1. Introduction of International Law Related to the CDM Development Process Peter Corne China Business Group Eversheds LLP November 2007

2. I. Overview of the International Legal Framework

3. Basic International Treaties on CDM United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) was signed in 1992 and came into force on 21 March 1994 Kyoto Protocol (the “Protocol”), aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas (“GHG”) emissions, was signed in 1997 and became a legally binding treaty on 16 February 2005 The Marrakesh Accords were adopted in 2001 to flesh out the Protocol rulebook and further advance implementation of UNFCCC To-date, 175 countries have ratified the Protocol

4. Inside the Kyoto Protocol The Protocol sets up quantitative objectives for reducing GHG emissions up to 2012 -Annex I countries are obliged to reduce their collective emissions by at least 5% during 2008-2012 -Credits obtained from 2000 to 2008 may be used to achieve compliance

5. Three Flexible Mechanisms Three mechanisms set out in the Protocol for emission reduction - JI: Joint Implementation (Article 6) (Annex I countries Annex I countries) -CDM: Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12) (Annex I countries Non Annex I countries) - IET: International Emission Trading (Article 17) (Annex B countries Government Annex B countries Government)

6. Implementation of Kyoto EU: launched the European Climate Change Programme in 2000 UK: successful emission control and a centre of emission trading Canada: behind target - recent legislation

7. Different Approaches: China Vs India India has the most issued CERs China has the highest overall projected CER volumes Unfettered competition Vs government regulation

8. Indian Vs Chinese Project Development More than 50% (11 out of 20 projects) rejected by the CDM Executive Board until August 2007 are from India, none from China 55 out of 136 projects that have been available for public comment before the end of 2005 but not been registered so far are from India, but only three from China Most of the Indian projects have not been developed on account of the CDM incentive and thus do not fulfil the additionality criterion

9. Indian Vs Chinese Project Development (ii) Indian DNA thus far does not seen its role as providing a PDD quality check Indian DNA supports principle of unilateral CDM China's DNA has a list of far-reaching requirements that project developers have to fulfil Unilateral CDM is now allowed but only takes up a small proportion of Chinese submissions ?? Which approach is more efficient to encourage environment-friendly projects?

10. II. Fundamental Legal Principals of CDM

11. Key Rules Affecting CDM The use of CERs must be supplementary to domestic action The requirement of additionality The “Baseline” scenario CDM projects are defined by reference to strict conceptual boundaries CDM projects must account for “Leakage”

12. Supplementarity The Marrakesh Accords demand that emission reduction targets of Annex B Countries cannot be met solely through JI, ET or CDMs (“Flexible Mechanisms”) At present there is no numerical definition of supplementarity Although not directly binding on private sector participants in CDM projects, the supplementarity requirement raises commercial risks both on the supply and purchase side of CDM trades

13. Supplementarity – Risks of Infringement Annex I Governments purchasing CERs may seek to impose contractual terms on a project permitting them to reduce or terminate purchasing commitments where they have a supplementarity problem

14. Supplementarity – Risks of Infringement (ii) Annex I Governments may unexpectedly withdraw support for a project in development (which otherwise meets requirements) on these grounds. This poses a development risk to sponsors

15. Supplementarity – Risks of Infringement (iii) Inability of individual Annex I investors to manage this risk (as they cannot control the activities of other investors of the same country) may dampen demand from the private sector for CERS

16. III. Recent Negotiations and Discussions On International Rules

17. Negotiations on Post-2012 Arrangements Negotiations on-going –Participants all recognize achievements through UNFCC and the Protocol –Abandonment of the Protocol post 2012 will be a global tragedy –CDM: a good tool to mobilize climate-friendly policies and investments, but need to be improved Further discussion in Bali next month

18. Difficulties Commitments from developing countries? –India –China

19. Difficulties Voluntary vs Compulsory

20. Difficulties Energy resources are limited Energy policy is strategic for national economy Energy consumption countries and energy production countries have different perspectives Internationally, there are different interest groups, e.g., OPEC and IEA Even within a country, there are different interest groups Difficult to reconcile positions of different countries, difficult to reconcile positions within a country, US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is an example Difficult to established a international mechanism: after UNFCCC was signed in 1992, it took 5 years for the Kyoto Protocol to be signed in 1997, and another 8 years for it to be approved and took effect in 2005 Wise to stick to the established Kyoto mechanism and aim to improve it

21. Discussions on Post-2012 Arrangements Pending formal agreement, there are discussions about: –Unilateral declaration by Annex I countries to extensively utilize post-2012 CERs; –Extension of the period of the next commitment to 10 years or more; –Goal for developing countries: pledge to reach intensity level in given sector, rewarded if achieved, no penalty if not achieved –Proactive support for post-2012 CERs by multilateral financial institutions Post-2012 Carbon Fund launched by EIB

22. EU ETS Discussion on Post-2012 Improvement Post-2012 cap: consistent with 2020 reduction target of at least -30% compared to 1990 levels Allowances: to be auctioned as from 2013 Limits: to set quantitative and qualitative limit on the use of CDM/JI credits in the EU ETS Expansion of coverage: sector (e.g., aviation) and GHG (e.g., N2O and CH4 from coal mine) No inclusion of domestic offsets and JI credits from EU countries into the EU ETS

23. IV. Key Documents in CDM Project Transaction

24. Key documents in CDM Project transaction Traditional project documents: construction agreement, purchase agreement, project finance agreement, power purchase agreement etc. Contract with CDM project consultant Contract with DOE ERPA

25. Key features of an ERPA International sale and purchase agreement Subject matter – a special type of good Different degrees of risks at different stages: approval, construction, cost overruns, project underperformance, delays, DOE fails to verify GHG emission reductions, rejected by CDM EB, changes in laws

26. Allocation of risks in an ERPA RisksSeller to assume the risksBuyer to assume the risks Project Registration/ DNA Approval/ Project Participation Status Conditions Precedent - Seller to apply for Registration Conditions Precedent - Buyer to obtain DNA approval to project participation CERs shortfalls - Seller guarantees minimum purchase quantity - negotiate amended delivery schedule -Pay cost of purchasing replacement CERs or market value of CERs -Terminate contract - Buyer purchases actual quantity - Buyer has first right of refusal to purchase excess CERs Failure to payPayment on delivery Upfront payment standby L/C Legal title to CERs Seller warrants full title to CERs delivered Seller warrants full authorisation to dispose of CERs (in an agency scenario)

27. Allocation of risks in an ERPA (continued) RisksSeller to assume the risksBuyer to assume the risks Creation of a security interest, transfer of assets - Seller will not create security interest over project/assets - Seller does not transfer project-related assets - No corporate restructuring which may affect the Seller’s ability to perform its obligations - Seller to notify Buyer when creating security interest on project or assets or when transfer any project-related assets - Seller to notify Buyer in scenarios of corporate restructuring Share of costs Seller bears project operation and monitoring costs, PDD fees, DOE validation fees, verification fees, EB registration fees, share of proceeds Buyer bears PDD fees, DOE validation fees, verification fees Post 2012 credits Seller grants to Buyer first right of refusal and exclusive period for negotiation Buyer has no first right of refusal and no exclusive period for negotiation Change in law/ failure of central systems Change in law provisions/ Force majeure provisions/ Focal pointBuyer / CDA acts as focal pointSeller acts as focal point

28. Eversheds China Business Group An integrated team of experts delivering the advice you need Experienced China practitioners in both London and Shanghai Strong Renewable Energy / CDM focus Work for both foreign companies pursuing deals in China and Chinese corporations in transactions outside the PRC Advice across time zones

29. Eversheds LLP Shanghai Office: Peter Corne Managing Director +86 (21) 6137 1001 +86 138 1818 3382 petercorne@eversheds.com