1. Conflict Resolution and Rebel Leader Selection Kathleen Cunningham University of Maryland and Peace Research Institute Oslo Katherine Sawyer University of Maryland

2. Theory Quasi-democratic rebel leader selection Rebel leader selected through voting – Examples: Congolese Democratic Coalition, 1999 All Bodo Student Union, 1986

3. Theory Continued Quasi-democratic rebel leader selection – Signal: Legitimacy and authority Group coherence – Driven by: Organizational culture Group aims (democracy) Credibility concerns

4. Rebel Leader Data Case histories by group – Ascension type and date – Categories of ascension types: Election Founder Inherited/Non-democratic Split Merged Third party Rebel officer

5. Rebel Leader Data Continued Figure 1. Distribution of Rebel Leadership Ascension by Type

6. Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: Rebel groups with quasi-democratically selected leaders are more likely to be negotiated with. Hypothesis 2: Rebel groups with quasi-democratically selected leaders are more likely to see civil war end.

7. Methods Two tests: Bivariate probit model Cox proportional hazard model Dependent Variables: Negotiations and Conflict Termination Independent Variable: Quasi-democratically elected leader (compared to all other types) Covariates: Secondary support, troop strength, legal political wing, democracy, ethnic fractionalization, population, GDPpc

8. Empirical Results Figure 2. Marginal Effects: Joint Probability of Negotiations and Conflict Termination

9. Endogeneity Empirical models – Negotiations do not predict elections – Elections difficult to model empirically Theoretical implications – Elections costly signal – Failed elections Significant consequences

10. Concluding Remarks Quasi-democratically elected leaders Increases probability of: Negotiations Conflict Termination Thanks!