1. Taming Mr Hayes: Mitigating Signaling Based Attacks on Smartphones Colin Mulliner, Steffen Liebergeld, Matthias Lannge, and Jean-Pierre Seifert Technische Universitat Berlin and Deutsche Telekom Laboratories

2. Outline  Introduction  Background  Threats  Design  Implementation  The AT Command Filter  Conclusions

3. Introduction  Mobile botnets hijack mobile phone to produce signaling traffic sent from mobile phones to the cellular network core. – DDoS  Rooted smartphones disable protection mechanisms. Applications may launch intentional malicious activity and accidental harmful operations.

4. Introduction  Protect the cellular network infrastructure from malicious smartphones  Virtual modem  Device-side protection system  Android-based  AT-command filter  The OS is separated from the baseband  Safe-to-root virtualized Android

5. Background  Cellular Network Architecture

6. Background  Cellular Signaling  Signaling traffic  MSC and HLR  Voice call, SMS, and updating account settings  Packet-data  SGSN, GGSN, and HLR  Packet Data Protocol (PDP)  ME establishes a PDP context by sending a GPRS-attach message to SGSN.

7. Background  Smartphone Architecture Baseband Processor Application Processor

8. Threats  Hijacked Phones and Mobile Botnets  PDP Context Change  Premium Rate SMS Trojans  Rooted Phones

9. Threats  Hijacked Phones and Mobile Botnets  ikee.B iPhone botnet infects about 22,000 devices  HTTP-based C&C channel  Traynor et al. issue the AT command to configure and enable call-forwarding settings in order to cause a high load on the HLR.  Mobile botnets use SMS messages for C&C.

10. Threats  PDP context activation and de-activation leads to high network load on the GGSN and SGSN.  On Android, it’s possible to force an PDP context change every 2 seconds.  43,200 PDP activation per day.  Pre-paid SIM cards may cause DoS attacks.

11. Threats  Premium Rate SMS Trojans  FakePlayer-A  The same problem applies to voice calls to premium numbers  android.permission.SEND_SMS

12. Threats  Rooted Phones  Simply install a modified firmware on the device  Exploiting known security flaws  EX: DroidDream

13. Design  Virtualize  Isolated  Assume the device’s DMA feature can be restricted to safe memory locations.  IO-MMU

14. Design  Micro Kernel as Secure Foundation  Modern third-generation micro kernels implement object- capabilitiesobject- capabilities  POLA (principle of least authority)

15. Design  Virtualized Android  Smartphone CPUs are not natively virtualizable.  The overhead of running a monolithic OS on top of a micro kernel is between 5 and 10 percent.  Enforce Android to access the baseband by not giving it access to the baseband’s IO memory.  Safe-to-root  A commercial version requires a bootloader that is capable of restricting updates to the Android partition.

16. Design  Virtual Modem  Baseband driver  Virtual serial interface  AT command filter  Virtual network interface  IP filter  NAT

17. Implementation  Intel x86-based smartphone  Moorestown platform (SOC)  Atom core  ST-Ericsson U300 – baseband  Fiasco.OC micro kernel  A L4 micro kernel

18. Implementation  L4Android  Based on L4Linux  L4Android kernel ABI is compatible with Android

19. Implementation  System Setup L4AndroidL4Linux

20. Implementation  L4Linux  Booting and initializing the baseband  Running baseband driver

21. Implementation  Modifications to Android RIL  libreference-ril.so  libsect-ril.so  They built their own abstraction library

22. The AT Command Filter  AT Command and Man-machine Interface (MMI) ##002# MMI Phone app AT Command AT+CCFC=0,4 AT Command AT+CCFC=0,4

23. The AT Command Filter AT+CGDCONT Configure a PDP context AT+CGACT Activated a configured PDP AT*EPPSD PDP context control for our ST-Ericsson baseband AT+CMGS Send an SMS message ATD+ ; Initiates a voice call to given number AT+CCFC Configure, activate, and de-activate call- forwarding settings AT+CFUN Configuration of the baseband state

24. The AT Command Filter  PDP Context Setup on the STE Baseband

25. The AT Command Filter  Special Problem  Special case APN  APN for MMS  Command side effects  If the baseband is switched between 2G and 3G, the PDP context is disconnected and reconnected

26. The AT Command Filter  Filtering AT Commands  AT_CCFC_interval = 60 (seconds)  AT_CCFC_threshold = 5 (# commands)

27. The AT Command Filter  SMS Filter  Short code detector  Short code (4-6 digits): Premium rate numbers  Block all SMS to short codes  Future work: secure GUI for legit SMS to short codes  Binary Message Payload Detector  Non-printable characters  Base64 encoding

28. The AT Command Filter  Blocking Commands  To not confuse the application logic in the RIL, our filter would inject the error message into the stream that carries the responses from the baseband to the RIL  Some commands are never blocked  Switch to flight mode (AT+CFUN=4)  PDP context deactivation (AT*EPPSD)  Emergency calls (ATD 911;)

29. The AT Command Filter  Profiling Benign AT Command Usage  Count the number of commands used Command#WhenWhy AT+CFUN2BootFlight mode. Normal mode. AT+CFUN1UseSwitch to GSM-only. AT+CDGMNT1BootSet PDP configuration. AT*EPPSD1BootActivate PDP context. AT+CMGS1UseSend a SMS message. ATD1UseIssue a voice call. AT+CCFC3UseQuery forwarding settings. AT+CCFC2UseSet a call-forwarding.

30. Evaluation  Setting  nanoBTS - openBSC  Faraday Cage

31. Evaluation  Limiting the Call-forwarding Attack [ref][ref]  2,500 TPS (Transactions per second) for low traffic network  30,000 TPS for high traffic network  AT+CCFC takes 4.7 seconds  12 commands per minute  4.7 seconds * 2,500 TPS = 11,750 hosts  Threshold = 5 commands / minutes

32. Evaluation

33.  Limiting PDP Context Changes  Switch the baseband mode between GSM-only, 3G-only, and GSM+3G  The threshold for PDP context changes, p t  The threshold for AT*EPPSD commands, e t  The threhold for AT+CFUN commands, c t  P t = e t + c t  Without any limit, 30 changes per minute is the maximum possible

34. Evaluation

35.  SMS Trojan  FakePlayer-A premium SMS Trojan  Number 3353

36. Evaluation  SMS Controlled Botnets  Binary Payload Detector  Blocking text messages will be complicated since they would need to be analyzed thoroughly before one is able to safety block them

37. Conclusions  Virtual modem  Future work  VPN Gateway  Advanced IDS/IPS  Policy Update Infrastructure  Secure GUI  Hardware Virtualization