1. UNIT II: The Basic Theory Zero-sum Games Nonzero-sum Games Nash Equilibrium: Properties and Problems Bargaining Games Review Midterm3/23 3/2

2. Bargaining Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want …; and it is this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. -- A. Smith, 1776

3. Bargaining Bargaining Games We Play a Game Credibility Subgame Perfection Alternating Offers and Shrinking Pies

4. Bargaining Games Bargaining involves (at least) 2 players who face the the opportunity of a profitable joint venture, provided they can agree in advance on a division between them. Bargaining involves a combination of common as well as conflicting interests. The central issue in all bargaining games is credibility: the strategic use of threats, bluffs, and promises.

5. The Ultimatum Game OFFERS 5 4 3 2 1 0 REJECTED ACCEPTED N = 15 Mean = $2.05 4 Offers > 0 Rejected 0 Offer < 1.00 (20%) Accepted (2/25/09)

6. The Ultimatum Game 0 2.72 5 P 1 P 2 5 2.28 0 2.50 1.00 What is the lowest acceptable offer? 9/9 4/4 25/27 2/2 3/3 20/28 13/15 N = 131 Mean = $2.25 34 Offers > 0 Rejected 6/26 Offers < 1.00 (20%) Accepted Pooled data (as of 3/07) 6/7 3/17

7. The Ultimatum Game Theory predicts very low offers will be made and accepted. Experiments show: Mean offers are 30-40% of the total Mode = 50% Offers <20% are rare and usually rejected Guth Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) Also, Camerer and Thaler (1995) How would you advise Proposer? What do you think would happen if the game were repeated? See: Guth Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) Also, Camerer and Thaler (1995)

8. The Ultimatum Game How can we explain the divergence between predicted and observed results? Stakes are too low Fairness –Relative shares matter –Endowments matter –Culture, norms, or “manners” People make mistakes Time/Impatience

9. (0,0) (3,1) 1 2 Chain Store Game (2,2) A firm (Player 1) is considering whether to enter the market of a monopolist (Player 2). The monopolist can choose to fight the entrant, or not. Enter Don’t Enter Fight Don’t Fight Credibility

10. Subgame: a part (or subset) of an extensive game, starting at a singleton node (not the initial node) and continuing to payoffs. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE): a NE achieved by strategies that also constitute NE in each subgame. eliminates NE in which the players threats are not credible. selects the outcome that would be arrived at via backwards induction. Subgame Perfection

11. (0,0) (3,1) 1 2 Subgame Perfection (2,2) Chain Store Game A firm (Player 1) is considering whether to enter the market of a monopolist (Player 2). Player 2 can then choose to fight the entrant, or not. Enter Don’t Enter Fight Don’t Fight Subgame

12. (0,0) (3,1) 1 2 Subgame Perfection (2,2) Chain Store Game Enter Don’t Fight Don’t 0, 0 3, 1 2, 2 2, 2 Fight Don’t Enter Don’t NE = {(E,D), (D,F)}, but Fight for Player 2 is an incredible threat. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium SPNE = {(E,D)}.

13. A (ccept) 2 H (igh) 1 L (ow) R (eject) 5,5 0,0 8,2 0,0 Proposer (Player 1) can make High Offer (50-50%) or Low Offer (80-20%). Subgame Perfection Mini-Ultimatum Game

14. A (ccept) 2 H (igh) 1 L (ow) R (eject) H 5,5 0,0 5,5 0,0 L 8,2 0,0 0,0 8,2 AARRARRA 5,5 0,0 8,2 0,0 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium SPNE = {(L,AA)} (H,AR) and (L,RA) involve incredible threats. Subgame Perfection Mini-Ultimatum Game

15. 2 H 1 L 2 H 5,5 0,0 5,5 0,0 L 8,2 1,9 1,9 8,2 5,5 0,0 8,2 1,9 AARRARRA Subgame Perfection

16. 2 H 1 L H 5,5 0,0 5,5 0,0 L 8,2 1,9 1,9 8,2 5,5 0,0 1,9 SPNE = {(H,AR)} AARRARRA Subgame Perfection

17. Alternating Offer Bargaining Game Two players are to divide a sum of money (S) is a finite number (N) of alternating offers. Player 1 (‘Buyer’) goes first; Player 2 (‘Seller’) can either accept or counter offer, and so on. The game continues until an offer is accepted or N is reached. If no offer is accepted, the players each get zero. A. Rubinstein, 1982

18. Alternating Offer Bargaining Game Two players are to divide a sum of money (S) is a finite number (N) of alternating offers. Player 1 (‘Buyer’) goes first; Player 2 (‘Seller’) can either accept or counter offer, and so on. The game continues until an offer is accepted or N is reached. If no offer is accepted, the players each get zero. 1 (a,S-a) 2 (b,S-b) 1 (c,S-c) (0,0)

19. Alternating Offer Bargaining Game 1 (a,S-a) 2 (b,S-b) 1 (c,S-c) (0,0) S = $5.00 N = 3

20. Alternating Offer Bargaining Game 1 (a,S-a) 2 (b,S-b) 1 (4.99, 0.01) (0,0) S = $5.00 N = 3

21. Alternating Offer Bargaining Game 1 (4.99,0.01) 2 (b,S-b) 1 (4.99,0.01) (0,0) S = $5.00 N = 3 SPNE = (4.99,0.01) The game reduces to an Ultimatum Game

22. Now consider what happens if the sum to be divided decreases with each round of the game (e.g., transaction costs, risk aversion, impatience). Let S = Sum of money to be divided N = Number of rounds  = Discount parameter Shrinking Pie Game

23. S = $5.00 N = 3  = 0.5 1 (a,S-a) 2 (b,  S-b) 1 (c,  2 S-c) (0,0)

24. Shrinking Pie Game S = $5.00 N = 3  = 0.5 1 (3.74,1.26)2 (1.25, 1.25) 1 (1.24,0.01) (0,0) 1

25. Shrinking Pie Game S = $5.00 N = 4  = 0.5 1 (3.13,1.87)2 (0.64,1.86) 1 (0.63,0.62) 2 (0.01, 0.61) (0,0) 1

26. Shrinking Pie Game 0 3.33 5 P 1 P 2 5 1.67 0 N = 1 (4.99, 0.01) 2(2.50, 2.50) 3(3.74, 1.26) 4(3.12, 1.88) 5(3.43, 1.57)… This series converges to (S/(1+  ), S – S/(1+  )) = (3.33, 1.67) This pair {S/(1+  ),S-S/(1+  )} are the payoffs of the unique SPNE. for  = ½ 1

27. Shrinking Pie Game 0 3.33 5 P 1 P 2 5 1.67 0 N = 1 (4.99, 0.01) 2(2.50, 2.50) 3(3.74, 1.26) 4(3.13, 1.87) 5(3.43, 1.57)… This series converges to (S/(1+  ), S – S/(1+  )) = (3.33, 1.67) This pair {S/(1+  ),S-S/(1+  )} are the payoffs of the unique SPNE. for  = ½ 1 2 3 4 5

28. Shrinking Pie Game Optimal Offer (O*) expressed as a share of the total sum to be divided = [S-S/(1+  )]/S O* =  /(1+  SPNE = {1- [  /(1+  )],  /(1+  )} Thus both  =1 and  =0 are special cases of Rubinstein’s model: When  =1 (no bargaining costs), O* = 1/2 When  =0, game collapses to the ultimatum version and O* = 0 (+  )

29. Shrinking Pie Game

30. We Play Some Games An offer to give 2 and keep 8 is accepted: PROPOSER RESPONDERPlayer # ____ Offer 2 or 5 Accept Reject (Keep 8 5)

31. Fair Play 8 0 5 0 8 0 2 0 2 0 5 0 2 0 8 0 GAME AGAME B

32. Fair Play 8 0 8 0 8 010 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 GAME CGAME D

33. Fair Play AB C D 50% 40 30 20 10 0 3/7 1/4 2/4 0/9 Rejection Rates, (8,2) Offer (5,5) (2,8) (8,2) (10,0) Alternative Offer 4/18/01, in Class. 24 (8,2) Offers 2 (5,5) Offers N = 26

34. Fair Play AB C D 50% 40 30 20 10 0 5/7 2/3 1/2 2/12 Rejection Rates, (8,2) Offer (5,5) (2,8) (8,2) (10,0) Alternative Offer 4/15/02, in Class. 24 (8,2) Offers 6 (5,5) Offers N = 30

35. Fair Play AB C D 50% 40 30 20 10 0 Source: Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 1999 Rejection Rates, (8,2) Offer (5,5) (2,8) (8,2) (10,0) Alternative Offer

36. Fair Play What determines a fair offer? Relative shares Intentions Endowments Reference groups Norms, “manners,” or history

37. Fair Play These results show that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates, depending on the other offer available to Proposer (but not made). This may reflect considerations of fairness: i) not only own payoffs, but also relative payoffs matter; ii) intentions matter. (FFF, 1999, p. 1 )

38. What Counts as Utility? Own payoffsU i (P i ) Other’s payoffsU i (P i + P j )sympathy

39. What Counts as Utility? Own payoffsU i (P i ) Other’s payoffsU i (P i - P j ) envy

40. What Counts as Utility? Own payoffsU i (P i ) Other’s payoffsU i (P i, P j ) EquityU i (P i + P i /P j ) Intentions ?

41. Bargaining Games Bargaining games are fundamental to understanding the price determination mechanism in “small” markets. The central issue in all bargaining games is credibility: the strategic use of threats, bluffs, and promises. Rubinstein’s solution: If a bargaining game is played in a series of alternating offers, and if a speedy resolution is preferred to one that takes longer, then there is only one offer that a rational player should make, and the only rational thing for the opponent to do is accept it immediately!

42. Next Time Review Hand in PS2