1. A Perfect Moral Storm Stephen M. Gardiner University of Washington, Seattle

2. Why Ethics? “Natural, technical, and social sciences can provide essential information and evidence needed for decisions on what constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ At the same time, such decisions are value judgments … “ (IPCC 2001a, p. 2; emphasis added.)

3. Value Judgments in Practice Q1: Setting a Global Ceiling  Needs and Aspirations of Current People  Obligations to Future People  Obligations to Animals, Plants and Nature Q2: Distributing Emissions Under a Global Ceiling  Historical Responsibility  Global Poverty and Inequality  Different Roles of Energy Consumption in Human Lives

4. Today’s Thesis  The peculiar features of the climate change problem pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make the hard choices necessary to address it. Climate change is a perfect moral storm.  One consequence of this is that, even if the difficult ethical questions could be answered, we might still find it difficult to act. For the perfect moral storm makes us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption.

5. Climate Change as a “Perfect Moral Storm” Convergence of three severe problems for ethical action:  The Global Storm  The Intergenerational Storm  The Theoretical Storm

6. The Global Storm  Spatial Dispersion of Causes and Effects  Spatial Fragmentation of Agency  Institutional Inadequacy

7. The Shape of the Global Storm Tragedy of the Commons: (PD1) It is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall pollution: each agent prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their individual pollution over the outcome produced by no one doing so.(PD1) It is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall pollution: each agent prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their individual pollution over the outcome produced by no one doing so. (PD2) It is individually rational not to restrict one's own pollution: when each agent has the power to decide whether or not she will limit her own pollution, each (rationally) prefers not to do so, whatever the others do.(PD2) It is individually rational not to restrict one's own pollution: when each agent has the power to decide whether or not she will limit her own pollution, each (rationally) prefers not to do so, whatever the others do.

8. Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons  “Mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”  Broader context of interaction

9. Obstacles to Resolving the Global Storm  Lack of Adequate Global System  Uncertainty about Effects at the Level of Nation States  Deep Roots  Skewed Vulnerabilities

10. The Intergenerational Storm  Temporal Dispersion of Causes and Effects  Temporal Fragmentation of Agency  Institutional Inadequacy

11. Temporal Dispersion  Lifetime of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide  Timeframe of Major Climate Processes (e.g., Oceans)

12. Lifetime of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide  Typical Estimate: 5-200 years (IPCC)  The Long Tail: “The carbon cycle of the biosphere will take a long time to completely neutralize and sequester anthropogenic CO2. … For the best-guess cases … we expect that 17- 33% of the fossil fuel carbon will still reside in the atmosphere 1kyr from now, decreasing to 10-15% at 10kyr, and 7% at 100 kyr. The mean lifetime of fossil fuel CO2 is about 30-35 kyr.” (Archer)

13. Implications of Temporal Dispersion Climate change is:  Resilient  Backloaded  Substantially Deferred

14. Shape of the Temporal Storm Benefits Now (to us); Costs Later (to them)Benefits Now (to us); Costs Later (to them) Predictable BiasPredictable Bias IterationIteration

15. The Pure Intergenerational Problem (PIP1) It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate: (almost) every generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome produced by everyone overpolluting. (PIP2) It is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each generation has the power to decide whether or not it will overpollute, each generation (rationally) prefers to overpollute, whatever the others do.

16. Some Points to Notice PIP is worse than a traditional Tragedy of the Commons:  Not everyone prefers to cooperate  Traditional solutions are undermined

17. The Theoretical Storm  scientific uncertainty  intergenerational equity  contingent preferences  contingent persons  nonhuman animals  nature

18. “Cost-benefit analysis … would simply be self- deception. And in any case, it could not be a successful exercise, because the issue is too poorly understood, and too little accommodated in the current economic theory.” (John Broome, Counting the Cost of Global Warming)

19. “There’s a quiet clamor for hypocrisy and deception; and pragmatic politicians respond with … schemes that seem to promise something for nothing. Please, spare us the truth.” Robert J. Samuelson, Newsweek, February 21, 2005 The Problem of Moral Corruption

20. Modes of Moral Corruption DistractionDistraction ComplacencyComplacency Unreasonable DoubtUnreasonable Doubt Selective AttentionSelective Attention DelusionDelusion PanderingPandering False WitnessFalse Witness HypocrisyHypocrisy