1. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS / Part 2 Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng. antony.thanos@gmail.com

2. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if  Setting of questions : “What (will happen) if…?” for the examination of evolution of undesired initial events (deviations from design, normal operation) in small sections of establishment  Areas covered by questions : oEquipment failures oHuman errors (sequence of actions etc.) oOperating conditions deviations from normal oExternal events

3. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Examples of questions : oWhat-if tank level is very high ? (deviation from normal) oWhat-if gas phase connection valve remains closed during LPG tank loading ? (human error)

4. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Examples of questions for piping : oWhat-if pipe leaks ? oWhat-if pipe is plugged ? oWhat-if pipe is subject to pressure surge ? o……. Please contribute……

5. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Examples of questions for piping : (cont.) oWhat-if pipe is subject to sudden flow interruption (water hammer issues) ? oWhat-if pipe is subject to vibration ? oWhat-if pipe supports fail ? oWhat-if pipe temperature rises ?

6. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Examples of questions for heat exchangers : oWhat-if feed temperature increases ? oWhat-if flow stops in hot feed ? o……. Please contribute……

7. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Examples of questions for heat exchangers : (cont.) oWhat-if flow stops in cold feed ? oWhat-if there is excessive fouling ? oWhat-if there is tube failure ?

8. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Example What-if table for Road tanker movement during loading What if Hazard / Consequence SafeguardsProposals Tanker moves Hose rupture, LPG leak Handbrake on Blocks (shoes) on tyres Break-away couplings

9. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.) Please apply What-if in vessel FI LC LIT LCV PRV HV

10. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Example What-if table What if Hazard / Consequence SafeguardsProposals Level rises Overpressure and vessel failure LIC controls level in vessel Install Level Alarm High (LAH) Modify HV to automatically and remote operated for shutting vessel feed line Pressure rises Vessel failurePSVInstall redundant PSV

11. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Example What-if table (cont.) What if Hazard / Consequence SafeguardsProposals LIT fails with no signal provided Level control fails, potential high level undetected Install redundant LIT and alarm for bad quality level measurement LCV fails and stucks at position Level control fails, potential high level LIT provided indication of level Install Level Alarm High (LAH) Modify HV to automatically and remote operated for shutting vessel feed line

12. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Advantages : oSimple oApplicable even in rather early stage of design oCorrelates hazards, causes and protection measures oGeneral questions can be applied in every process : e.g. “What will happen if instrument air supply fails?”

13. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Advantages : (cont.) oEffectively applied with combination of check lists oLimited time requirements (in the order of 8 days for large processes)

14. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium What-if (cont.)  Disadvantages : oNot strictly defined oSuccess heavily depends on experience of work team and questions set oHazards can be easily overlooked oNo evaluation of deviation cause oNo evaluation of deviation cause (e.g. why tank level is very low, why tanker moved?)  Can be considered as suitable for Safety Report, but proper judgment for “what-if” questions is necessary

15. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis)  Focus on events caused by component failures and not to deviations of operating parameters  Bottom-up approach (initial failure to top event)  Origin from military applications ( MIL-P-1629)

16. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  FMEA development :  Identification of sub-systems to be examined  Identification of equipment/components per sub- system  Definition of failure type per equipment (failure cause could also be defined)  Definition of outcomes per failure (assuming that protection measures are not in operation)  Identification of safeguards (protection measures)  Proposals

17. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  General failure types : oFailure in operation (e.g. unintended stop of agitator) oFailure to operate at prescribed time (e.g. agitator failure to start when required by process) o Failure to cease operation at prescribed time (e.g. feed valve failure to close after necessary time to feed reactor – batch process) oOperation at premature time (e.g. pump starts before discharge valve opens)

18. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Effects (outcomes) types: Local/System  Can be complemented with probability calculations and severity estimation (FMECA variation of method)  Applicable widely also in electronics aviation, space, automobile industry  Indispensable for reliability concept. Essential method in Safety Integrity Level (SIL) evaluation (FMEDA variation of method)

19. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.) Example of simplified results table for LPG road tanker loading hose ElementFailureEffectsDetection/ Compensation (Safeguards) Proposal LPG Road tanker hose Hose leaks LPG leak with fire Regular testing / inspection of hose Install remote operated isolation valve in both PG establishment and road tanker piping

20. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.) Please apply FMEA to regulating valve (FCV) at reactor inlet FI LC LIT LCV PRV FCV

21. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Example FMEA table ElementFailureEffectsDetection/ Compensation (Safeguards) Proposal Reactant flow control valve (FCV) Failure in full open position High reactant flow to reactor High level to reactor, overpressure Local flow indicator (FI) in feed line Level indicator transmitter (LIT) signal to Distributed Control System (DCS), automatic level control by LCV Flow indicator transmitter (FIT) with signal to DCS and flow alarm high (FAH) High/High-High alarm from level transmitter (LAHH) Independent high-high level switch (LSHH) with interlock to feeding pump operation

22. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Advantages : oStrictly defined and systematic method (IEC 60812) oDirect correlation of hazards and causes and effects oEasily applied in systems with simple and in- series failures

23. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Disadvantages : oEmphasis only to component failures and not to deviations caused by failures in other processes oOnly single failures are used oHard to implement in systems where hazards appear as outcome of failure combinations (undetectable failures must be checked for potential hazards in combination with other failures)

24. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Disadvantages : (cont.) oHuman errors are not easily encountered (only indirectly by component failures incurred) oNot focused on system/process behaviour oExperienced personnel required oTime consuming (in the order of 4 weeks for large systems )

25. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium FMEA (cont.)  Can be considered as suitable for Safety Reports under the condition of human errors taken into account

26. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree  Fault tree development : oAccident (top event) selection oAccident causes identification (all intermediate events contributing to top event, 1 st stage) oIdentification of all events (2 nd stage) contributing to 1 st stage events ….. o… down to basic fault events (component faults)

27. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree (cont.)  Top-down approach  Application of Boolean algebra operands (AND, OR) for definition of sequence for failures and errors (incl. human) contributing to accident  Origin from military application (Bell laboratories, 1962, Minuteman I ICBM) Missile)  Applicable in electronics, aviation, space and nuclear industry, robotics  Results presented in logic diagram form

28. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree (cont.)  Example : Overfilling of NH 3 road tanker TOXIC RELEASE FROM SAFETY VALVE OVERFILLING LOADINGS OPER.FAILS TO IDENTIFY LI FAILURE OPERATOR ABSENT DURING LOADING LEVEL INDICATOR (LI) FAILURE 200 per year OR AND 10 -6 per year 4x10 -4 per year 10 -3 per year 2x10 -6 per year 1x10 -6 per year AND

29. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree (cont.)  Advantages : oWell defined (IEC 61025) oCorrelation of hazards and causes oCombinations of human errors and equipment failures can be identified oAccident probability calculations possible, if failure/error database is available oSupplement to other techniques (e.g. what- if, HAZOP) for more detailed examination of causes for significant accidents

30. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree (cont.)  Disadvantages : oComplete dependence on final accidents (top events) selected for building trees oNot all top events guarantied to be identified oSequence errors not easily taken into account oHigh experienced personnel and proper software required oTime consuming (in the order of 2 months for large processes)

31. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Fault tree (cont.)  Can be considered as suitable for Safety Report, but judgment is necessary on completion of top events considered

32. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) Study  Hazards and malfunctions are expressed via deviation of operating parameters from normal values, or due to human errors, equipment failures  Usual parameters to be examined : oPressure oTemperature oFlow oLevel

33. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Usual deviation keywords : Ομάδα HAZOP KeywordsDeviation interpretation Νο Lack/absence, e.g. No flow : zero flow No mixing : mixer failure More Value higher than normal, e.g. More Temperature : higher temperature, e.g. high temperature in cooling water due to cooling system failure Less Value lower than normal, e.g. Less pressure : Lower pressure, e.g. product withdrawal from tank while PVV stuck ReverseUsually refers to flow with direction reverse to normal

34. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Usual deviation keywords (cont.) : Ομάδα HAZOP KeywordsDeviation interpretation Part ofFraction of normal value, usually for solutions concentration As well as Qualitative increase, as for new phase development, or presence of impurities (e.g. water in anydrous ammonia, corrosive) Before/after Errors in operations sequence, e.g. addition of sulphuric acid before water in dilution tank during solution preparation Early/lateAction in wrong time (e.g. early stop of batch reaction)

35. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Usual deviation keywords (cont.) : Ομάδα HAZOP KeywordsDeviation interpretation Loss of Containment Any event of “Loss of Containment”, not attributed to operation deviation, e.g. Leak from tank failure due to weld failure Collision of road tanker Utilities failure e.g.lack of instrument air or electric power for pneumatic/motorized valves (lack of control action), lack of cooling water supply Environmental Earthquakes, floods, lightnings Other than Complete substitution, e.g. wrong stream feed (for example, feed of propane in butane line)

36. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP examination sessions overview Ομάδα HAZOP Step 3 Comments, proposals Step 1 Design comprehension Step 2 Systematic examination of deviations KeywordParameter NO LOW HIGH AS WELL AS Flow Pressure Temperature HAZOP Table COMMENTS / PROPOSALS SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES CAUSESDEVIATION P-1 Nr P-2 HAZOP Team

37. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP steps Ομάδα HAZOP Key-words application Identificatio n of deviation causes Consequences, safeguards identification Discussion, comments, proposals Next parameter Design comprehension Unit Section (P&ID) Next section

38. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Unit/Sections (Nodes) identification based on main activities. Definition of Section borderlines and related drawings  Sections identification examples : oPipeline from port to tank oTank oTank pump-house oRoad tanker loading station Ομάδα HAZOP

39. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Main equipment definition per Section  Equipment example for Road Tanker loading station : oLiquid phase piping from pump-house oGas phase return piping to tank oHoses/loading arms oRoad tanker Ομάδα HAZOP

40. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Before each session, Leader defines Section to be examined  An outline of operation for Section has to be given (appr. 15 min), so that all group members understand the basic elements of process examined Ομάδα HAZOP

41. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Example case Ομάδα HAZOP FI LC LIT LCV PRV FCV

42. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Table example for feed line :  Please apply HAZOP for high level and high pressure in reactor Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 5 High flowFailure of feed control valve at open position High level in reactor and potential overpressure FI (local indicator) LIT (remote indicator transmitter) (R) FIT (remote flow transmitters) with flow high alarm (FAH) HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY Company :ABC S.A.Drawing :S-9871 (31/12/03) Site :XYZ SiteHAZOP Date :01/10/13 Unit :U-1234 Work group :See attendance list Section:Reactor feed lineRev. : 5

43. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Table example (cont.): Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 76 High pressure High level in reactor High temperature in feed Blocked PSV due to ice accumulation in discharge pipe Reactor failurePSV(R) As product is very toxic, include rupture disc upstream PSV in order to avoid product (toxic) dispersion in case of PSV leakage (R) Light weight cup in PSV discharge pine HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY Company :ABC S.A.Drawing :S-9871 (31/12/03) Site :XYZ SiteHAZOP Date :04/10/13 Unit :U-1234 Work group :See attendance list Section:Reactor vesselRev. : 5

44. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Table example (cont.): Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 75 High levelFailure of either feed (open) or product (closed) valve Reactor overpressure LIT (remote indicator) Level control valve (LCV) (C) Check that error in LIT provides error signal to DCS and last good value is not retained (R) Provide level alarm high (LAH) and high – LAHH) from LIT signal HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY Company :ABC S.A.Drawing :S-9871 (31/12/03) Site :XYZ SiteHAZOP Date :04/10/13 Unit :U-1234 Work group :See attendance list Section:Reactor vesselRev. : 5

45. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Table example (cont.): Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 75 High level (R) Provide level high- high switch (LHHS) from independent level transmitter forcing trip of feed pump HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY Company :ABC S.A.Drawing :S-9871 (31/12/03) Site :XYZ SiteHAZOP Date :04/10/13 Unit :U-1234 Work group :See attendance list Section:Reactor vesselRev. : 5

46. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Study organisation  HAZOP team structure oLeader/facilitator oRecorder (Scribe) oMembers (design, operator, maintenance, H&S, I&C, inspection) Ομάδα HAZOP Team formation P&IDs study Examination sessions

47. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP Team oUsually 4-12 members oVery small groups lack broad disciplines, oVery large groups proceed very slowly and have limited discussions between members Ομάδα HAZOP

48. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP leader oFacilitator of team operation oKeeps team on track oAvoid unnecessary delays (e.g. unclear issues which need additional information to be provided in later stage) oFollows up pending issues oExperienced in HAZOP method application oNot necessarily a technical expert on the process Ομάδα HAZOP

49. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.) oHAZOP Members disciplines : oDesign oOperator oMaintenance oHealth and Safety (H&S) oInstrumentation and Control (I&C) oInspection o…. Ομάδα HAZOP

50. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP examination sessions organisation: oPredefined oParticipants presence verified oParticipants do not leave during meeting (dedicated time) Ομάδα HAZOP

51. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP examination sessions : oUsually 2-3 hours, up to 4-6 hours oLonger sessions result to actually slower progress and bad quality of results due to group fatigue oSessions must not be interrupted oSuccessive days should be avoided if possible Ομάδα HAZOP

52. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Necessary support material for examination session to begin : oUpdated P&IDs “ Carrying out a HAZOP on a incorrect line diagram is the most useless occupation in the world”, Trevor Kletz oPlot plans oFlow sheets oOperating manuals, control documentation Ομάδα HAZOP

53. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Necessary support material for examination session to begin (cont.) : oESD procedures oEquipment specifications oSDS oAccident reports  Support material available to HAZOP team at least 1 week before sessions to begin Ομάδα HAZOP

54. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  HAZOP examination session room : oSufficient space, isolated from other activities oBig table available oLaptop for HAZOP table entry during session oWall/floor stand for drawings oProjector for clarifications presentation (if necessary, especially in large groups) Ομάδα HAZOP

55. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Advantages : oWell defined (IEC 61882) oWidely applied and recognised oSystematic and comprehensive - nevertheless creative- technique oSystem (process) oriented (developed by ICI) oCovers both causes and effects of hazards, along with safeguards, in a robust format oHuman errors and equipment failures can be identified

56. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Disadvantages : oMature design data are needed (not suitable for early design stages) oInteractions between sections not straightforward examined oSpecial hazards need use of special keywords

57. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  Disadvantages : (cont.) oRather time consuming (in the order of 4 weeks for large processes) oPlant layout issues not inherently taken into account  Can be considered as suitable for Safety Reports Nevertheless, please do not forget …

58. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP (cont.)  “A HAZOP is no substitute for knowledge and experience. It is not a sausage machine which consumes line diagrams and produces lists of modifications. It merely harnesses the knowledge and experience of the team in a systematic and concerned way”, Trevor Kletz

59. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree  Logic evolution of potential outcomes (top event) of an initial event  Bottom-up approach  Results in tree form (sequence of failures leading to accident)  Safety measures taken into account

60. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree (cont.)  Development of event tree : oSelection of initial events, such as : process upset (e.g. high pressure) equipment failure (e.g. hose rupture) human error (e.g. closure of valve at pump discharge)

61. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree (cont.)  Development of event tree : (cont.) oFor each initial event, identification of safety measures, such as : equipment for prevention of further escalation of upsets (e.g. PSV for high pressure upset, emergency shut down systems) alarms (if mitigation actions are possible) operator actions (e.g. operator closes remote- operated isolation valves in loading station and road tanker) mitigation equipment (e.g. water courtains)

62. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event Tree (cont.)  Example case for high flow to reactor (assuming containing LPG) Ομάδα HAZOP FI LC LIT LCV PRV FCV

63. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree (cont.)  Example tree INITIAL EVENT LCVPSVIGNITIONTOP EVENT LCV OPERATES SAFE HIGH FLOW LCV FAILS PSV OPENSIMMEDIATEJET FLAME DELAYED FLASH FIRE/UCVE PSV FAILSBLEVE (FIREBALL)

64. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree (cont.)  Usually used in categorisation of final accidents (top events) per initial release identified (e.g. jet flame after failure of pipeline due to corrosion)  Typical top events : Pool fire,BLEVE (fire ball) Flash fireUVCE Toxic dispersionMissiles  Technique in the borderline of hazard identification and consequence analysis

65. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Event tree (cont.)  Advantages : oCan be combined with probabilities calculation for initial event and conditions for top event calculations oCan be used in combination with Fault Trees  Disadvantages : oTotal dependence on initial event selection oVery complex in large processes oTime consuming (8 weeks for large processes)

66. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Bow-Tie  Combination of Fault Tree and Event Tree  Development of Bow-Tie : oSelection of critical event oIdentification of causes leading to critical event (fault tree side) oIdentification of development of critical event to top event/final accident (event tree side) oSafety measures (safety barriers) included : oprevention (fault tree side) omitigation/recovery (event tree side)

67. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Bow-tie simplified example, LPG hose rupture THREATS HOSE RUPTURE Tanker moves Material failure Handbreak on Break-away couplings Inspection OR Remote isolation valves Deluge system PREVENTIONBARRIERS MITIGATIONBARRIERS TOP EVENT (final accident) Safe dispersion Ignition control Flash fire VCE (ignition outside) Jet flame/ BLEVE

68. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Bow-Tie  Advantages : oEffective in early stage of design for identification of safety measures required oEasy to develop, understand and communicate (graphical illustration of problem) oNot high expertise necessary oVisible links to competencies, systems compoments, HSE issues

69. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Bow-Tie  Disadvantages : oTotal dependence on top event selection oVery complex in large processes, oversimplifications possible oPossible confusion on relation of mitigation measures with initial causes

70. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Conclusion for Hazard Identification Methods  Not suit fits all  Technique selection depends on: oproject maturity stage (concept, early design, detailed design, existing establishment) osystem complexity orequired outcomes (quantitative/ qualitative results)

71. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature for Hazard Identification Methods  Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Elsevier Butterworth Heinemann, 3 nd Edition, 2005  Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, CCPS-AICHE, 2 nd Edition,, 1995  Procedures for performing Effective pre-Startup Safety Reviews, CCPS- AICHE, 2007  HSL, Review of Hazard Identification Techniques, HSL/2005/58  Nolan D., Application of HAZOP and What-if Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries, Noyes Publications, 1994  Vincoly J., Basic Guide to System Safety, John Wiley and Sons, 2 nd Edition, 2006  DOE Handbook, Chemical Process Hazards Analysis, US DOE, DOE- HDBK-1100-2004

72. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature for Hazard Identification Techniques (cont.)  Methods for Determining and Processing Probabilities, Red Book, CPR12E, VROM, 2005  RIVM, Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessments, 2009  DOW Fire and Explosion Index, AICHE, 7th Edition, 1994  The basics of FMEA, CRC Press, 2 nd Edition, 2009  Guide Dépôts de Liquides Inflammables, Groupe de Travail Dépôt de Liquides Inflammables (GTDLI), 2008 (in French, default fault trees included)  Syed Zaiful Hamzah, ABS Group, Use Bow Tie Tool for Easy Hazard Identification, 14th Asia Pacific Confederation of Chemical Engineering Congress Singapore, 21-24 February 2012

73. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Literature for Hazard Identification Techniques (cont.)  API RP 14C, Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Off-shore Production Platforms, 7th Edition, 2001  API RP 14J, Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis for Off-shore Production Facilities, 2nd Edition, 2001  IEC 31010, Risk Management -Risk Assessment Techniques, 2009  IEC 60300, Dependability management, Part 3-1 Application guide – Analysis techniques for dependability – Guide on methodology, 2003  IEC 60812, Analysis techniques for system reliability – Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), 2nd Edition, 2006  IEC 61025, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 2nd Edition, 2006  IEC 61882, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Application Guide, 2001