1. Complex Power Sharing Key Sources: The Cambridge Carnegie Project on Resolving Self-Determination Disputes Using Complex Power-Sharing [www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk/research/cps/] Institutional Design of Conflict Settlements [www.stefanwolff.com/working-papers.htm]

2. Complex Power Sharing Self-governance PLUS further mechanisms for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies advocated by:  liberal consociationalism  integrationism  power dividing Result of the implementation of a self- governance regime whose success as a conflict settlement device requires a relatively complex institutional structure that cannot be reduced to autonomy/(ethno-)federalism, (traditional) models of power sharing or power dividing.

3. Institutional Design in Divided Societies Structure and organisation of the state as a whole:  symmetry and asymmetry in institutional design;  distribution and separation of powers; and  coordination mechanisms. Composition and powers of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government and the relationship between them :  the nature of the government system and the choice of the electoral system;  power sharing; and  legal entrenchment. Relationship between individual citizens, identity groups and the state:  human and minority rights provisions; and  recognition and protection of identities.

4. Main Institutional Arrangements Recommended by Different Theories of Conflict Resolution Integrative Power sharing Liberal Consociational Power sharing Power dividing Principle recomm. Interethnic cooperation and moderation induced by electoral system design Interethnic cooperation at elite level through jointness of executive Cooperation between different, changing coalitions through separation of powers Gov. system PresidentialParliamentary or Collective/Rotating Presidential system Presidential Executive power sharing Yes: voluntaryYes: guaranteedNo, except in initial transition phase after civil wars Electoral system Plurality preferentialPR list or PR preferential Plurality Judicial branch Independent

5. Main Institutional Arrangements Recommended by Different Theories of Conflict Resolution Integrationist Power sharing Liberal Consociational Power sharing Power dividing Unitary vs. federal territorial organisation Federal: heterogeneous units Federal: units based on self- determining communities Federal: heterogeneous units Individual vs. group rights Emphasis on individual rights Emphasis on combination of individual and group rights Emphasis on individual rights Recognition of distinct identities Yes, but primarily as private matter Yes, but as private and public matter Yes, but primarily as private matter Legal entrenchment Yes

6. Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems Central parliamentary system Central presidential system Sub-state parliamentary system Sub-state presidential system BelgiumBrussels ItalySouth Tyrol Bosnia and Herzegovina* Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia MoldovaGagauzia Ukraine*Crimea United KingdomNorthern Ireland

7. Power Sharing Institutions No power sharing Horizontal power sharing at the centre Horizontal power sharing at sub- state level only Horizontal power sharing at the centre and sub- state level Macedonia Moldova Crimea Northern Ireland South Tyrol BiH/Federation of BiH Belgium/Brussels

8. Human and Minority Rights Provisions Constit. Human Rights Provisions Constit. Minority Rights Provisions State- wide Min. Rights Legisl. Local Human Rights Legisl. Local Min. Rights Legisl. Belgium/Brussels YesNo Yes BiH Yes Italy Yes Macedonia Yes N.A. Moldova Yes NoYesNo Ukraine Yes No UK YesNo YesNo [1][1] The UK does not have a single constitutional text, in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

9. Some Tentative Conclusions Complex power sharing in practice combines regimes of territorial self- governance with a variety of other macro- level techniques of conflict resolution  power sharing and power dividing and a range of ‘supplementary’ mechanisms  specific electoral systems  human and minority rights legislation  coordination and arbitration mechanisms

10. Some Tentative Conclusions None of the three theories of conflict resolution fully capture the current practice of complex power sharing, BUT  liberal consociationalism is most open to incorporation of elements of integrationist power sharing and power dividing ojudicial entrenchment and enforcement mechanisms; ouniversally applicable and enforceable human rights legislation; overtical division of power; opreferential electoral systems

11. Some Tentative Conclusions Complex power sharing practice MAY eventually lead to a synthesis of existing theories in a complex power sharing framework, BUT there is as yet not enough real- world evidence about how stable such regimes can be under varying conditions. Examples examined here indicate that some cases have proven relatively stable over time (i.e., over ten years):  Belgium, Brussels, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Crimea, Gagauzia, and South Tyrol Others are too short-lived to provide reliable data about their long-term stability:  Macedonia, Northern Ireland