1. Security and Reliability of Smart Card Smart HKID Card Forum Jan 6, 2001 Science Museum
Dr LM Cheng
Director
Smart Card Design Center
Dept. of Electronic Engineering
City University of Hong Kong
Good afternoon chairman, panel members and audiences, my name is Lam Yuk Lung. Today I would like to present my final year project. My project title is development of a flexible chip operating system for smart card.

2. Content Background General Security Features
Simple Cryptographic Engine
Encryption Techniques
Security Standards & Assessment
Physical & Electrical Reliability
Electro-static Discharge

3. Background Type of Smart Cards Worldwide Market
New Technologies requirement

4. Types of Smart Card Memory Card MPU IC card Crypto- processor card
Contactless card

5. Worldwide Smart Cards Market Forecast (Millions of Dollars and Millions of Units) Data From Frost & Sullivan

6. New Technologies Required
Data Storage Management - information protection
authentication process -
biometric: fingerprint, facial features, iris identification, dynamic signature recognition, speech recognition
Advanced encryption methods -
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, chaotic techniques, AES

7. Basic Internal Structure of CPU Smart Card

8. Possible Attacks on Smart Card
UV or X-ray inspection: use high efficiency UV or X-ray to inspect the memory areas to extract important information like PIN, secret key and public key
EM analysis: use electron microscope to inspect the internal structure of the mask

9. duplication: illegal copying of card content from one to another
confusion: disturb the power supply/frequency during PIN verification to confuse the accurate enter of PIN and allow access to the protected memory
duplication: illegal copying of card content from one to another

10. tracking: based on the protocol exchange between the terminal and the card to track the sequence of commands

11. Other possible attracts:
attract on DES like differentiate methods
attract on RSA using cyclic properties

12. General Smart Card Security Features
Against UV or X-ray inspection:
Using implementation to avoid visible of
ROM Code
EM analysis:
Address Scrambling of memories
Against confusion:
Low/High voltage sensors
Low/High Frequencies sensors
High Frequency Protection

13. Against Cyclic properties:
Against duplication:
Security PROM Hardware Protected
Unique Chip Identification Number
Move Code Blocking
Against Tracking:
Secure authentication and data/key encryption
Against DPA:
Random Wait State (Advance)
Current Scrambling Generator (Advance)
Against Cyclic properties:
No simple solutions

14. Protection Against Tracking
Random Number Generator for dynamic key generation
Cipher Engine for data protection:
Block
Stream

15. Random Number Generator
For generation of session keys
Digital approach can only generate pseudo random number based on
Xi =(a Xi-1 + b) mod c
Other use analogue approaches like VCO, white noise generator etc.

16. Block Cipher K1: Master Key of length 16-bit
K2: Card ID of length 16-bit
Process in block and errors propagate within the block
Block Cipher Method – Write to Memory
Block Cipher Method – Read from Memory

17. Stream Cipher
Similar to a state machine with K1K2 as the initial state
A pseudorandom number sequences generated are XOR with the Input Data to form the Output Data
The data must be in sequence in order to encode and decode correctly

18. Encryption Techniques
Encryption will modify data into irregular form for security storage and transmission. The reconstruction is achieved by using a set of relevant Keys.
Two cryptosystems are currently being used, i.e. symmetric (DES/FEAL) and asymmetric (RSA, ECC). Symmetric cryptosystem requires only one common key for encryption and decryption whereas asymmetric system requires two keys, i.e. private/user key and public/system key.

19. Common Encryption Techniques in Smart Card
Private:- Data Exchange
DES (Data Encryption Standard)
Public:- Key Exchange
RSA (Rivet, Shamir, Adleman)
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
Also for Authentication

20. Is Smart Card Secure?
There are no perfect (100% secured) systems available
Systems design and built for minimal attack risk can be treated as secure sytems
Secure systems are evaluated/classified in different levels using international standards such as TCSEC/DoD (Orange -USA), ITSEC (Europe) and CCITSE (ISO15408)

21. Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria – USA(DoD)
D: Minimal protection
No protection
C1: Discretionary Security Protection
Use control access
C2: Controlled Access Protection
Use accountability/auditing

22. B1: Labeled Security Protection B2: Structured Protection
Use sensitivity (classification) labels
B2: Structured Protection
Use formal security policy more resistant to penetrate
B3: Security domain
Highly resistant to penetration. Use security administrator, auditing events and system recovery process
A1: Verified protection
Highly assure of penetration. Use formal specification and verification approaches.

23. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) and Common Criteria (CC) – Europe&Canada
EAL1 - functional tested
EAL2 - structurally tested
EAL3 - methodologically tested and checked

24. EAL6 - semi formally verified designed and tested
EAL4 - methodologically designed, tested and reviewed
EAL5 - semi formally designed and tested
EAL6 - semi formally verified designed and tested
EAL7 - formally verified designed and tested

25. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) - evaluation
FIPS 46-2 and 81 for DES
FIPS 186 for Digital Signature
FIPS for Cryptographic Modules

26. Security evaluation requirements
Cryptographic modules
module interface
role and services
finite state machine model
physical security
Environmental Failure Protection/Testing (EFT/EFP)

27. Software security
Operation security
cryptographic key management
cryptographic algorithm
EMI/EMC
self tests

28. Physical & Electrical Reliability
Test
Standard Reference
Test Methodology
Test Frequency 1
Salt Atmosphere
CECC
48 h, 35°C, 45%HR, 5% NaCl
Manufacturing product audit 2
Insertion Test
Bull
insertion 3
Data Retention
Semi-conductor Std.
10 years 4
ESD Protection
MIL STD-883C Mtd. 8
Class 3: 4Kv
Chip Characterization

29. Electro-static Discharge – Dry/Wet weather comparison

30. ESD – failure in various stages

31. Reliability of Contact Type Smart Card Reader
Mechanical Insertion Life time – around 1-3x105 insertion
For a typical flow of 105 crossing per day
Each reader will only last for 3 days
Assuming 30 readers installed at border, all readers have to be replaced in 90 days.
Whereas, contactless type has MTBF over 115,000 hrs = over 13 years

32. Conclusion Smart Card is an evolutionary product
Trend of use is irreversible
HKID project can built a framework to make it smart
More technology breakthrough is needed to make them really multi-applications
Technology is fact but not miracle