1. Internet2 Middleware Drinking Kool-Aid From A Fire Hose or Sniffing Glue-Ware Michael R. Gettes Principal Technologist Georgetown University gettes@Georgetown.EDU http://www.georgetown.edu/giia/internet2

2. “Middleware is the intersection of what the Network Engineers and the Application Programmers don’t want to do” - Ken Klingenstein Chief Technologist, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder Director, Internet2 Middleware Initiative Lead Clergy, MACE PS of LC Middleware makes “Transparently use” happen

3. 3 Internet2 Middleware If the goal is a PKI, then you need to consider: Identifiers (SSNs and other untold truths) Identification & Authen process (“I & A”) Authentication systems (Kerberos, LDAP, etc) Lawyers, Policy & Money (lawyers, guns & $$$) Directories (and the applications that use them) Certificate Mgmt System (CMS) Deployment –CA Certficate, Server Certificates, Client Certificates Authorizations (a real hard problem, Roles, etc)

4. 4 Internet2 Middleware Building Application/System Infrastructure What is missing in Internet 1 Not “Network Security” (wire level) Assumes the wire is insecure Assumes the Application is insecure If security was easy, everyone would be doing it. http://middleware.internet2.edu

5. 5 National Science Foundation NMI program $12 million over 3 years www.nsf-middleware.org Middleware Service Providors, Integrators, Distributors GRID (Globus) Internet2 + EDUCAUSE + SURA May 2002 – first set of deliverables from all parties

6. 6 MACE Middleware Architecture Committee for Ed. IT Architects – meet often – no particular religious affiliations MACE-DIR – eduPerson, Recipe, DoDHE MACE-SHIBBOLETH – global AuthN/Z MACE-PKI  HEPKI (TAG/PAG/PKI-Labs) MACE-WebISO – Web Initial Sign-on VID-MID – Video Middleware (H.323/SIP) MACE-FDRM – Federated Digital Rights Management NMI - NSF Middleware Initiative

7. 7 MACE-ochists RL “Bob” Morgan, Chair, Washington Steven Carmody, Brown Michael Gettes, Georgetown Keith Hazelton, Wisconsin Paul Hill, MIT Ken Klingenstein, Colorado Mark Poepping, CMU Jim Jokl, Virginia David Wasley, UCOP Von Welch, ANL/Grid Scott Cantor, Ohio St Bruce Vincent, Stanford Euro: Brian Gilmore & Ton Verschuren, Diego Lopez

8. 8 A Map of Middleware Land

9. 9 MACE-DIR Keith Hazelton, Chair, Wisconsin eduPerson objectclass LDAP-Recipe Dir of Dirs for Higher Education (DoDHE) Shibboleth project dir dependencies Meta Directories – MetaMerge Groups (Dynamic vs. Static; Management) Afilliated Directories (Stitched, Data Link) http://middleware.internet2.edu/directories

10. 10 MACE-DIR: eduPerson 1.0 (1/22/01 release) MACE initiated (Internet2 + EDUCAUSE) Globally interesting useful attributes Get community buy-in, must use it also eduPersonAffiliation (DoDHE), eduPersonPrincipalName (Shibboleth) “Less is more”, how to use standard objectclasses http://www.educause.edu/eduperson

11. 11 eduPerson 1.5 object class Included as part of the NSF Middleware Initiative (NMI) Release 1.0 May 7 th, 02 eduPerson 1.0 is the production version, 1.5 status is “released for public review” (RPR) Next NMI release will include final 1.5 based on review period discussions

12. 12 eduPerson 1.5 object class Changes from 1.0: Introductory section added RFC2252 style definitions included for the eduPerson object class itself and for each of the eduPerson attributes. Notes on additional attributes from existing object classes, existing notes clarified, syntax and indexing recommendations updated.

13. 13 eduPerson 1.5 object class Two new attributes: eduPersonPrimaryOrgUnitDN eduPersonEntitlement Simple case: value is the name of a contract for licensed resource http://xstor.com/contract1234 Values of eduPersonEntitlement can be URLs or URNs

14. 14 eduPerson 1.5 object class eduPersonEntitlement Values of eduPersonEntitlement can be URLs or URNs –http://www.w3.org/Addressing/ –RFC2396 Uniform Resource Identifiers –RFC2141 Uniform Resource Names URNs to allow federation of name creation without name clashes. –urn:mace:brown.edu:foo mace-submit@internet2.edu for information on URN registration

15. 15 eduOrg 1.0 eduOrg 1.0 released as “Experimental” object class Basic organizational info attributes from X.520 –Telecomm, postal, locale eduOrgHomePageURI eduOrgIdentityAuthNPolicyURI eduOrgLegalName eduOrgSuperiorURI eduOrgWhitePagesURI

16. 16 LDAP-Recipe positioning and the NMI R1 A special case document Pre-existed NMI and MACE document standards for format and naming. Will conform to NMI/MACE naming and future process for acceptance. Content??? Well, we shall see…

17. 17 LDAP-Recipe Version 1.5 (pre May 7, 2002) Directory Tree Schema (Design, upgrading, maint) AuthN (binding and pw mgmt) eduPerson attr discussion (select) Access Control Replication Name population

18. 18 LDAP-Recipe Version 2.0 (NMI R1 May 7, 2002) Groups, Groups, Groups Static, Dynamic, app issues, builds on “NMI Groups Doc” E-Mail Routing considerations Attribute firewalling, Sendmail, app issues eduPersonOrgDN and eduPerson{Primary}OrgUnitDN Original Intent for eduPerson 1.0 and Primary RDN Issues (a must read) Software reference (small, needs to grow)

19. 19 MACE-DIR: Directory of Directories for Higher Education Web of Data vs. Web of People Prototype: April, 2000 (by M. Gettes) Highly scalable parallel searching Interesting development/research problems Configs, LDAP libraries, Human Interface Realized the need to: Promote eduPerson & common schema Promote good directory design (recipe) Work proceeding – Sun Microsystems Grant http://middleware.internet2.edu/dodhe

20. 20 MACE-DIR: DoDHE and LDAP Analyzer Todd Piket, Michigan Tech Web based tool to empirically analyze a directory eduPerson compliance Indexing and naming LDAP-Recipe guidance (good practice) Beta: http://morpheus.dcs.it.mtu.edu/~tcpiket/dodhe http://morpheus.dcs.it.mtu.edu/~tcpiket/dodhe

21. 21 MACE-Dir Futures Technical Advisory Board eduOrg, eduPerson, edu??????? Shibboleth and other related work Roles (RBAC) Group Implementations (Eileen Shepard, BC; Tom Barton, Memphis) Blue Pages LDAP-Recipe (next?) Affiliated Directories (Rob Banz, UMBC) pkiUser/pkiCa, Bridge CA, etc… Video Middleware (commObject{Uri} OCs) GRID interoperability Directory Policy

22. 22 MACE-Dir Futures (continued) EduOrg “blue page” entries EduOrgUnit 1.0 object class and attributes Affiliated directories scenarios Identity management in Health Sciences Assembling info on the fly Data/Metadata bundles as units of exchange Exploring with our Technical Advisory Board

23. 23 MACE-SHIBBOLETH Steven Carmody, Brown, Chair A Biblical pass phrase – “password” Get it right or “off with your head” Inter-institutional Authentication/Authorization Web Authorization of Remote Sites with Local Credentials Authentication via WebISO October, 2002 – Version 1.0 with NMI http://middleware.internet2.edu/shibboleth

24. 24 MACE-WEBISO Web Initial Sign-on Based on University of Washington “pubcookie” implementation Washington will developing and steward with external funding JA-SIG uPortal, Blackboard, WebCT, Shibboleth – will do or are highly likely to do. http://www.washington.edu/computing/pubcookie

25. 25 VID-MID Video Middleware Authentication and Authorization of H.323 sessions. Client to Client Client to MCU Directory enabled How to find video enabled people? What is necessary to describe video capabilities? Will likely extend to IP Telephony and so on…

26. 26 Technical Policy PKI is 1/3 Technical and 2/3 Policy?

27. 27 HEPKI TAG – Technical Activities Group Jim Jokl, Chair, Virginia Mobility, Cert Profiles, PKI-Lite, etc, etc, lots of techno PAG – Policy Activities Group Default Chair, Ken Klingenstein, Colorado Knee-deep in policy, HEBCA, Campus, Subs+RP PKI Labs (AT&T)– Neal McBurnett, Avaya Wisconsin-Madison & Dartmouth Industry, Gov., Edu expert guidance http://www.educause.edu/hepki

28. Transforming Education Through Information Technologies http://www.educause.edu/ Common Solutions Group, January, 2002 (Sanibel Island) 28 Multiple CAs in FBCA Membrane Survivable PKI Cross Certificates allow for “one/two-way policy” Directories are critical in BCA world.

29. Transforming Education Through Information Technologies http://www.educause.edu/ Common Solutions Group, January, 2002 (Sanibel Island) 29 A Snapshot of the U.S. Federal PKI Federal Bridge CA NFC PKI Higher Education Bridge CA NASA PKI DOD PKI Illinois PKI University PKI CANADA PKI

30. 30

31. 31 Bridge CAs Higher Education Bridge CA – FBCA peering We have a draft HEBCA CP (Net@EDU PKI WG) FBCA Compatible How many HEBCAs? (EDUCAUSE!) Do we really understand PKI implementations with respect to policy needs? (proxy certificates, relying party agreements, name constraints, FERPA, HIPAA, who eats who?) BCA seems to be the most promising perspective. Will each person be a BCA? Does ALL software (Client/Server) need to be changed? Mitretek announces new BCA deployment model 2/15/2001 Scalable & deployable Server plug-ins make client changes less likely

32. 32 The PKI Puzzle By David Wasley, UCOP PKI Hierarchy Medical

33. 33 domainComponent (DC=) Naming Traditional X.500 naming: cn=Michael R Gettes, ou=Server Group, ou=UIS, o=Georgetown University, c=US domainComponent (DC) naming: uid=gettes,ou=People,dc=georgetown,dc=edu HEPKI is issuing guidance and advice on DC= naming

34. 34 Attributes for PKI Store them in a Certificate? Attributes persist for life of Certificate No need for Directory or other lookup –The Certificate itself becomes the AuthZ control point Store them in a Directory? Very light-weight Certificates Requires Directory Access Long-term Certificate, Directory is AuthZ control point. How many Certificates will we have? Pseudonymous Certificates

35. We’re Building A “Bridge Over The River PKI”

36. Shibboleth Update Steven Carmbody, Brown University Project Leader, Shibboleth Michael R. Gettes, Georgetown University

37. 37 Target Web Server Origin Site Target Site Browser Authentication Phase First Access - Unauthenticated Authorization Phase Pass content if user is allowed Shibboleth Architecture Concepts - High Level

38. 38 Second Access - Authenticated Target Web Server Origin Site Target Site Browser First Access - Unauthenticated Web Login Server Redirect User to Local Web Login Ask to Obtain Entitlements Pass entitlements for authz decision Pass content if user is allowed Authentication Attribute Server Entitlements Auth OK Req Ent Ent Prompt Authentication Phase Authorization Phase Success! Shibboleth Architecture Concepts (detail)

39. 39 Shibboleth Architecture

40. 40 Shibboleth Components

41. 41 Descriptions of services 1.local authn server - assumed part of the campus environment 2.web sso server - typically works with local authn service to provide web single sign-on 3.resource manager proxy, resource manager - may serve as control points for actual web page access 4.attribute authority - assembles/disassembles/validates signed XML objects using attribute repository and policy tables 5.attribute repository - an LDAP directory, or roles database or…. 6.Where are you from service - one possible way to direct external users to their own local authn service 7.attribute mapper - converts user entitlements into local authorization values 8.PDP - policy decision points - decide if user attributes meet authorization requirements 9.SHAR - Shibboleth Attribute Requestor - used by target to request user attributes

42. 42 Shibboleth Flows Draft

43. 43 Target Web Server Origin Site Target Site Browser Shibboleth Architecture -- Managing Trust TRUST Attribute Server Shib engine

44. 44 Personal Privacy Web Login Server provides a pseudononymous identity An Attribute Authority releases Personal Information associated with that pseudnonymous identity to site X based on: Site Defaults –Business Rules User control –myAA Filtered by –Contract provisions My AA Site Defaults Contact Provisions Browser User

45. 45 Managing ARPs

46. Middleware Marketing

47. 47 Drivers of Vapor Convergence JA-SIG uPortal Authen OKI/Web Authentication Local Web SSO Pressures We all get Web SSO for Local Authentication and an Enterprise Authorization Framework with an Integrated Portal that will all work inter- institutionally! Shibboleth Inter-Realm AuthZ

48. 48 Middleware Inputs & Outputs Grids JA-SIG & uPortalOKIInter-realmcalendaring Shibboleth, eduPerson, Affiliated Dirs, etc. EnterpriseDirectoryEnterpriseAuthenticationLegacySystemsCampus Web SSO futures EnterpriseauthZ LicensedResourcesEmbedded App Security

49. Errata--ica

50. 50 The Liberty Alliance www.project-liberty.org Sun Microsystems, American Express, United Airlines, Nokia, MasterCard, AOL Time Warner, American Airlines, Bank of America, Cisco, France Telecom, Intuit, NTT DoCoMo, Verisign, Schlumberger, Sony … Initiated in September 2001. Protect Privacy, Federated Administration, Interoperability, Standards based but requires new technology, hard problems to solve, a Network Identity Service Funny, doesn’t this stuff sound familiar?

51. Got Directory?

52. 52 Techniques for Product Independence Good/Evil – make use of cool features of your product. Does this make it more difficult or impossible to switch products later? Does this make you less interoperable? Standard? Does this limit your ability to leverage common solutions? All the above applies to enabled apps as well.

53. 53 Groups, Groups, Groups Static vs. Dynamic (issues of large groups) Static Scalability, performance, bandwidth Dynamic Manageability (search based, but search limits) Is there something neutral? Indexed Static Groups MACE-DIR consideration (Todd Piket, MTU) Index unique/member The likely approach, IMHO, doesn’t inhibit dynamic stuff Group Math (& (group=faculty)(!(group=adjunct)) (member=DN) )

54. 54 Roles Is this an LDAP issue? MIT roles DB – a roles registry Are groups good enough for now? Probably not, see next Are your apps prepared for this? Maybe they need some service to consult? Will Shibboleth help here? Vendors have proprietary solutions.

55. 55 Stitching disparate directories How to relate to distinct directories and their entries. Kjk@colorado & kjk@ViDe -- are they the same? Locate someone in a large directory (DoDHE) and then switch to their video abilities Suggestion: define new object of a “data source directory”. Associate it with a Cert. Send signature of all data elements for an object, store in same. This allows for digital trust/verification. Still working this out. Not much work in this space? (the affiliated dirs problem) X.520 AttributeIntegrityInfo Attribute – will it suffice?

56. 56 A Campus Directory Architecture metadirectory enterprise directory database departmental directories OS directories (MS, Novell, etc) border directory registries source systems Enterprise applications dir

57. Middleware 201 Directories Configuration & Operations Michael R. Gettes Principal Technologist Georgetown University Gettes@Georgetown.EDU

58. 58 How Deep? Background Site Profile - configuration Applications General Operational Controls Schema Access Lists Replication Related Directories LDAP-Recipe – http://middleware.internet2.edu

59. 59 Site Profile dc=georgetown,dc=edu Netscape/iPlanet DS version 4.16 2 Sun E250 dual cpu, 512MB RAM 105,000 DNs (25K campus, others = alums + etc) Directory + apps implemented in 7 months Distinguished names: uid=x,ou=people DC rap, “Boom shacka lacka” Does UUID in DN really work? NSDS pre-op plugin (by gettes@Princeton.EDU) Authentication over SSL; Required Can do Kerberos – perf problems to resolve 1 supplier, 4 consumers

60. 60 Authentication: Overall Plan @ Georgetown Currently, Server-Side PKI self-signed Best of all 3 worlds LDAP + Kerberos + PKI –LDAP Authentication performs Kerberos Authentication out the backend. Jan. 2001 to finish iPlanet plug-in. Credential Caching handled by Directory. Cooperative effort – Georgetown, GATech, Michigan –All directory authentications SSL protected. Enforced with necessary exceptions Use Kerberos for Win2K Services and to derive X.509 Client Certificates One Userid/Password (single-signon vs. FSO)

61. 61 Applications Mail routing with Sendmail 8.12 (lists also) Netscape messaging server v 4.15 (IMAP) WebMail profile stored in LDAP Apache server for Netscape roaming (no SSL) Apache & Netscape enterprise web servers Blackboard CourseInfo Enterprise 5.5.1 Whitepages: Directory Server GateWay DSGW DSGW for priv’d access and maintenance

62. 62 Applications (Continued) Remote access with RADIUS (funk). No SSL (3/2000); proper LDAP binds (fix 8/2000) Authenticates and authorizes for dial-up, DSL and VPN services using RADIUS called-id. We want to use this for other access control such as Oracle

63. 63 RADIUS server RADIUS + LDAP NAS (terminal server) Dialup Users User calls 202-555-1110 CalledId from NAS is mapped to guRadProf Directory Server Netid = gettes guRadProf = 2025550001 guRadProf = 2025551110 guRadProf = OracleFin LDAP Filter is: guRadProf = 2025551110 + NetID = gettes

64. 64 Applications (Continued) Alumni services (HoyasOnline). External vendor in Dallas, TX (PCI). They authenticate back to home directories. Apache used to authenticate and proxy to backend IIS server. Email Forwarding for Life

65. 65 NET ID TMS HRIS SIS Alumni LDAP Master Client Browser WWW hoyasonline Content PCI (Dallas) Vendor-provided services Other local hosts GU provided self- service applications LDAP Replica OS/390 HoyasOnline Architecture Gratuitous Architectural Graphic (GAG) Way Down In Texas

66. 66 Applications (Continued) Access+ Georgetown developed Web interface to legacy systems using Unix front- end to custom made mainframe tasks. Many institutions have re-invented this wheel. LDAP authentication, mainframe doesn’t yet do SSL. Always exceptions to rules. Student, Faculty, Staff, Directory/Telephone Access+ Services. This technique keeps mainframe alive. (good or bad?)

67. 67 Applications (Continued) Specialized support apps Self service mail routing Help Desk: mail routing, password resets, quota management via DSGW Change password web page Person registry populates LDAP people data, currently MVS (mainframe) based. PerLDAP used quite a bit – very powerful! (make sure version >= 1.4) Now moving to Net::LDAP

68. 68 Applications (Continued) Georgetown Netscape Communicator Client Customization Kit (CCK).CCK Configured for central IMAP/SSL and directory services. Handles versions of profiles. Poor man’s MCD Future: more apps! Host DB, Kerberos integration, win2k/ad integration?, Oracle RADIUS integration, Automatic lists, Dynamic/static Groups, Top-Secret, Bb – further integration.

69. 69 General Operational Controls Size limit trolling (300 or 20 entries?) Lookthru limit (set very low) Limit 3 processors for now, MP issues still! (v4) 100MB footprint, about 8000 DNs in cache Your mileage will vary – follow cache guidelines documented by iPlanet. 24x7 operations What can users change?? (Very little) No write intensive applications

70. 70 General Ops Controls (cont…) Anonymous access allowed Needed for email clients Anonymous access is good if you resolve FERPA and other data access issues.

71. 71 Schema: Design & Maint Unified namespace: there can be only one! Schema design and maintenance Space/time tradeoffs on indexing Eduperson 1.0 vs. guPerson guRestrict, guEmailBox, guAffil, guPrimAfil guPWTimebomb, guRadProf, guType, guSSN Relationships (guref) Maintained by ldif file using ldapmodifyldif

72. 72 Access Lists Design & Maintenance Access lists: design & maintenance Buckley(FERPA) protection & services Priv’d users and services userPassword & SSN Maintained by file using ldapmodifyfile Working on large group controls at GU Groups vs. Roles Likely easy to populate, hard to design & implement

73. 73 Replication Application/user performance Failover, user and app service Impact of DC= naming (replica init) Fixed in 4.13 and iDS 5.0 Monitoring: web page and notification Dumper replica – periodic LDIF dumps Backups? We don’t need no stinkin’ backups! Vendor Specific No good solution for backups (iPlanet) IBM uses DB2 under the covers Novell?

74. 74 Replication (Continued) Application/users config for mult servers Deterministic operations vs random Failover works for online repairs Config servers are replicated also 10 to 1 SRA/CRA ratio recommended Cannot cascade with DC= (iPlanet) Cascading is scary to me

75. 75 Normal Ops Replica Structure MASTER DUMPER WHITEPAGES MAILHOST POSTOFFICE NetID Registry Web Servers Users Failure Ops

76. 76 Netscape Console Java program (FAT client). Used to create, configure and monitor Netscape servers. Preferred the web page paradigm of the version 3 products. Has enough bugs that it is only used by server admins, not for mere mortals. Demo??? (nope)

77. 77 Other Directories Novell – GU abandoning GroupWise. Active directory??? Ugh!!! Static Groups Only Strict Tree Structure for Group Policy No plans for MS to change this…

78. 78 Buyer Beware LDAP is LDAP is LDAP – yeah, right! “Sure! We support LDAP!” What does that mean? Contract for functionality and performance Include your Directory/Security Champion!!! Verify with other schools – so easy, rarely done. Beware of products that specify Dir Servers Get vendor to document product requirements and behavior. You paid for it!

79. 79 Microsoft Win2K Integration Project Pismere http://web.mit.edu/pismere MIT, CMU, Michigan, Stanford, Colorado, etc… One way trust from MIT KDC to Win2K KDC The devil we know Metamerge can play an important role Handle DHCP/DNS as your site wishes

80. 80 Win2K & Enterprise Integration W2K Kerb AuthN Ent Kerb AuthN W2K Active Directory Enterprise Directory 1 2 3 One-way X-realm Trust Identity mgmt Meta-Dir Function MetaMerge?

81. Other examples of research…

82. 82 Current Research (examples) GROUPER A special LDAP server (OpenLDAP) engineered to handle group math operations against the enterprise directory for applications that are not group savvy. Application -> get group BLAH -> GROUPER -> combine 15 groups and remove those in the exclusion group -> give back combined static object as group BLAH

83. 83 Certificate Parsing Server Peter Gietz - a draft to describe X.509 certificates as plain old directory objects. Finding certificates becomes easy for directory aware applications. Use PKI operations on the cert you select to verify it. David Chadwick - a Certificate Parsing Server (CPS). Like GROUPER but only works on add/delete/modify operations and stores cert objects as child objects as well as userCertificate attributes where they are now. This should have a dramatic impact on Bridge CA model operations.

84. 84 What to do next? eduOrg, eduPerson, edu(other …) Shibboleth Roles (RBAC) GIG (Group Implementer’s Guide) GROUPER, RI-Bot, GASP Blue Pages LDAP-Recipe (next?) Affiliated Directories HEBCA, Bridge PKI, etc… Video Middleware (commObject) GRID AuthN campus integration GRID AuthZ campus integration Medical Middleware (MedMid) Operational Issues (perf/mon) Directory Policy PKI Policy Identity Mgmt Practices Metadirectories Dir of Dirs Higher Ed (DoDHE) LDAP Analyzer The Art of Directories/Databases PKI-Lite and S/MIME Early Harvest for App Developers Digital Rights Management (DRM) Outreach and Dissemination N-Tier Systems (portals) Filesystems Selling it Project Mgmt 1 5 11 4 1 4 5 0 2 5 1 2 1 8 11 2 4 3 0 7 4 1 3 0 1 6