1. WHAT ARE WE GOING TO LEARN IN THIS UNIT? Under what conditions do countries work together? Under what conditions are states working together likely to succeed in meeting collective goals? Why do so many countries continue to suffer from war? How well are countries working together to solve this problem? What are our collective options for preventing state-on-state violence, intrastate violence, and the proliferation of WMDs? Why do billions of people in the world live in abject poverty? Why do we still have global econ. Crises? Can the international community solve this problem?

2. THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: WHEN DO ACTORS WORK TOGETHER Let’s play a collective dilemma game : – You and another person have robbed a bank to pay for college. While escaping, your car ran over someone. You both have been arrested. – If you confess, and your partner doesn’t: You get paid and are set free. Your partner get’s life in prison – Both of you stay quiet: Both set free for lack of evidence. – Both of you confess: Both get life in prison What is the difference between positive sum and zero sum games, and what kind of game is PD? Fortunately, most of intl relations is about positive sum games unless you are realist who focuses on relative power.

3. WHAT ARE THE DEFINING FEATURES OF AN INTL REGIME? States or societies working together, guided by: – Principles/purpose – Norms and rules – Decision-making procedures and “institutions” WHAT TYPES OF REGIMES ARE THERE? IGOs: Leagues, Confederations, Federations INGOs & transnational corporations Non-legitimate intl. groups: Organized crime; organized terrorists Semi-institutionalized regimes: English as the international language & FIFA

4. WHAT DO INTL. REGIMES ATUALLY DO FOR US? Interactive arena for self-interested states Centers of cooperation Over time, they can become independent actors with their own legitimacy Are they the basis for world government? WHY ARE THERE SO MANY REGIMES SUDDENLY? How is the fall of the Soviet block and the increased value placed on “international sovereignty” shaping intl. regimes? – More, weaker, interdependent states means bigger coordination problems – More connections across states to allow it: globalization and norms – Bigger problems and more opportunities The dominant hegemon—the US—has purposefully built international institutions. Do intl. regimes have a good track record? On both development & security success, intl. regimes are proving to be of high value

5. WHY DO REGIMES FORM AROUND SOME ISSUES AND NOT OTHERS? HOW DO WE EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT THERE ARE MORE AND MORE INTL REGIMES? Realism: Relative gains, free-riding, prisoners’ dilemmas all mean that most IOs serve the most powerful states’ interests Liberalism: Tit-for-tat & learning; substate pressures mean that you can have IOs form even if it’s not in the state’s best interests (why did the US allow the sec. council after WW2?) Marxism: IOs keep forming so intl capital can better coordinate exploitation and the concentration of wealth Constructivism: Regimes are forming in areas where doing so is consistent with the dominant ideas of elites and the prevailing discourse. There are main ways to get cooperation when faced with a “collective dilemma” like the PD: dominance, reciprocity, and identity

6. WHEN ARE INTL. REGIMES LESS OR MORE LIKELY TO DEVELOP? Most likely when…. (1) one state or actor threatens everyone else and (2) a small number of states with similar political views can deal with the problem (e.g. rogue regimes) Less likely when… a small number of states must participate in a regime or face bad outcomes for going it alone (InterPol, airport rules) Even less likely when numerous states must work together to secure a collectively beneficial outcome (members of the Security Council) Even less likely when most, but not all, states must each sacrifice something important to avoid collective doom (Kyoto) Least likely when… (1) most states must each sacrifice something to get an optimal outcome; (2) this is especially hard to do if you can’t measure compliance (reciprocity probs) and (3) the benefits of collective behavior won’t happen until the future.

7. THE KEY VARIABLES SHAPING WHETHER STATES WILL COOPERATE OR NOT ARE: How much communication occurs between the involved states Whether this is a one-off instance of cooperation or part of a larger series of interactions Whether the benefit in question can be limited to just those helping to secure it Whether there is some way to enforce cooperation and measure whether compliance by the involved states is occurring Whether the benefit/harm corresponding to collective action is certain Whether the benefit involves preventing a harm/loss or securing a benefit not previously enjoyed Whether the benefit/harm is now or in the future Whether the participation of one, a few, many, or all states is necessary to achieve the outcome What’s at stake (strangely, this isn’t the only variable)