Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009
PES and Governance Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design
Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design If not, extremely difficult

Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance
CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years. We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve. We have theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that: Elites tend to benefit from the status quo (oppose changes) Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so) Tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself. Therefore need to protecting the procedural conditions tfor effective function and evolution of CBNRM. i.e. protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.

Principles ECONOMIC: The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS) POLITICAL: The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them

Macro Level Civil Society Meso Level Micro Level International
State/Provincial Property rights push the locus of power towards the local level ‘Governance’ is the linkage between these different levels of public and civil society entities Civil Society District/Municipal Meso Level Cooperative/Multi- community Local/Community Micro Level Household

Governance of Local Collective Action
International National State/Provincial District/Municipal Cooperative/Multi- community Local/Community Household Civil Society Governance & Enabling Environment Weak conceptual understanding, within historically and site specific circumstances. Biggest challenges to success: incompetence / disinterest defense of status quo Governance of Local Collective Action Strong, widely applicable conceptual and operational model/s High probability of success

CBNRM in Luangwa: Institutional Lessons
Quality wildlife resources CBNRM in Luangwa: Institutional Lessons

South Luangwa National Park
CBNRM in Luangwa, Zambia (NORAD Project) South Luangwa National Park 9,050km2 9,000 elephants Costs USD1m / year Income USD850,000 Lupande GMA Six chiefs (4,500km2) 50,000 people Six Community Resource Boards 45 Village Action Groups Two hunting concessions Earning USD 230,000 annually South Luangwa National Park

Harsh Climate Floods Droughts Disease

Community Development Programme: Top Down Phase
Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”) 40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by them and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not involved) Did 36 different projects in community: Women’s programme (chickens) Roads Infrastructure / buildings Culling Bus service Tourism and hunting managed by project Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive funding

When I arrived in 1996: People did not understand the Project Very low perception of benefit Conflict/suspicion over project implementation Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to village level (80%) of income

Resistance to Devolution by “Losers”
Revenue distribution meetings held in Malama But chief rejects programme

Success in Chivyololo

Innovations: Mechanisms of Constituent Accountability
Recognition that devolution is a RIGOROUS process “Loose-tight” principles Constitutions Accounts Records of decisions

Constituency Accountability
Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly)

Innovations: Self Managed Revenue Distribution

The tight part (i.e. procedural) of loose-tight management (loose = let people decide for themselves provided they follow democratic procedure)

Community Projects

Investing in Wildlife Management

Financial Flows in CBNRM
First Generation CBNRM Participation Benefits Projects Accountability Attitudes to wildlife Investment in wildlife Wildlife trends PERFORMANCE METRICS 100’s Few, public 10? 40-80% money missing -86% 0% down FIRST GENERATION 75-100,000 20,500 people got cash 230+ 0.8% +90% 18% of income Stable/up SECOND GENERATION Central Government Local Government Representational Democracy Second Generation CBNRM Participatory Democracy

Single versus Multiple Villages
Defining local regimes According to Madison/ de Tocqueville: A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government) A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons Single Village Direct/participatory democracy/ accountability Multi-Village community Indirect or representational governance

Real Life Implications
Form of accountability Proportion getting to individuals (cash, Projects) Proportion consumed by overheads (allowances, salaries, etc.) Participatory >60-80% 20% Representational <10-20% >90% Preliminary data from CBNRM (next slide) is intriguing. Suggests Madison’s dichotomy is critical to success

Participatory Governance Representational Governance
Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??

The effects of full face-to-face participation
Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice) Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville) Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?

CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)
This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability. There are several critical changes: Money goes to individuals, and then flows upwards through collective agreement This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below) Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities) This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Scale Down (devolve rights)
Sequencing Scale GLOBAL REGIONAL Scaling process is critical: Scale down by devolving rights Scale up through upward delegation Avoid appropriation of rights Read Murphree (2000) NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL Province/State/Department District/County/Traditional Area Scale Down (devolve rights) Community Scaling Up Village Household

I’ve included more detailed notes and recommendations on CBO governance at the bottom of this Power Point

The Enabling Environment: some preliminary lessons

Some early hints at what a CBNRM enabling environment is
National process work in impersonal states May need to rely on projects in personalized (neo-patrimonial states) where scaling up is challenging Legislated use rights (benefit, manage, allocate, sell) critical. Can pilot with project agreements (but vulnerable) Continuity of champions Protect conditions for emergence Inter-disciplinary experience and advice Innovation requires trust Pilots critical (pilots lead policy) Learning through communities of practice Long-term, persistent, consistent facilitation  Aborted devolution

More hints for enabling environments
Donors – variability in outcomes Design (often flawed; locally envisaged programs worked best) Tenacity (seldom present) But financing, political role, can be used positively Associations invaluable: Political (e.g. CAMPFIRE Association) Technical (e.g. CCG, NACSO) Responsible Research adds value (but research often an irritant) Need meso-organization (still lots to learn): Role of local government (district councils) a two-edge sword Sustainability of NGO support organizations Capacity-building Process often misunderstood and badly designed = wasteful, expensive Across-scale, experiential learning highly effective

REDD – opportunity or threat?

REDD New resource – limited vested interested allows us to do it properly But objectives very unclear, and seems to be driven top down with too little listening to landholders and communities If done properly, could contribute to environment, development, governance: Land recovery (biodiversity, productivity, carbon) Improve livelihoods in marginal areas Incentivize improved governance (build “hollow states” from the bottom up)

Rights critical to success but unclear and disputed
Forest Tenure: Who ‘owns’ the World’s Forests? Rights critical to success but unclear and disputed M has M has Africa Latin America African data appears to ignore customary tenure rights? Gov’t ……………….Owned and Administered by Government Public-Comm ……Community has usufruct rights (Gov’t owned) Private-Comm ….Owned by communities and indigenous peoples Private-Indiv ……..Owned by Individuals or Firms [Sunderlin, Hatcher and Liddle 2008]

Governance in Countries with 10 largest oil reserves
(The Resource Curse) Money that flows top-down from a single source => governance problems 90% of these countries ranked in the lowest 1/3 in terms of Governance Oil Reserve Data from: Governance Indicator Data from:

How do we avoid a Tragedy of the Global Carbon Commons?
Tragedy of the commons occurs in open access situations Many of the commons situations envisaged by Hardin are in fact subject to rules – local, communal and national What are the rules and structures that exist to govern Carbon? Governance = structure and processes that link the macro- with the meso- and micro-levels of NRM

Carbon Governance Mechanisms – Global to Local
International UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol UN Declarations human rights civil/political rights ILO 169 Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP) Regional Inter-American Court of Human Rights Inter-American Commission of Human Rights National Case Law Human Right to Property (Mabo Case) Constitution Social Function Doctrine Complex – can we start with very simple and clear goals? Community CBOs CAMPFIRE Conservancies

[RRI 2008]

Conclusion REDD attaches new value to forests
Threat of elite land speculation Governance structures/processes need to be developed for REDD - transparent, accountable, participatory, legitimate Who makes the new rules? Where is the landholder voice? Carbon raises all the same concerns and opportunities as CBNRM Thanks to RRI for their support

GOVERNANCE/SCALE ISSUES
GLOBAL Accounting REGIONAL Baseline Additionality Distribution Monitoring NATIONAL SUB-NATIONAL Province/State/Department District/County/Traditional Area Community Projects (low national capacity, initial pilot startups) Scaling Up Village Issues: Size/Pop Density? tenure security perverse incentives capacity building Household

Summary Results of CBNRM Assessment and Priority Recommendations

Overall Findings (2) Single Village CBOs work far better than multi-village CBOs CBOs lack procedural guidelines Large, unsatisfied demand for technical support / information Managers, on the whole, working well (need technical support, socialization in empowering communities, protection)

Critical Areas for Improvement
Governance, accountability and participation of people (including finances) is weak especially in multi-village CBOs Benefits at household level far too low (ratio of overhead to benefit is FAR too high)

Overall Judgment Performance Criteria OCT CECT KALIPA Khwai Mababe
Sankoyo Fundamental problems with structure and/or constitution   ??   Elite capture and corruption ? Solved? Strong rumours of problems with JV partner (corruption, unfair agreements) Information gets to people  Benefits   Overall   

Key Recommendations (1)
A. Institutional Design Break multi-villages up into single villages Set guidelines for constitutions and for procedural conformance Monitor conformance

B. Devolved Capacity Support and oversee marketing (database, facilitation, training) Develop participatory revenue allocation and accountability systems Experiment with participatory quota-setting (and set goals for wildlife monitoring and management responsibilities) Develop stronger national and internal-CBO information systems

C. Enabling Environment and Support Agencies Develop MET capacity for: Adaptive policy formulation Conformance monitoring Develop producer association/s right to levy communities provided they fulfill key functions: Political representation Peer-based monitoring (Grameen Bank) Information (capacity-building) Develop capacity for capacity-building. How?? Who ?? Independent monitoring and research (adaptive management model?)

Building Capacity through Procedural Conformance
Government should monitor procedural conformance to ensure Full participation and democracy, Equity, Transparency and accountability, Protect the weak against the serious threat of elite capture Hence Capacity-building should focus on: Sound constitutions and awareness of them Information flow Participatory financial allocation and accountability

Conformance Criteria Budget properly discussed, presented and agreed by whole community Proper financial and technical general meetings every quarter, well attended Quarterly financial reports are accurate, follow budget, low variance, no misuse Annual audit presented to community and approved by them (as an activity-based budget) Annual/biannual elections Only approve quota / payments on receipt of conformance audit (not just a financial one)

Technical Recommendations for CBO Management
Improve participation and transparency in financial allocation and control Participatory financial management (budgeting, control) Use PRA communication techniques to make financial decisions Quarterly variance analysis Improve information through carefully planned quarterly meetings Organize financial information to reflect benefits, overheads, investments Define roles and procedures in small manuals

Participatory Budgeting
Steps: Define membership Make list of members (and check it) List animals shot and values Worked out share per person Agree on allocation: HH, projects, wildlife, management

Format for Budget Total Per Household N=55 INCOME 3,000,000 54,545
EXPENDITURE 1. Cash benefits 110,000 2,000 2. Local Projects 825,000 15,000 3. Wildlife management 275,000 5,000 4. Administrative overheads 550,000 10,000 5. Investments 1,100,000 20,000

Making & communicating budgets
Community participation Visualization

Making sure people Understand
Each Member Gets Their Full Share in Cash Each Person Pays Into Projects (Buckets) As Agreed by Community

Quarterly Variance Analysis
Ensure that everyone knows what is happening with the finances (quarterly) Expenditure Item Budget agreed at AGM Actual Expenditure Variance Planned corrective Action 1. Cash benefits 2. Local Projects 3. Wildlife management 4. Administrative overheads 5. Investments

Quarterly Report Agenda Value of animals Constitution Financial report
Project report Wildlife management report Report on hunting and tourism HIV/AIDS Other issues arising of interest e.g. wildlife policy

Notes on Designing Effective Community Based Organizations

Collective action is a response to the benefits of managing ecosystems at larger scales
Many high value resources in semi-arid savannas are mobile, or fugitive, in space or time – wildlife, water, grazing, ecological health Without institutional mechanisms to manage these ecosystems at scale, the systems tend to be used for those activities that can be owned individually – small scale agriculture, and privately owned livestock In other words, because we do not know to manage these ecosystems at the correct scale, the high value resources tend to be replaced by lower value resources However, scale is a complex issue because: Human institutions work better when they are small Ecological systems work better when they are big (The principles for dealing with this mismatch will be dealt with separately) Within the southern African region, and particularly in relation to the wildlife-tourism resource there are large economic benefits associated with scaling up, and new institutions are evolving for this purpose. These include: Large, private ranches and conservancies CBNRM TFCAs There is considerable evidence to showing that scaling up creates significant ecological and economic benefits, including job creation. Scaling up is working well on private land (e.g. Conservancies), and TFCAs are still in their infancy and have many issues worked out.

CBNRM requires highly disciplined institutional design
However, our interest is in the special case of CBNRM which faces is own challenges: Even at small scale, large numbers of people need to be involved There are particular problems of poverty, literacy People have a long history of political and managerial marginalization (disempowerment) People have limited or no experience with modern organizational development theory and practice, and tend to default to models less appropriate to the challenges of being competitive in a global world. Consequently, many CBNRM programs face serious problems of financial mismanagement, low levels of participation, and elite capture. This reflects badly on policy makers, implementers and communities We do, in fact, understand both the principles and operational practices of CBNRM sufficiently that we should be able to implement it with a high probability of success. There are many parallels with democratization. In the history of mankind, democratization is a rare process that seems to occur only under a particular and complicated set of circumstances. Gradual evolution should not be assumed – even though there is clear evidence that democratic governance is much better for people (every single country with a per capita GDP of over $20,000 is a democracy, except for a few oil rich nations), societies usually remain in a non-democratic status-quo for decades and even centuries.

Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of effective, equitable CBNRM governance
This has several lessons for CBNRM: CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years. We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve. Fortunately, we now have sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that: Elites tend to benefit from the status quo, including dominating Committees and Trusts, and will strongly oppose such changes, or changes that benefit the majority Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they will usually need help/support to do so) Nevertheless, there will be a tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself. Therefore supporters of CBNRM, especially government agencies with legal authority, have an important role to play in protecting the procedural conditions that allow effective function and evolution of CBNRM. This can also be seen as protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.

Aligning CBNRM objectives by locating discretionary choice with individual landholders
Effective design of CBNRM institutions brings the following principles and practices into alignment: It establishes mechanisms for property rights and exchange that allocate scarce resources to the highest valued uses, i.e. the conditions for a neo-liberal democratic economy It locates the right to make decisions with individual community members (not their representatives), i.e. the conditions for participatory democracy It uses communications methods that promote positive social change and transformation It uses performance tracking mechanisms that improve the effectiveness and adaptability of management It manages natural resources profitably and sustainably to create jobs and reduce poverty and vulnerability Therefore, if CBNRM is not designed properly, managing CBNRM becomes a complicated trail (and trial)of crisis management. However, if we follow the single principle that discretionary choice should be located in the individual landholder, and aggregate institutions upwards from this foundation, it is remarkable how well all these principles come together. In this document we present an institutional design for communities that provides a solid foundation for these objectives. Other designs include fundamental political, economic, or ecological contradictions, and we are skeptical that they will work.

A Practical Sequence for Implementing CBNRM
IF we assume the government has put in place an enabling environment for CBNRM (the subject of another chapter), we can view CBNRM as sequentially addressing the following challenges: Earning money – the first step is to generate benefits by, for example, marketing tourism, hunting or timber concessions. This is easily achieved using open, competitive marketing and many communities do this reasonable well (note 1, 2) Spending money – much less attention is paid to the use of this money, and it is here that many problems occur. Effective systems will: Allocate revenue to the most effective uses Maximize individual benefits and choice (not only collective benefits) as costs are borne by individuals Avoid serious challenges of corruption and elite capture However, our research in communities in six countries implementing CBNRM in southern Africa suggests that serious problems are occurring: At best, very few individuals are getting benefits, or participating in the program, or have information about what is happening At worse, communities face serious problems of financial misappropriation (corruption) and elite capture Effective natural resource management Note 1: Nevertheless, benefit streams can be greatly improved. We will address this issue separately Note 2: While our focus is on high value resources (e.g. wildlife, tourism), which is the fastest and easiest way to develop CBNRM, we acknowledge that CBNRM is entirely appropriate for other natural resource management challenges such as non-financial ecosystem services.

Spending money As noted, earning money from wildlife / tourism is relatively easy. However, effective natural resource management is only likely to occur when this money generates individual and communal incentives. Therefore the key to CBNRM, and its biggest challenge and opportunity, lies in spending money effectively so that: It is allocated effectively, transparently and honestly It is used to build high levels of participation, accountability, and benefit, and therefore a commitment to a natural-resource based economy In other words “spending money” is the key to GOOD GOVERNANCE However, the serious problems of financial mismanagement and/or elite capture that currently afflict many CBOs are gravely undermining the concept of CBNRM. Consequently, the major threat to CBNRM is governance. This more easily corrected than often supposed but requires that: Implementing agencies understand and operationalize the principles of CBNRM governance Policy makers are committed to devolution, and operationalise this by ensuring that communities have strong rights (and responsibilities) for natural resource management We will describe the essential principles, and operational practice for effective governance below.

Reason 1: Individuals determine land use
Individual landholders (including community members) are deterministic of land use and conservation outcomes. Their decisions are strongly influenced by a personal cost benefit analysis that compares: the value of wildlife (including tangible values like cash and intangible values like proprietorship and aesthetics), to (1) alternative land uses (2) and costs and opportunity costs associated with wildlife The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS) The success of commercial wildlife management in southern Africa has been based on this principle However, we tend to ignore the importance of maximizing individual landholder benefit when dealing with communities by: Reducing the value of wildlife through bureaucratic constraints, license fees, etc. Thinking that community benefits are equivalent to individual benefits when clearly they are not. Even in communities making a lot of money from wildlife, individuals are often excluded from direct benefit. CBNRM will not be sustainable unless this is changed.

Reason 2: Individuals determine land use
The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people (not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the people, and not in charge of them. Many natural resources, like wildlife, are mobile or fugitive (over time and/or space), and therefore need to be managed collectively. Collective management is currently problematic, and the source of the financial and governance challenges that we are well aware of. Further, in Africa, elite capture is often more pronounced at local than at national level. It is a serious problem that arises from a hollow state, i.e. where leaders are neither controlled by or accountable to the people To make CBNRM work, we have to explicitly address this challenge. The trick to effective CBNRN governance is that individuals (not committees) must control financial benefits and decision-making Achieving this requires careful design of community organizations and procedures to ensure ACCOUNTABILITY and TRANSPARENCY.

Achieving Accountability
Bottom-up accountability is highly effective in rural communities. However, it is seldom automatic, and has to be achieved by careful institutional design and role formulation To protect the community, especially women and the poor, the state needs to protect the conditions for bottom-up accountability. This is achieved by insisting on transparent, accountable, democratic procedures that are maintained through the conformance criteria outlined below.

Community Resource Board
6. Illustration of the change from a top-down to a bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy Central Govt. Chiefs Community Resource Board Wildlife Village Action Group

Administration and Scale
To design effective local organizations, it is essential to understand the relationships between difference layers of government, and their respective roles In Africa there are often five layers of organization (illustrated). A sixth layer, province is omitted to simply this explanation 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Centralized, colonial administration of wildlife resource
Following the London Convention of 1933, most Africa countries centralized the control of wildlife outside protected areas (note that centralization often increased in post colonial states) All benefits (if there were any) were paid to Treasury, and all decisions were made by the wildlife/game department. The system failed: Landholders (and local governments) were alienated from wildlife and came to resent its presence Wildlife declined rapidly outside protected areas 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

The lesson of private conservation in southern Africa
Recognizing that wildlife outside of parks was threatened primarily by competition for land, southern Africa adopted a sustainable use strategy. Policy makers: Encouraged commercial use (rather than banning it) Devolved ownership of and benefits from wildlife to private landholder This led to a rapid increase in wildlife on private land in southern Africa. Landholders received the following rights: To benefit from wildlife To manage wildlife (e.g. set quotas) To allocate and sell wildlife Government retained a regulatory role. This worked most effectively when: A light touch approach to regulation was used Regulatory functions were devolved to communities of landholders (e.g. Intensive Conservation Areas in Zimbabwe, and more recently Conservancies) The success was based on a triad of principles: Price – maximise the value of wildlife Proprietorship – devolved rights to wildlife (often usufruct) to landholders Subsidiarity – ensure that all functions are conducted at the lowest possible level. They should only move upward through upward delegation. The success of this model from the 1960s, led to CBNRM 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization (ICA) 1. Private Ranchers Wildlife/Tourism

CBNRM 1.0 (first generation)
The first CBNRM program was WINDFALL in Zimbabwe. Benefits followed the path illustrated. District Councils were pressured to get benefits to communities producing wildlife, albeit often in the form of schools, clinics and projects. WINDFALL only partially modified the original colonial model, and failed because: The links between wildlife and benefits were long and unclear to rural people People had few rights to manage wildlife themselves – they were more the objects of windfall charity than empowered wildlife producers 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Zimbabwe quickly recognized these problems. This led to CAMPFIRE Using the Parks and Wildlife Act, “Appropriate Authority Status” (the same status enjoyed by private landholders – see above) was devolved to District Councils. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management had wanted to establish “Village Companies” as the appropriate authorities. However, this was resisted by the Ministry of Local Government and a strategic compromised was reached whereby: Rights were legally devolved to District Councils, but There was a gentleman’s agreement, the “CAMPFIRE Principles/Guidelines” that rights would be further devolved to local communities The closer the CAMPFIRE Principles were followed, the better the individual programs worked In some communities, benefits were decided on by individuals. Some of this money was retained by households, and some was delegated upwards to the CBO for collective projects (see blue arrows) It is probably not a coincidence that these were the high performing CAMPFIRE communities, and that they have proven robust even in the face of current economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe (e.g. Masoka, Mahenye). Note that the blue arrow model is actually a prototype second generation CBNRM model 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Recognizing these problems, CBNRM practioners improved the model. Namibia and Botswana, for example, avoided the problems of passing benefits through district councils. They established communities as legal entities (Conservancies, Trusts). Benefits flowed directly to these CBOs. However, in most cases, CBOs included multiple villages. Research and anecdotal evidence indicates serious governance problems with this model including: Low levels of individual participation and benefit (i.e. high levels of elite capture) Financial impropriety There are some exceptions. These are nearly always single village communities. This suggests what we call a second generation CBNRM approach 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Single versus Multiple Villages
Defining local regimes Implications According to Madison/ de Tocqueville: A Democracy – is where every one meets together to represent themselves (Township Government) A Republic – is where people’s interests are represented by elected persons This correlates to: A single Village with direct or participatory democracy/ accountability A multi-Village community with indirect or representational governance Preliminary data from CBNRM across the region (see next slide) is intriguing. This confirms the importance of Madison’s dichotomy Form of accountability Proportion getting to individuals (cash, Projects) Proportion consumed by overheads (allowances, salaries, etc.) Participatory 80% 20% Representational <10% >90%

Participatory Governance Representational Governance
Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash) public good??

The effects of full face-to-face participation
Where everyone in the community is involved in financial decision making (with full discretionary choice) Revenue is allocated to the best combination of uses (i.e. the highest valued uses) including household and community benefits This locates the origin of power in individuals (Tocqueville) Does this gives us a single metric that can measure both poverty reduction at HH level and empowerment (i.e. participation, accountability, democratization)?

CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)
This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second generation model build on the principles of bottom-up accountability. There are several critical changes: Money goes to individuals, and then flows upwards through collective agreement This ensures that committees are downwardly accountable to their constituents An important role for government is to protect downward accountability (see conformance criteria below) Communities must be small enough to meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single Village communities) This structure is much more likely to be effective than CBNRM 1. However, structure must be accompanied by effective information The following slide compares CBNRM 1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide range of performance metrics 5. Central Government 4. District Council 3. Community Based Organization 2. Village (Grass-roots community) 1. Individuals (Grass-roots community) Wildlife/Tourism

Real data comparing performance of CBNRM 1 and CBNRM 2
First Generation CBNRM Participation Benefits Projects Accountability Attitudes to wildlife Investment in wildlife Wildlife trends PERFORMANCE METRICS 100’s Few, public 10? 40-80% money missing -86% 0% down FIRST GENERATION 75-100,000 20,500 people got cash 230+ 0.8% +90% 18% of income Stable/up SECOND GENERATION Central Government Local Government Representational Democracy Second Generation CBNRM Participatory Democracy

Example Policy Statement: Organizational Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
Recognizing that democratic institutions (e.g. CBOs) that rely on representation (rather than full and direct participation) are structurally predisposed to problems of accountability, weak participation, and non-performance: Single Villages shall be constituted as the building blocks of any CBOs. As the primary level of implementation, they shall: receive the majority of natural resource revenues (>85%), and shall be responsible for day-to-day decisions and management. This is the DOING level, and all decisions shall ultimately be made by individuals. Village decision processes shall be structured in such a manner that ordinary people (i.e. members) control the all activities and budgets, and are responsible for : instructing committees, including setting budgets and work plans through annual general meetings. (Committees should never make budgets themselves, and should be instructed by (and never instruct) their constituents controlling committee activity through regular (quarterly) feedback on financial and technical performance (variance analysis). All decisions, including budgets and the control of financial and technical performance (variance), shall be fully participatory and exercised through regular (quarterly) meetings of the membership. Communities shall decide on the allocation of funds to alternative uses in a full forum. They shall have the right to allocate benefits from natural resource benefits to best advantage, including: Community projects (e.g. social infrastructure; revenue generating projects; loan funds; food relief; clubs) Natural resource and natural resources management Household cash dividends Administration. However, decisions may be implemented by committees that are democratically elected on an annul basis.

continued Where Multi-Village CBOs are necessary:
their primary function shall be COORDINATION (not management). They shall depend on voluntary payments from Villages, to which they are accountable. These functions shall generally be conduct with no more than 5% -15% of natural resources revenues. Multi-Village CBOs tend to create functions that do not add value if they get too much money Optimally, all revenues should be allocated to Villages. Coordinating CBOs then then obtain their revenues after justifying their plans and performance to the membership of Villages

Conformance Criteria Recognising that the devolution of (defined) rights and responsibilities is the basis for institutional evolution and should not be held out as its reward. Recognising, further, that institutional evolution always involves experiment, and without authority such experiments are both methodologically and substantively defective. Recognising that capacity must be created in both the leadership, but especially the followership, to avoid the problems associated with asymmetric power and knowledge relationships Recognising, by implication, that the route towards effective CBNRM programmes requires entrusting communities with rights at the scale of face-to-face participation, and facilitating the followership to learn experientially how to apply these rights; Recognising that “experiential learning” is not trial-and-error but a rigorous process than includes (1) scrupulous monitoring and adaptive management, plus (2) insistence on conformance to certain organizational principles (and sometimes (3) NRM performance criteria), the following conformance principles shall apply:

Institutional Conformance Principles
Decision-making: The budget (which reflects key allocation decisions) shall be made by the whole community. Its allocation between cash dividends, projects, natural resource management and administration shall be recorded in detail (using a standard format) Accountability: The variance between financial and technical status (e.g. project implementation) and the instructions embodied in the budget, shall be carefully and competently presented to, and accepted by, a minimum of two thirds of the community quarterly Performance audit: Technical and financial variance analyses shall be audited internally at least twice a year, and at least once a year by an external agency, and this audit report shall be presented to the community Financial management system: Each Village shall have a bank account, and a double-entry cash book systems with clear filing of invoices and receipts. Banking: Income owing to a community shall be paid directly into a community bank account and protected with two panels (signatures) – that of the community, and that of the regulatory agency or a proxy acting on their behalf. Release of benefits: Money shall be released in a timely manner for community benefit provided all conformance criteria and financial problems are resolved. Conformance shall be subject to a standard analysis (see form **) Elections: The committee shall face re-election bi-annually subject to performance ratification by AGM

NR Management Performance Criteria:
National authorities may dictate what monitoring takes place (conformance), but the choice of desired outcomes are desired shall rest with the community. The following performance metrics should be monitored: Protection effort: The community shall undertake a number of patrol days each month as agreed with the respective authority Protection effectiveness: Monitoring of patrolling shall ensure that the catch-effort ratio of poaching incidence per patrol days remains below a pre-determined threshold NRM status: The number of animals / fish / trees seen per unit effort (e.g. on patrol, per day, per block covered) shall be monitored Monitoring offtake: The offtake of all natural resources shall be monitored by Village employees. An annual summary shall be prepared and presented to the Annual General Meetings in all Villages. For wildlife this annual summary should list: all animals hunter, Name of hunter, the price paid, and concessions fees. trophy quality Data provide by the national authority, the hunting outfitter, and community monitors, and shall be reconcile d. For fish …. For trees …. Zonation Plan: Each community shall make a land use zonation plan and monitor adherence to plan

Useful checklists The following slides provide:
Chart summarizing roles of each organization Checklist to assess if community has conformed with CBNRM principles (and to authorize annual payments) Checklist to assess of principles of accountable financial management are being followed Checklist to assess of CBNRM principles are being followed

Community Trust / Board
6. Illustration of the change from a top-down to a bottom-up, democratic, transparent and accountable policy Central Govt. Community Trust / Board Wildlife Village Action Group 80-90% 5-10% Some of wildlife revenue All Wildlife Revenue (100%) Old Policy (failed) New Policy (Second generation) Effective CBNRM requires evolution from a First Generation (left) to a truly devolved Second Generation CBNRM programme (right). In a First Generation: Devolution is only partial People and communities are ‘subjects’. They are not trusted to make sensible decisions, and middle-level government officials invariably ratify or ‘guide’ their choices. They invariably evolved into Second Generation projects because they do not really work. Second Generation CBNRM Projects: Generate real grass-roots participation and empowerment by devolving revenues to them. Encompass principles that ensure full participation in a democratic, transparent and account system. Depend heavily on scale since all members of a community institution should be able to meet face-to-face. People become citizens

Definition of Roles Roles Income Chiefs Patron; ideally, protect democratic principles in VAGs. Overall advisor, and maintain traditional values; Neutral arbitration; Guide decisions on broad land-use issues; Non-executive, non-administrative role. Board / Trust Conservancy COMMUNICATION &COORDINATING LEVEL Maintain bank account and financial records; Monitor and summarize Village performance and financial records; Coordinate development plans for area; Plan, implement and monitor large multi-VAG projects; Monitor and oversee NRM utilization in the area (e.g. wildlife management and safari hunting, fishing). Conflict resolution within and between VAGs Income share: 5-10 % NR/wildlife income Purpose: administration and coordination. Where CRB undertakes project implementation (e.g. clinic) or activities (e.g. employ game-guards) money must be voted to it from VAGs Village (VAGs) DOING LEVEL Membership shall hold annual, democratic elections, with power to dissolve committees. At any time All decision shall be made at general meetings to prepare,, to prioritize and agree all plans and budgets (no imposition of choices); NR/wildlife revenues shall be allocated to (1) projects/activities (2) household cash (3) NRM and (4) administration t general meetings; Hold quarterly general meetings to report on financial and technical performance andv ariance from budgets and workplans Plan, implement and monitor Village projects and activities Maintain bank account and financial records Manage NR (wildlife, fish, trees) at the local level (e.g. employ Village Scouts or sanction/prosecute poachers according to by-laws) Income share: 90+ % NR/wildlife income Purpose: equivalent to income from crops or livestock except that use must be decided by the community. May be used for any purposes decided by the community including household needs (cash), projects and activities. CBNRM Support Agencies Monitor performance (finances, wildlife/NR, institutional development) of CBNRM; Develop managerial capacity of community institutions (i.e. design systems and provide training); Ensure compliance with conditions by which wildlife revenues are devolved including: 80% + of income to communities; Full community participation in decision-making Revenue distribution guidelines Auditing Donors or tax

Certification of VAG performance and approval of release of funds
We hereby confirm the following: This VAG held at least four general meetings during the year at which matters were openly and transparently discussed and which were well attended. (If not, and you are convinced that there are legitimate reasons for this, please note these reasons below). That the financial accounts of this VAG are accurate, follow the budget, and that no money has been misused, or if misuse has occurred acceptable corrective action has been taken. (Before approving this, you should be (a) be convinced that adequate and responsible corrective action has been taken and (b) the problem and actions should be summarized below). That the finances and other matters of this VAG were properly presented and approved by the community at the AGM. That a membership list was updated and approved by the general community. That elections were freely and fairly held and that a newly approved committee is now in place to receive the NR/wildlife income. That projects and activities were properly presented for the community to choose. Communities were properly facilitated to choose projects. That the choice of projects and approval of the budget was done by the community in a general meeting and was not forced on them. That the VAG reported on protection, monitoring, zonation metrics That the VAG has full records of wildlife/NRM offtake and income Certified by authority (or proxy): To be attached following revenue distribution: AGM minutes …………… ………………….. ………………. VAG AGM Summary Report (Form 2) Approved Name Title …………… ………………….. ………………. Approved Name Title

Principles for Revenue Distribution
Conditions Means of verification 1. Decisions regarding use of benefits must be democratic, transparent and participatory. Decisions must be made at general meetings attended by at least 60% of household heads and confirmed in written minutes. 2. People must have full choice of the use of their money, including household dividends (cash), projects and activities. Confirmed by minutes and auditing of General Meetings. 3. All finances must be used in the manner agreed at general meetings, and must be fully accounted for by keeping proper financial records. Full financial records will be compiled and submitted quarterly by Villages and BCOs to general meetings (with copies to support agencies) 4. Each body should report regularly to its constituents (i.e. downwards) Committees must report regularly on project implementation and finances at general meetings. 5. Villages and CBOs must be properly constituted and democratically elected. Each Village and CBO must have a constitution, and hold regular (annual) elections. 6. Money should be allocated according to the principle of producer communities. Revenue should be allocated to the Village which animals are shot or tourism income earned. 7. The link between production and benefit should be immediate and transparent Revenues should be disbursed no later than May in the year following that in which it is earned, and should be accompanied by a full list (and value) of animals shots and other fees paid.

How are these fulfilled by Policy Guidelines
Analysis of Congruence of Policy Guidelines with CBNRM Principles and Best Practice Principles of CBNRM How are these fulfilled by Policy Guidelines 1. The unit of production should be the unit of management and benefit. Are all revenues generated in the area returned to these communities in a bottom-up manner? Is there good participation in quota-setting and allocation; and law enforcement? 2. Producer communities should be small enough that all households can participate face-to-face. Are decisions on at least % of revenues made at VAG-level and by a quorum comprising 60+% of households? 3. Community corporate bodies should be accountable to their constituency. Do committees report regularly and accurately to general meetings on financial and technical performance? 4. Functions should be conducted at the lowest appropriate level. Are projects, village scouts, etc. done at VAG-level or lower? 5. The link between production and benefit should be transparent and immediate. Are wildlife revenues returned to the communities where it was earned at general meetings? Is this accompanied by good records of wildlife offtake and income? 6. Communities must have full choice in the use of wildlife revenues, including household cash. Are revenues allocating at general meetings where members have the full choice of cash dividends? 7. All marketing should be open and competitive and should be done by the wildlife producers themselves. Is marketing open and competitive? Do communities select safari operators themselves? (This significantly strengthens the important relationship between safari operators and community). 8. The rates of taxation of wildlife should be similar to that of other resources. Do communities get 100% of wildlife revenues? 9. Activities or investment should not be undertaken unless they can be managed and sustained locally. Can wildlife activities fund themselves in the near future? 10. Government is the ultimate authority for wildlife. Does a government agency monitor key process such as institutional accountability, finances and community wildlife management? 11. Devolving authority and developing community management capacity is a process. While enlightened management must accept that there will be mistakes and misappropriations, does this take place within a rigorous framework that monitors progress and takes corrective action?

Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback

Log in

Auth with social network:

Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009

Similar presentations

Presentation on theme: "Brian Child University of Florida 31 August – 3 September 2009"— Presentation transcript:

Similar presentations

About project

Feedback