estonia
2.26
1.318
0.258**
Hungary
2.82
1.443
Latria
1.204
0.250**
Lithuania
2.51
1.419
0.269**
Moldova
2.37
1.424
0.116**
Poland
2.09
1.139
0.185**
Romania
2.32
1.018
0.364**
Russia
2.81
1.751
0.326**
Slovakia
3.62
1.224
0.208**
Ukraine
2.16
1.347
0.352**

30. Answer to the question: have you ever worked abroad? (N, and in %)
Country
Yes No
Belarus 58
942
Moldova
184
858
5.8%
94.2%
17.7%
82.3%
Bulgaria 63
914
Poland
213
1268
6.4%
93.6%
14.4%
85.6%
Czech Rep. 81
910
Romania
126
1366
8.2%
91.8%
8.4%
91.6%
Estonia
149
903
Russia 70
1930
14.2%
85.8%
3.5%
96.5%
Hungary 48
982
Slovakia
159
873
4.7%
95.3%
15.4%
84.6%
Latvia
106
895
Ukraine 85
1299
10.6%
89.4%
6.1%
93.9%
Lithuania
111
889
11.1%
88.9%

31. Have you ever worked abroad? (N, and in percentages)
Moldova
Poland
Slovakia
male
female
all
> 25 N 17 10 27 16 26 20 37
% age
63.0
37.0
100.0
61.5
38.5
45.9
54.1
% sex
15.6
13.3
14.7
11.1
14.5
12.2
21.3
25.3
23.3
% all
9.2
5.4
7.5
4.7
10.7
12.6
26–37 64 42 21 63 24 43 67
57.8
42.2
66.7
33.3
35.8
64.2
33.9
36.0
34.8
29.2
30.4
29.6
30.0
54.4
42.1
20.1
19.7
9.9
15.1
27.0
38–49 25 23 48 35 15 50 11
52.1
47.9
70.0
70.3
29.7
22.9
30.7
26.1
24.3
21.7
23.5
32.5
13.9
13.6
12.5
16.4
7.0
6.9
50–61 12 31 41 2 14
65.7
34.3
75.6
24.4
85.7
14.3
21.1
16.0
19.0
21.5
19.2
15.0
2.5
8.8
All
6.5
14.6
1.3
62 <
N gen. 7 3 13 33 1 4
60.6
39.4
25.0
75.0
6.4
4.0
18.8
15.5
3.8
1.6
9.4
6.1 .6
1.9
109 75
184
144 69
213 80 79
159
59.2
40.8
67.6
32.4
50.3
49.7

32. Table 8. Standard deviation and average answers (Likert Scale from 1 (agreement) to 5 (disagreement)) to questions on expected government intervention (“What in your opinion is a duty of the state?”) in 13 European countries (the five lowest values of standard deviation are indicated by the numbers in brackets, 1 being the lowest).

33. Country code
Gov.
/Job
/health care
/old people
/unemployed
/housing
/childcare
Belarus (average)
1.55
1.40
1.39
2.55
2.68
1.72
Standard deviation
1.079
.997
1.059
1.646
1.934
1.275
Bulgaria (average)
1.58
1.23
1.21
1.99
1.69
.925
.594 (4)
.584
1.050 (2)
1.326
1.236
Czech Rep. (average)
1.68
1.22
1.33
2.54
1.49
1.116
0.548 (3)
.791
1.605
1.631
.874
Estonia (average)
1.81
1.26
1.27
2.15
2.19
1.64
1.152
.654 (5)
.692
1.459
1.587
1.278
Hungary (average)
1.29
2.09
1.38
.806 (2)
.659
.766
1.199
1.292
.803
Latvia (average)
1.51
1.19
2.01
1.62
.956
.544 (2)
.649
1.299
1.040
.895
Lithuania (average)
1.36
1.44
1.97
2.25
1.85
1.058
.721
.892
1.468
1.777
1.426
Moldova (average)
1.43
1.42
1.59
1.65
1.54
.899 (5)
.837
.872
1.021 (1)
1.003
1.024
Poland (average)
1.48
1.25
2.14
1.60
.888 (4)
.583 (3)
.639
1.541
1.562
1.124
Romania (average)
1.46
1.24
1.57
1.50
.821 (3)
.745
.788
1.071 (4)
1.048
Russia (average)
1.47
2.24
2.16
1.56
1.002
.751
.713
1.665
1.772
1.178
Slovakia (average)
1.52
1.98
2.00
.613
.694
1.068 (3)
1.296
.934
Ukraine (average)
1.16
1.15
1.91
.487 (1)
.433 (1)
.459
1.470
1.674

34. Final statement
I. As we know (based on the EUREQUAL data), in postcommunist countries the role of the state in relation to problems of employment, healthcare, and the care of old people being a more active one is relatively commonly accepted. Expectations sometimes tend to construct a whole complex etatist syndrome (as in Hungary, for example), or sometimes it may split into a different vision when the problems of employment, healthcare, or (as in the Polish case) pensions play the crucial role.

35. “welfare policy arguments and institutions exacerbate or ameliorate existing social cleavages and conflicts” (Glass, Marquart-Pyatt, 2007), which in my interpretation may in certain social environments result in more or less high migration tendencies”.

36. II. „Inappropriate solutions in the welfare regime may be one of important factors which can increase structural pressure, but at the same time there are no universal rules, and there are—in my opinion—more conditions which distinguish the positions of the citizens of, say, Estonia (where migration is still at a low level), from its neighbour Latvia, where the level of migration is significantly higher”.

37. III. “The second important factor relates to the more conscious aspects, an element of the comparison of the chances that the whole system will make “progress” (that is, will in the future result in improved conditions for the individual), with the possibilities of misfortunes in the local community where potential migrants live, all of which may—once again—strengthen or weaken the “push” (to migrate)”.

38. III. The third aspect is related to the cultural process of internalizing the “exit” strategy [not „voice” in Hirschman view] as an element of universal ideology which creates visions and gives the tools to solve individual problems outside of the context of one society. This is strong in Poland.

39. This third aspect could be either analysed as a much more longue durée factor, and in this sense reinforces the more general atmosphere of emigration as a solution in the way of the “diffusion of innovations”, where migration experiences are collected in individual histories, and become an element of the culture. This third element is in my opinion relatively significant”.

40. Politics or policy reasons for emigration (Iveta Ķešāne, Emigration as a Strategy of Everyday Politics: the Case of Latvian Labour Emigrants in Ireland)
„The free movement of labour gave a legal opportunity to many Latvians to go abroad in order to earn their livelihood, to provide for their families, and also to find self-esteem and fulfilment”.

41. „ An analysis of the post-Soviet societies by Sztompka (2004) demonstrates that the period following transition shows that much was unexpected about the change, and that the society was not prepared for it. This is despite the fact that Latvians largely welcomed the collapse of the socialist regime and the transition towards the west. In reference to Durkheim, Sztompka refers to this condition as the “anomie of success” (Sztompka, 2004; 157, 158)”

42. The politics/policy way of conceptualising emigration
the question of governance becomes the question of self-governance in the discourse and technique of emigration.

43. Understanding of power and self relation to the power (governmentality) …
„‘governmentality’ implies the relation of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of ‘governmentality’ to cover the whole range of practices that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use... (Foucault, 2003: 41)” From the 1984 interview, “Concordia”, Revisita internacional de filosophia 6.

44. Interviews
I gave birth to my youngest daughter when I was forty... she finished Gaujienas Secondary School, and then I understood that there’s nothing she can do in Alūksne. There’s nothing to do anywhere (HYAN) I had a good marriage, good education, the children were growing. We were hoping that we would graduate from university and have better salaries. And then everything went to rack and ruin (SLRH)

45. and other…
We paid an employment agency to find a job. But it was all totally wrong. In our rural area, where we used to live, two big fish processing factories went bankrupt. That was just because there were no cheaters with golden necklaces there, for example, investors, shareholders, the ones able to subordinate. A lot of money has been lost, everyone suffered financial losses. Maybe that is the reason why...There were practically no ways out anymore... (LMNF)

46. …
„ I had entered the Polytechnic Institute and graduated from the Technical University [the name of institution was changed after Latvia regained independence]. That was the last year that people studied for five years [...] And we were the last graduates who were neither bachelors nor masters. Also there were no appointments to jobs, nothing—look for a job yourself! And at that moment nobody needed anything anymore and it was like the Russians used to say, kupi i praday [buy and sell]. The most important thing was to trade, to launder money, and at that moment nobody thought about specialists anymore (KGFC)”

47. …
I was working in the fish processing factories as a head engineer. I had a disagreement with the employer. It was an issue with a lawyer and all...There was nowhere to complain. There was just one solution: to find a job somewhere else; back at that time I went to Riga to look for a job somewhere. [...] In Riga, they told me that I’m too old and they can’t take me. We need young, forward looking people! Then they told me that they didn’t need me (LMNF)

48. Finally
„… labour emigration from Latvia, at the time of the transition, was for some of the emigrants a type of protest against these new ways of living and the way they were articulated in Latvia, and that emigration provided a mode of “exit” for these people. Moses (2007) ”.

49. “The analysis of emigrants’ self-problematization at the time of their decision demonstrates that it is a strategy of everyday politics for the reason that it attempts to resists and evade limitations set by the mode of state governance and instead increasingly relying on self government”. …

50. Emigration and inequalities in the destination country (Guglielmo Meardi, Labour mobility, union immobility? Trade unions & migration in the EU)
Inequalities and migration in the EU labour market - is it a problem?

51. “In debates on the liberalization of the movement of services in the EU (the so-called Bolkenstein Directive), on freedom of movement, and in legal cases concerning “social dumping” in the European Court of Justice, migrants from the new EU member states are often portrayed as a threat to established worker rights in Western Europe”.

52. The case of trade unions

53. The context of perceivd inequalities
“Current debates on labour markets are frequently framed within an ‘insider-outsider’ model. Typically, insiders would be middle-aged male local workers belonging to the ethnic majority, with no disability, while the most typical outsiders are migrants. To guarantee the perpetuation of their advantageous position, insiders have a number of institutional devices—the most typical of which, it is argued, is the trade union”.

54. The diagnosis from the past
“The insider-outsider idea of migration is rooted in structuralist conceptions of the labour market of Piore (1979), who argued that capitalist economies require continuous flows of new migrants in order to maintain occupational hierarchies, that is to provide labour for low-prestige occupations (marginal jobs). Without migrants, employers would have to pay local workers considerably higher salaries to take these positions, which in turn would have caused demands for higher pay from workers in mainstream jobs, who would not accept being paid as little as those in marginal jobs”.

55. Migrants are necessary for “keeping” salaries low, and balancing the costs of the labor market Should trade unions be against migrants (from local labour perspectives)?

56. “The distinction between insiders and outsiders varies by country, and among industrialized economies it is assumed to be strongest in “Southern European” and “Continental” welfare states, especially Germany (Ferrera, Hemerijck, and Rhodes 2000), and Austria”. but there is the opposite tendency...

57. The pressure of the illegal economy… Why labour union help migrant workers
Watts (2002) reiterates the point on internationalization in the case of the shifts of French, Spanish, and Italian unions towards open migration policies. She also adds two more factors: the importance of the illegal economy (especially in Italy and Spain), with the consequent union interest in channelling migrants towards legal status; and organizational needs in the face of declining membership

58. Restriction policy
“Although they did not formally take a position against enlargement or against the principle of freedom of movement, some western trade unions, especially the German and Austrian ones, supported the introduction of transition periods as protection for the host country labor markets”.

59. Polish plumber is coming to the stage
“The mythical figure of the ‘Polish plumber’ was a crucial factor in the French rejection of the European Constitution in the referendum of May Real tensions emerged in the transport sector, and major disputes occurred in both transport and construction (sectors where labour mobility is a normal occurrence)”.

60. Strategy ‘exit’ or ‘voice’
Strategy ‘exit’ or ‘voice’. The results of the policy of the open labour market
Even if the “voice” of employees in the new member states has remained feeble, their massive exit has forced employers, and to a lesser extent governments, to introduce important concessions, leading to higher than expected wage growth and some improvements in employment conditions.

61. The ‘exit’ and the ‘voice’ is back…

62. The integration perspective
“innovative practices such as cooperation with ethnic associations (e.g. with the Polish Catholic Association in Birmingham) and the setting up of Polish-language sections (in Southampton and Glasgow)” “focused on two particularly important antidotes to migrant exploitation: provision of information on employment rights, and skills—including recognition qualifications and English language skills”.

63. “The most significant activity has been the cooperation with eastern European trade unions (mostly Polish, given the “critical mass” of Polish migration), leading to the posting of organizers from the Polish trade unions Solidarity and OPZZ to UK and Ireland, which in turn facilitated the recruitment of activists and organizers among migrants.”

64. “Most notably, major developments have occurred in cross-border cooperation, especially in the border regions, through the Interregional Trade Union Councils (seven of them involve Austrian or German trade unions and partners from the new member states). In 2006, for instance, DGB, Ver.di and Solidarity jointly protested in the border region against a megastore that was violating worker rights (Szewczyk and Unterschütz 2009). In May 2009, a Polish-German trade union forum was launched in Gdańsk.”

65. A different situations exists in services…

66. Final statement
“Migration provides more opportunities than just the movement of services. In particular, migration seems to make it easier for trade unions to “humanize” foreign workers and develop solidarities with them, than does the simple existence of remote foreign subsidiaries. Regarding the freedom of movement of services, the opportunities for socialization are minimal, and the only positive effects come indirectly from broader European labour socialization, in which nationalism tends to be sidelined.

67. Supplement: another beginning by Ettore Recchi
Cross-state mobility in the EU, “European Societies” nr 2, 2008.

68. Start…
1951 the decision about free movements for coal and steel workers; … to 2004, and 2007 enlargement to the EU correlated with the policy of opening labour markets. “That is, the original and revolutionary programme of the founding fathers toward the creation of a truly supra-national economic, social and political space”.

69. And cross-boarder mobility increase
From 1987 to 2004 From 14.4 millions to 21.4 millions Why in theory people migrate (in the perspectives of the author): “If a national economy does not grow, work opportunities shrink; if wages are higher abroad, people have an increase motivation to leave”.

70. Inflows of EU non-nationals (from country to country before enlargement).

71. The highest inflows (amount of inhabitants)…
“Leader” of inflows: Germany (314 thousands) Spain (178 thousands); the UK (162 thousands); Italy (56 thousands). The traditional direction: south north is disputed

72. What are the destinations preferred by Germans, Brits, French?
The highest amount of Germans emigrated to the UK, Spain and Austria; Britons emigrated to Spain; The French preferred Germany and the UK.

73. And the East-Central part of Europe

74. Where did Polish inhabitants emigrated before accession (2003)?
Germany (79 thousands);
Spain (4 thousands);
Austria (3 thousands);
The Nederland (3 thousands).

75. We could noticed increase…
… in number of workers from the UE countries in comparison with 80s, and 90s of the 20th century. But still the tension from outside the UE is higher (till 2008). Generally: (1) technological changes and innovations increase knowledge and activate mobility (people collect information about the quality of life abroad); (2) the policy of integration increase mobility which is a part of EU doctrine and ideology (Erasmus, Marie Curie projects etc.).

76. Years since 1986 to 2004. The mobility and other factors

77. Who emigrated (western perspective)?
“Generally speaking, traditional receiving countries of intra-European migration, like Germany, Sweden, and France, host a less educated population of working age EU movers: those with a tertiary-level degree are 14.4, 22.4 and 25.2 percent, respectively”. The UK and Germany attract (pull) different workers. Germany lower educated, the UK higher…

78. Answers?
1. It could be the specificity between services (UK), and production (DE). The core is the specificity of the economy. 2. The different perspectives could be either generational (it could answer questions about direction: North South). The core is the specificity of the welfare regime.

79. How the well-educated emigrated?
“The education of the EU non-nationals has improved markedly from If in the mid-1990s only 14 percent of intra-EU movers had tertiary degree, in 2005 this is the case for almost a quarter of them”. We could suggest: “The upgrading of the education level of UE movers has exceeded that of the general population. The author suggest: “UE movers now a positively selected population in terms of education”.

80. Three levels of education (comparison of nationals (N) and non-N)

81. The periphery perspective of the immigration in C&E Europe?

82. The polarization of the service sector
“… <<service sector>> is distinguished into two separate categories: a low-level sector (mainly including personal service activities) and mid-high level sector (in which non-manual activities are the main role). In the low level service sector, UE15 non-nationals are more frequently employed than nationals, but less than third-country nationals”.

83. Mobility for what?
The theoretical pictures of migration... Free movement as employment insurance (unemployment increase pushes up pressure) “… the size of migratory response to unemployment differentials is so low that it would take more than a decade for unemployment inequalities to be evened out by regional or international labor mobility in the EU”.

84. …
A different situation was noticed in the 1980s.

85. Free movement as productivity enhancer (the mismatch between skills and jobs “is working” as a push factor)”. We find in Europe a relatively high level of unemployment ergo: “European economies suffer in an incapacity to allocate human capital efficiently”. A part of this problem relates to insufficient level of the mobility of the labor force. “Unemployment and especially underemployment are the individual consequences, and a loss of productivity the aggregate outcome”.

86. but is the problem…
There is no scientific evidence, an we should discus a different perspective of explanation: “Productivity derives from both general human capital (gained via education) and specific human capital (gained via on-the-job training). The former is fixed, while the latter tends to grow with job tenure. The more productivity depends on specific human capital, the more it profits from immobility”.

87. Free movement as an innovation trigger (the relation between geographical mobility and technological innovation). “Even when immigration and innovations areas coincide, this is no proof of a causal link between the two phenomena. “A well known-known enthusiast of diversity and city life as a stimuli of creativity, in fact Florida found no significant correlation between total immigration inflow and innovation in American metropolitan areas. Key to technological progress is rather the ‘density of brains’. The mobility of the highly qualified is a way to achieve such as density”.

88. Creative class

89. Free movement as a EU legitimizing tool (mobility goes hand by hand with stronger legitimacy of the EU) “Cross-state migrants have a much more positive image of the EU, feel a stronger attachment to the EU and perceived themselves as more knowledgeable about European institutions and policies than people who stay put in their countries of origin”.

90. How attached do you feel to the EU?

91. Mobility motives
“work-driven mobility, which dominated the European area until the early 1970s, and increased after the waves of enlargement 2004 and 2007” (I was calling it the ‘structural motive’ or affect by push factors);
“… by the personal and affective relationship (I was calling it as personal motives or pull factors);
“quality of life motivated mobility, that is the desire of living in a better social and natural environment (I was calling it as personal motives or pull factors).

92. The contemporary Eurostat rapport about a discrimination and migrants (Special Eurobarometer 393, 2012)
The survey results reveal that the social circles of Europeans are steadily becoming more diverse (more open). But what should be emphasized here is that there is no such category as migrants as a discriminated group. I will analyze relation to nation/ethnic and religion/belifs.

93. Social environment (how diverse)

94. How many “outsiders”

95. Being politicians

96. Widespread or rare

97. Outside the work

98. Ethnic discrimination

99. Religion, beliefs

100. By sex, age, education, and politics

101. By…

103. Summing up
The level of perceived discrimination is decreasing with times. There are more divers experiences within various groups (who potentially could be discriminated against). There are perceived factors of discriminations.