1. Proposal to Ensure Personnel Surety at CFATS Facilities Presented to DHS by Chemical, ONG and Pipeline SCCs

2. CFATS RBPS 12 Requires appropriate background checks: 1.Verify and Validate Identity 2.Check Criminal History 3.Verify and Validate Legal Authorization to Work 4.Identify People with Terrorist Ties Owner/Operators can satisfy 1-3 independently Must rely on DHS to satisfy item 4 2

3. Benefits of Proposal Provides both a short term and long term solution to ensure effective personnel surety at CFATS sites in the fastest time frame. Leverages existing Federal vetting programs, promotes efficiency and minimizes duplication. Eliminates redundant PII collection and reporting. Minimizes burden on owner/operators and DHS. Focuses priority on workers with NO current vetting Workers are vetted prior to, rather than after, gaining access to regulated sites Long term approach would use current technologies and industry best practices 3

4. Interim Approach -- Employees Workers who have been vetted: Recognize existing government vetting programs that include all 4 elements in RBPS 12 (TWIC, HME, ATF, etc) Workers who have NOT been vetted - Use one or both of two options: Transitional Vetting Program Owner/Operators conduct checks for 1-3 and provide DHS with PII [verbal confirmation] for check of 4 (terrorist screening) Expanded TWIC Revise TSA policy to allow TWIC population to include CFATS- regulated facilities 4

5. Interim Approach -- Contractors/Visitors Owner/operators would NOT directly vet contractors or visitors Contracting/visiting companies could vet their own employees to RBPS 12 items 1-3 For item 4, contractors would provide DHS with PII, AND/OR utilize a network of “Trusted Agents” that might include TWIC enrollment centers Local Safety Councils Channelers (e.g. Axiom, Cogent) Trusted Agents could: Verify identity and collect PII Submit to DHS for Terrorist Screening Receive confirmation from DHS Provide confirmation to Contractor Owner/operators could require confirmation of PII submissions to ensure compliance for contractor or visitor personnel requiring unescorted access 5

6. Long-Term Approach Option 1: CFATS Credential Create a new credential just for CFATS workers who require unescorted access to restricted areas Option 2: Critical Infrastructure Worker Identification Credential (“CIWIC”) The CIWIC would replace all other Federal Credentials through use of multiple endorsements. Either option should learn from the TWIC experience Establish a DHS/SCC Workgroup on Long Term Approach 6

7. Workgroup Participants Clyde Miller, BASFPeter Weaver Chair of PCISILTA, member of CSCC 973-245-6233RPWeaver@ilta.comRPWeaver@ilta.com clyde.miller@basf.comclyde.miller@basf.com202-842-9200 Terry Whitley, Shell Cynthia Hilton Chair of NPRA Security CommitteeInstitute of Makers of Explosives, member of CSCC 713-241-4061202- 266-4319 Terry.whitley@shell.comchilton@ime.org Rick Kane, Rhodia Chair of Chemical Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC), Jamie Conrad SOCMA representativeCounsel to SOCMA 609-860-3054202-822-1970 Richard.kane@us.rhodia.comjamie@conradcounsel.com Jeff Gunnulfsen NPRA Security Committee Director 202-552-4371 jgunnulfsen@npra.org Mike Williamson Tesoro, member of NPRA Security Committee 210-626-4726 Michael.m.williamson@tsocorp.com 7