1. Towards a New Naming Architectures
Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker, and many others…

2. Goals Support Make middle-boxes part of architecture Security …
Mobility: machine, data, session
Multi-homing, multiple-interfaces
Make middle-boxes part of architecture
Security
Better support against DDoS
Anonymity …

3. Designs Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Semantic-Free Referencing (SFR)
Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)

4. Designs Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Semantic-Free Referencing (SFR)
Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)

5. Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Provides:
Fast mobility
Multi-homing
Support for different addressing schemes
Transparent IPv4 to IPv6 migration
Security
Anonymity
Secure and authenticate datagrams

6. HIT replaces IP address as a name
HIP
A public key used to identify an end-host
A 128-bit host identity tag (HIT) used for system calls
HIT is a hash on public key
Global scope
A 32-bit local scope identifier (LSI) for IPv4 compatibility
HIT replaces IP address as a name
of a system

7. Protocol Stack Process Process Transport <IPaddr, port>
<HIT, port>
IP Layer
HIP Layer
<IPaddr>
<HIT>
IP Layer
<IPaddr>

8. How It Works? Client app Client app DNS library DNS Transport
HIT
DNS request
Client app
Client app
DNS
library
DNS
DNS reply = pubkey (P)
send(HIT)
HIT=hash(P)
IPaddr
Transport
Transport
HIP
daemon
4-way authentication
HIP
daemon
HIT
HIP Layer
IPaddr, P
HIP layer
send(IPaddr)
IPsec
IPsec

9. Designs Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Semantic-Free Referencing (SFR)
Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)

10. Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Supports:
Mobility
Multi-homing
Anycast
Multicast
Accommodate middle-boxes
Security
Anonymity
DoS

11. Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Each packet is associated an identifier id
To receive a packet with identifier id, receiver R maintains a trigger (id, R) into the overlay network id
data id
data
Sender id R
trigger
Receiver (R) R
data

12. Integrate Middle-Boxes
Use a stack of IDs to encode sequence of operations to be performed on data path
Transcoder (T)
idT,id
data
idT,id
data id
data
Receiver (R) R
data
Sender
T,id
data id R
idT T

13. ID can identify any entity that
i3 Identifiers
256-bit IDs
ID ultimately mapped to an (IPaddr:port)
Mapping under application control
ID can represent
A host, flow, service, etc
ID can identify any entity that
can receive packets

14. ID/<IPlocal, port>
Protocol Stack
Process
Process
local scope
Transport
ID/<IPlocal, port>
Transport
<IPaddr, port>
i3 layer
(IPlocal->ID)
<ID>
IP Layer
<IPaddr>
IP Layer
<IPi3>
Sender specific

15. How It Works? (Native i3 Applications)
Receiver R
DNS request
DNS
Client app
Client app
DNS reply = id
send(id)
Transport
Transport i3
daemon
send(id)
i3 layer
i3 layer
send(IPi3)
send(id) id R
IPi3 IP IP

16. How It Works? (Legacy Applications)
IP address: r
DNS request
Client app
Client app
DNS
library
DNS
DNS reply = id
IPlocal
Transport id
Transport i3
daemon i3
daemon
send(IPlocal, port)
send(r,p)
i3 layer
i3 layer
id,IPlocal
send(IPi3)
send(id) id
(r:p)
IPi3 IP IP

17. Designs Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Semantic-Free Referencing (SFR)
Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)

18. Goal: Address DNS Limitations
DNS names identify machines and organizations not data
Data cannot be easily moved
Data cannot be easily replicated
DNS names are brand names
Political fighting

19. SFR Solution Use IDs instead of DNS name
ID space is flat and IDs have no semantics
A generalization of DNS
Returns metadata instead of an IP address
How to implement it?
Use distributed hash-tables (DHTs)!

20. DHT Primer Interface Highly scalable Highly robust Highly dynamic
put(id, data)
data = get(id)
Highly scalable
O(log N) hops to execute an operation
Highly robust
Can tolerate ~50% of nodes going down
Highly dynamic
Entries can be changed very fast

21. Designs Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Internet Indirection Infrastructure (i3)
Semantic-Free Referencing (SFR)
Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)

22. Layered Naming Architecture (LNA)
Supports:
Mobility
Multi-homing
Integrate middle-boxes
Security (through middle-boxes)
Anonymity
DoS …

23. A Old Naming Taxonomy Four kinds of network entities (Saltzer):
Services (and data)
Hosts (endpoints)
Network attachment points
Paths
Should name each individually:
Ignore paths (router involvement)
IP addresses name attachment points
Endpoint identifiers (EIDs) name hosts
Service identifiers (SIDs) name services/data

24. Protocol Stack Process Process SID↔EID <SID> Transport
<IPaddr, port>
Transport
<EID, port>
IP Layer
EID↔IP
<IPaddr>
<EID>
IP Layer
<IPaddr>

25. How It Works? “DNS” Client app Client app SID↔EID SID↔EID LNA daemon
DNS request
“DNS”
Client app
Client app
DNS reply = sid
send(sid)
SID↔EID
eid = get(sid)
SID↔EID
put(sid, eid)
put(eid, IP)
LNA
daemon
DHT
send(eid)
Transport
IP = get(eid)
Transport
send(eid)
EID↔IP
EID↔IP
Intermediary (IPi)
send(IPi) IP IP

26. Principles Don’t bind to lower-level IDs prematurely
Host mobility and renumbering (HIP)
Service and data migration
Resolution of name need not point to object itself, but can point to its delegate
Resolution can point to intermediaries who process packets on behalf of the named target

27. Naming Architecture Requirements
There should be a layer in the protocol stack that uses IDs not IP addresses
Mobility, multi-homing, replications, …
IDs should be able to name arbitrary objects
IDs should encode as little semantics as possible
End-points should be able to use indirection at the ID level
Integrate middle boxes

28. How Many ID Layers? HIP: one layer; IDs identify machines
SFR: one layer; IDs identify data
i3: one layer; IDs identify arbitrary objects
LNA: two layers
EIDs identify machines
SIDs identify everything else

29. When is the Resolution IDIP Done?
SFR: above transport
HIP: below transport, at HIP layer
i3: in the infrastructure
LNA: below transport
But IP address can be an intermediate point

30. Security Support? HIP: i3 LNA Authentication, data integrity
Anonymity at transport layer
Transport layer resistance to DoS attacks i3
Anonymity at IP layer
Some DoS defense at IP layer
Everything else can be done though middle-boxes
LNA
Everything can be done through middle-boxes

31. Resources HIP: http://homebase.htt-consult.com/~hip/
SFR:
i3: