1. Outline QUIZ at start of next Tuesday class - postponed Prepare for discussion for next class Key questions about institutions Variables, IVs, and DVs 3 types of interactions among states Definition of regimes/institutions Why do institutions form? Two approaches: rationalist / reflective

2. Prepare for Discussion for NEXT CLASS Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from this class session – Look at NYT before next class and find two INTERNATIONAL problems that illustrate one of the differences we have discussed

3. Key questions about institutions Formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions in the first place? Design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them in the ways they do? Influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states? Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

4. Variables, IVs, and DVs Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values) Values: what a variable varies between E.g., – Variable: color – Values: ROYGBIV DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain IVs: Independent variables – what you use to explain the DV

5. Variable Terms and Concepts Examples Unit of analysis VariableIndicatorValues of variableValues of indicator Problem Level of Difficulty Time til Start of Negotiations MalignLong BenignShort Problem Level of Difficulty Time til Complete Negotiations MalignLong BenignShort Treaty Ambitious- ness Type of Obligations AmbitiousDifferentiated Not-ambitiousCommon TreatyStrength Monitoring Provision StrongProvision present WeakProvision absent

6. Some DVs for the Course Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it DVs for the course – Whether institution forms or not – What are the features of the institution – Behavior of states

7. Institutional formation Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution? Variable: institutional formation Values: yes or no IVs: features of problem structure – Capacities – Incentives – Information and knowledge – Norms

8. Logic of Consequences vs. Logic of Appropriateness Logic of consequences – States calculate what is best – Independent self-interest (narrow) – Independent self-interest ( broad) – Interdependent self-interest Logic of appropriateness – States behave to establish/maintain particular identity and/or to follow social rules – Institutions alter of what is right/appropriate

9. What is problem structure? Features of the problem that influence: – Formation: How hard/easy to solve the problem? – Design: What kind of solution states arrive at? – Institutional influence: How effective is the solution? No need for single dimension of hard to easy Think about different problem features and implications for negotiation and effectiveness

10. Problem structure: Nine (9) key questions Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony? Q2: Who are the actors? Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power Q4: Incentives/preferences Q5: Information/knowledge Q6: Norms Q7: Violation tolerance Q8: Inherent transparency Q9: Response incentives

11. Problem structure: Nine (9) key questions Mainly for comparing ACROSS problems Answers to all effect – Whether states will form institution – What features they will incorporate – How states will respond to institutional rules

12. Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation or harmony? Is it conflict or would it be if no institution? Is it harmony? If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable? Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute gains frame

13. Q2: Who are the Actors? How many actors are there? What roles do actors have? What types of actors are involved?

14. Q3: Capacities and power Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior? If not, it’s a “ Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity ”. E.g., – Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons – Reducing AIDS in developing countries – Helping small countries defend selves from attack Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

15. Q4: Incentives/preferences How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries? Types of incentive problems – Upstream / downstream – Coordination – Collaboration All involve logic of consequences issues

16. Q5: Information/knowledge Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them? Two types of info/knowledge problems – Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations – Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games Largely still logic of consequences

17. Q6: Norms Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g., – Human rights abuses – Apartheid or treatment of women – Choice of government Involves logic of appropriateness

18. Q7: Violation tolerance Question: Do violations matter a lot? Are states very concerned about them? Hypothesis: If strong violation INtolerance, leads to either preclusive strategies OR careful monitoring WITH enforcement

19. Q8: Inherent transparency Question: Is it easy to “see” violations and/or hard to conceal them? Hypothesis: If little inherent transparency, then strong monitoring provisions are likely.

20. Q9: Response incentives Question: Will states respond to violations? Hypothesis: Strong incentives to respond to trade violations ==> carefully devised dispute resolution systems

21. Types of problem Review Deadlock Positive externality plagued by incapacity Upstream / downstream problems Coordination Collaboration Epistemic / knowledge problems Assurance problems Normative problems Plus violation tolerance, inherent transparency, and response incentives

22. Conclusion Is there a conflict? Who are the actors Capacities and power Incentives Information / knowledge Norms Violation tolerance Inherent transparency Response incentives