1. Radical Behaviorism and How We Believe by Michael Shermer Season Almason Western Michigan University

2. Overview The purpose of this presentation is to present some of the issues discussed in the book How We Believe: Science, Skepticism, and the Search for God by Michael Shermer and relate them to the philosophy of radical behaviorism and the science of behavior analysis The purpose of this presentation is to present some of the issues discussed in the book How We Believe: Science, Skepticism, and the Search for God by Michael Shermer and relate them to the philosophy of radical behaviorism and the science of behavior analysis

3. Why is it important to understand why we believe? The philosophy of science is concerned with epistemology The philosophy of science is concerned with epistemology –How we come to believe and justify our beliefs is the main concern of epistemology The philosophy of science is also concerned with truth criteria The philosophy of science is also concerned with truth criteria –How we come to tact our beliefs as “true” is, therefore, also a concern of the philosophy of science

4. Why is it important to understand why we believe? (cont.) Scientific behavior involves believing Scientific behavior involves believing In order to understand scientific behavior it is important to understand why we believe In order to understand scientific behavior it is important to understand why we believe

5. Science & Religion “Claims that religious tenets can be proved through science require a response from the scientific community. Making evidentiary claims puts religion on science’s turf, so if it wants to stay there it will have to live up to the standards of scientific proof” (p. xxvi). “Claims that religious tenets can be proved through science require a response from the scientific community. Making evidentiary claims puts religion on science’s turf, so if it wants to stay there it will have to live up to the standards of scientific proof” (p. xxvi).

6. Question: If religious scientists are operating in a different paradigm or under a different world theory than other scientists, are those other scientists justified in judging the questions the religious scientists ask or the methods and truth criteria they use? If religious scientists are operating in a different paradigm or under a different world theory than other scientists, are those other scientists justified in judging the questions the religious scientists ask or the methods and truth criteria they use?

7. Answer: According to Kuhn (1962) and Pepper (1942) scientists from one paradigm or world theory are not justified in judging the work of scientists from another paradigm or world theory based on the criteria of their own paradigm or world theory According to Kuhn (1962) and Pepper (1942) scientists from one paradigm or world theory are not justified in judging the work of scientists from another paradigm or world theory based on the criteria of their own paradigm or world theory However: “O, ye of little faith. Why do you need science to prove God? You do not. These scientific proofs of God are not only an insult to science; to those who are deeply religious they are an insult to God” (p. 123). However: “O, ye of little faith. Why do you need science to prove God? You do not. These scientific proofs of God are not only an insult to science; to those who are deeply religious they are an insult to God” (p. 123). –Are we not supposed to believe by faith, not by sight?

8. Scientific Proof for God “ID [intelligent design] theorists also attack scientists’ underlying bias of ‘methodological naturalism.’ That is, they feel it is not fair to forbid supernaturalism from the equation as it pushes them out of the scientific arena on the basis of nothing more than a rule of the game. But if we change the rules of the game to allow them to play, what would that look like? How would that work? What would we do with supernaturalism?” (p. xxxi). “ID [intelligent design] theorists also attack scientists’ underlying bias of ‘methodological naturalism.’ That is, they feel it is not fair to forbid supernaturalism from the equation as it pushes them out of the scientific arena on the basis of nothing more than a rule of the game. But if we change the rules of the game to allow them to play, what would that look like? How would that work? What would we do with supernaturalism?” (p. xxxi). “If science is the art of the soluble, religion is the art of the insoluble. God’s existence is beyond our competence as a problem to solve” (p. 7). “If science is the art of the soluble, religion is the art of the insoluble. God’s existence is beyond our competence as a problem to solve” (p. 7).

9. Question: Have we really rid science of the supernatural? Have we really rid science of the supernatural?

10. Answer: It was the goal of the logical positivists to move philosophy and science away from the study of the metaphysical (Smith, 1986) It was the goal of the logical positivists to move philosophy and science away from the study of the metaphysical (Smith, 1986) –Their solution: operationism Skinner (1945) points out, however, that operationism has not resulted in the removal of the supernatural from science Skinner (1945) points out, however, that operationism has not resulted in the removal of the supernatural from science

11. Another Question: If scientists are still going to fill gaps in the causal chain with hypothetical processes, why should an appeal to God be rejected? If scientists are still going to fill gaps in the causal chain with hypothetical processes, why should an appeal to God be rejected?

12. Answer: If a mechanistic world theory is to be used there is no reason that God cannot be used to fill gaps in the causal chain if other hypothetical constructs are acceptable If a mechanistic world theory is to be used there is no reason that God cannot be used to fill gaps in the causal chain if other hypothetical constructs are acceptable This is not an issue in radical behaviorism because mechanism and all appeals to supernatural entities are rejected (Chiesa, 1994) This is not an issue in radical behaviorism because mechanism and all appeals to supernatural entities are rejected (Chiesa, 1994)

13. How do we believe? Selectionism Selectionism –Shermer’s hypothesis of how religion and belief in God evolved is consistent with a selectionist account –Shermer proposes that pattern-seeking evolved into storytelling, storytelling evolved into mythmaking, mythmaking evolved into morality, morality evolved into religion, and religion evolved into a belief in God –Basically, religion evolved out of a community’s need for individual behavior to be controlled even when no one is watching