1. Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication Dr. Taj Elsir Mahjoub Nairobi 2005

2. Outline 1. JAM: Motivation, Objectives, Scope and Process 2. Emerging Shared Vision for Poverty Eradication Strategy and MDGs 3. Program and policy priorities 4. Financing Needs and Institutional Arrangements 5. Monitoring Arrangements 6. Conclusion

3. 1. Motivation: Machakos Protocol, 2002 Lays out the parties’ vision to achieve sustained peace Addresses key causes of the conflict Presents a historic opportunity to overcome the devastation of war and neglect (5Rs)  Need for extraordinary efforts to realise this opportunity

4. JAM: Objectives and Scope Objectives: Assessment and costing of the reconstruction and development requirements for consolidation and sustenance of peace in the post- conflict Sudan Framework for sustained peace, development and poverty eradication with clear benchmarks for assessing progress Scope and Emphasis: Diagnostic: Quantitative, qualitative, field work, conflict, environment and gender analysis and consultations Poor and most disadvantaged parts of the country, Policies and programs focus on poverty eradication, acceleration to reach the MDGs and on redressing disparities Thematic Areas: Institutional development, rule of law, economic policy, productive sectors, basic social services, infrastructure, livelihoods and social protection, and information and statistics) Covers reconstruction and development needs within national priorities, efforts and budget commitments Covers the Interim Period, through 2011, but focuses on critical first two years (2005-07)

5. JAM: Process and Structure Conducted by the World Bank and the United Nations Partnership with technical teams from GOS and SPLM Substantial input from Civil Society and international development partners Focus on capacity building Running for nearly one year, in parallel to the peace process, and to support the peace process through joint technical dialogue and policy training Ownership Process: Ensure local ownership and buy-in from domestic and international stakeholders through broad-based consultations Structure: (Core Coordination Group, Core Teams, Higher/National Committees, Council of Ministers/ Leadership Council)

6. December 2003: CCG established in Nairobi August 2004: Joint Poverty Eradication Strategy developed by parties Jan/Feb 2005: Core team to draft synthesis report – GoS, SPLM, UN, WB – in Addis Ababa May 2004: Signing of 3 Naivasha Protocols Sectoral Field Assessment Missions Drafting of cluster reports and synthesis report February 2004: Preparatory phase initiated January 2005: Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement September 2004: Official launch of JAM at joint retreat in Nairobi Consultations and sharing of final report March 2005: Final report circulated to donors April 2005: Donors conference in Oslo JAM Timeline September 2004: IPF meeting in Oslo Dec 04/Jan 2005: Joint sectoral sessions/workshops

7. 2. Emerging Shared Vision for Poverty Eradication and the MDGs 1. Implementing the CPA; 2. Building decentralised governance, characterised by transparency and accountability; 3. Ensuring macro-stability; 4. Comprehensive capacity building programmes at all levels; 5. Enabling environment for private sector and rural development; 6. Empowering local communities and civil society groups; 7. Managing resources in an environmentally sound way 8. Exerting maximum efforts to spread a culture of peace 9. Promoting access to services 10. Building a sound and simple system to monitor and evaluate progress towards the MDGs

8. Patterns of Growth and Poverty Important economic gains achieved in 1990s following macro stabilization, but pattern of growth is unbalanced  Wide poverty variation both between--and within--North, South, and three areas NorthSouth (Darker color indicates higher level of poverty)

9. Human Development Index State-level and Cross-Country Comparison Disparities in outcomes large, both across states and compared to neighbors and countries with similar income levels, with Southern Sudan among the worst in the world Worse-off states are comparable to Ethiopia, which has a much lower per capita income

10. 3. Program And Policy Priorities Two broad phases: Immediate recovery and consolidation of peace in the first 2 ½ years (mid-2005-2007) Scaling-up for MDGs in Phase II (through 2011) Embedded in the CPA, and building on the principles laid out for the Poverty Eradication Strategy (PRSP)

11. National Government (NG) and Northern States Committed to strategic objectives: 1. Enable consolidation of the CPA at all levels through capacity building and increased political commitment; 2. Improve governance through promoting human rights, decentralization, improved management capacity, and anti- corruption measures; 3. Broad-based growth of income-earning opportunities through stable macroeconomic framework and policy reform; and 4. Expanding access to basic services.  Cross-cutting objective: Ensure pro-poor programs that make unity attractive

12. Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies. Phase I JAM costs for National Government (including Three Areas) by Cluster (million US$)

13. Government of Southern Sudan Strategic objectives: 1. Developing physical infrastructure for roads, river and air; 2. Prioritizing agriculture, and promoting private sector development; 3. Restoring peace and harmony (including through access to basic services, including health, education and water); 4. Regenerating social capital (including safe return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees); and 5. Developing institutional infrastructure for better governance, focusing on public service and service delivery capacity. Cross-cutting objectives: Achieve rapid results while building long term capacity; and clustering of services to enable development planning decisions in the short to medium term.  Ambitious program that would be accelerated further provided that implementation proceeds rapidly. Early commitments necessary to build capacity

14. Phase I JAM costs for Southern Sudan by Cluster (Million US$) For infrastructure: Phased strategy with rapid scale-up once adequate planning and management capacity is in place and technical and feasibility studies have been prepared Higher assessed needs to be presented for 2007 if sufficient implementation capacity in place Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies.

15.  High and rising Pro-Poor Ratio, Declining External Share (%) 4a. Financing Needs: Phase I (US $ billions)

16. 4b. Aid Management Arrangements and the Multi-Donor Trust Funds “In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonization, alignment and managing for results are adaptable to environments of weak governance and capacity” Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, March 2005 Donors asked to work mostly through two MDTFs, established in the CPA, to minimize fragmentation and transaction costs: One for NG for North and the Three Areas One for Southern Sudan World Bank as administrator In the South, MDTF to be implemented by a Program Implementation Agency (PIA); appropriate arrangements being put in place in the North Regular “consortium” meetings to assess results, discuss future directions, and renew pledges

17. 5. Monitoring Framework Immediate start to monitoring of JAM implementation to cultivate a results-based focus and culture of public & donor accountability. Results matrices have been developed At the cluster level Overall summary monitoring framework Monitoring framework is instrument for dialogue at several levels: Line agency, cabinet, NG and GOSS - donor and donor-donor  reported to Sudan Consortium Designed to be comprehensive –including security and political -- framework – and with integral link to emerging Poverty Eradication Strategy

18. Sample of Summary Monitoring Framework

19. Conclusions 1. Historic opportunity building on CPA 2. Fully owned and locally grounded framework 3. Basis for policy and programs to address challenges ahead jointly with development partners, focused on results 4. Implications for Darfur