1. Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism What are we doing when we make moral judgments? Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’ –Aim to describe how the world is –Can be true or false –Express beliefs that the claim is true Non-cognitivism: moral judgments –Do not aim to describe the world –Cannot be true or false –Express attitudes towards the world

3. The authority of morality If there is no objective moral truth, then does ‘anything go’? What is the authority of morality? –If morality is subjective, then is it anything more than a matter of taste? Reply: this is a misunderstanding –Living as though there are no moral values is itself a kind of choice, an immoral one –Non-cognitivism does not entail that we should stop having moral feelings!

4. Condemning immorality But can we justify interfering with others’ behaviour because their actions interfere with our feelings? Reply: our feelings isn’t the reason we interfere, the cruelty (or whatever) is But taking cruelty as a reason to interfere is itself subjective

5. Moral progress If there is no moral reality, then our moral beliefs or feelings cannot become better or worse. –They may have changed, but change is not progress if there is no truth. Reply: people’s views can change for the better in non-moral ways, e.g. become more informed or rational (consistent or coherent).

6. Moral progress Reply 2: people’s views can become better in moral ways: –If we disapprove of past moral codes and approve of our own moral code, then we will say that we have made moral progress. Moral progress is relative to a particular point of view – but this is just the usual problem of moral disagreement.