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9/11, What We Know Now! Significant new Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates clear CIA culpability in allowing the attacks.

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Presentation on theme: "9/11, What We Know Now! Significant new Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates clear CIA culpability in allowing the attacks."— Presentation transcript:

1 9/11, What We Know Now! Significant new Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report demonstrates clear CIA culpability in allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place

2 What is the new information! The account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan Tenet and Black’s White House emergency July 2001 meetings with Rice and Clarke, Rumsfeld and Ashcroft Tom Wilshire’s s to his CTC managers in July 2001 The NSA August 28, 2001 release from NSA caveats to FBI HQ

3 Key People Ali Soufan - lead FBI investigator on Cole bombing Steve Bongardt – FBI agent NY, Soufan’s assistant Dina Corsi, FBI IOS at FBI Bin Laden unit Margaret Gillespie FBI IOS at CIA Bin Laden unit Tom Wilshire - deputy chief of CIA Bin Laden Clark Shannon- CIA officer at Bin Laden unit

4 The new information! The account of Ali Soufan, lead FBI investigators on the Cole bombing, describes three requests to the CIA for information on a meeting in Kuala Lumpur and on Tawfiq Bin Attash (Khallad).

5 Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates: Tenet and Black’s White House emergency meeting with Rice and Clarke, on July 10, 2001, and with Rumsfeld and Ashcroft on July 17, 2001 indicated that a huge al Qaeda attack was about to take place that would cause mass casualties in the US.

6 Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates: Tom Wilshire’s July 5, 13 and 23, 2001 e- mails to his CTC managers, indicated that Mihdhar and Hazmi would take part in the next big al Qaeda attack. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 298, Defense Evidence 939, Moussaoui Trial]

7 Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: August 28, 2001, the NSA release of NSA caveats was sent to the FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi, this is the same day she told FBI Agent Bongardt, he and his team would not be allowed to take part in the investigation of Mihdhar because of the NSA caveats. [Defense Evidence #449, Moussaoui Trial, DOJ/FBI IG report, Page 304]

8 Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: Tom Wilshire's knowledge that Mihdhar and Hazmi would take part in next al Qaeda attack with the NSA release sent to Dina Corsi on August 28, 2001 shows that the investigation of Mihdhar by FBI Agent Steve Bongardt was deliberately sabotaged.

9 Information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report indicates that: In addition, in spite of the knowledge that a huge al Qaeda attack was about to take place and that Mihdhar and Hazmi were going to take part in this attack, no one at the CIA gave this information to FBI Cole investigators, or raised an alarm over this information to prevent this attack.

10 Analyzing the information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report Analysis of the DOJ/FBI IG report combined with the account of FBI Agent Ali Soufan, and evidence from Moussaoui trail shows that material information had been deliberately withheld from FBI criminal investigators on numerous occasions in at least 4 major wide ranging criminal conspiracies at the CIA.

11 Analyzing the information uncovered since the 9/11 Commission report The information that was with held was the information on the al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 5-8, 2000 attended by Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Tawfiq Bin Attash (Khallad).

12 The al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur on January 5-8, 2000 This meeting was described in an NSA cable sent to CIA, FBI and FBI Director Louis Freeh in December 1999 as an important al Qaeda planning meeting; the attendees were all photographed by Malaysian intelligence at the request of the CIA

13 The al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur on January 5-8, 2000 January 9, Photographs of Khallad, Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Saleem al-Hazmi and other other al Qaeda terrorists were given to Cofer Black and George Tenet and other people at the CIA after this meeting.

14 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI January 5, 2000, Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of the CIA Bin Laden unit blocked FBI Agent Doug Miller’s cable on Mihdhar from going to the [DOJ/FBI DOJ/FBI IG Report 240] January 5, 2000, CIA desk officer working for Wilshire sends a cable to the rest of the CIA stating that the information on Mihdhar had been sent to the FBI [DOJ/FBI DOJ/FBI IG Report 240]

15 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI March 5, 2000 cable received at CIA HQ indicated that Hazmi has entered the US on January 15, 2000, Many people in the CIA and the CIA Bin Laden unit including Wilshire read this cable. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 248]

16 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI November FBI Agent Ali Soufan, FBI lead of Cole bombing investigation, sends request to the CIA Yemen station for any information the CIA has on Khallad Bin Attash and any al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur and is told CIA has no information [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

17 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI November Soufan then sends the same request to the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, and asks Freeh to forward this request to CIA Director Tenet, and is told the CIA has no information [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66-67]

18 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI April Soufan sends same request for any information the CIA has on Khallad Bin Attash and any al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur directly to CIA headquarters in April Soufan is given no information. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

19 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI June 11, CIA and FBI HQ hold meeting in New York FBI field office meeting with Soufan’s people. Three photos are of Mihdhar and Hazmi are presented to Soufan’s Cole investigating team, at this meeting. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

20 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI June 11, 2001 But FBI Agent Bongardt, Ali Soufan’s assistant is never told Hazmi is in US, that Mihdhar has a multi-entry visa for the US, that Khallad had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, with Mihdhar and Hazmi connecting both to the planning of the Cole bombing. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Pages 69-70]

21 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 5, 2001 Tom Wilshire indicates in that people at Kuala Lumpur meeting are connected to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack. [DOJ/FBI IG Report 298]

22 The CIA withheld information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 10, 2001 Tenet and Black call emergency meeting at White House with Rice and Clarke on imminent threat of huge al Qaeda attack that will cause mass US casualties, [Woodward, State of Denial, Pages 49-52]

23 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 13, Tom Wilshire asks his CIA CTC managers for permission to transfer information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting to FBI [Moussaoui Trial, Defense Evidence Item 939, DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 298]

24 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 17, 2001 Tenet and Black give Rumsfeld and Ashcroft same information given to Rice and Clarke, [Woodward, State of Denial, Pages 49-52]

25 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI July 23, 2001, Wilshire in to CTC managers asks why he has received no reply his request to transfer information to the FBI and indicates that Mihdhar will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack. [Moussaoui Trial, Defense Evidence Item 939]

26 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 22, 2001 FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie finds that both Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US, and gives this information to FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi and Tom Wishire. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 300]

27 The CIA withholds information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 22-30, 2001 In spite of Wilshire knowing Mihdhar and Hazmi are in US in order to take part in al Qaeda attack, he works with FBI IOS agent Dina Corsi to sabotage FBI Agent Steve Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar.

28 Major criminal conspiracies at the CIA to hide the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI 1 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station asking for all information the CIA has any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad Bin Attash. He is told there is no information 2 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI, and is told the CIA has no such information

29 Major criminal conspiracies at the CIA to hide the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI 3 April 2001, Soufan’s sends this request directly o the CIA, he receives no reply 4 July-August 2001 CIA and FBI HQ sabotage the investigation of Mihdhar by the FBI Cole investigators

30 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station November 2000 – In response to Soufan’s request for information to the CIA Yemen station, Soufan’s is told that the CIA has no information on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

31 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station December 2000 – The passport photo of Khallad attached to Soufan’s request is shown to FBI/CIA joint source, Khallad identified as high level al Qaeda terrorist [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

32 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station December 2000 – The CIA Yemen station sends a request to the CIA Bin Laden unit requesting the photos of both Mihdhar and Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur. [NOTE: Yemen station was identified in DOJ/FBI IG report Page 270, as “CIA personnel overseas’, Page 269]

33 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station January – Khallad is positively identified in the photo from Kuala Lumpur. This identification connects Mihdhar and Hazmi. who were also at the this meeting directly to the planning of the Cole bombing. [DOJ/FBI IG report Page ]

34 November Soufan’s request to CIA Yemen station January The CIA Bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station and the CIA handler for the FBI/CIA joint source are all aware of this identification of Khallad at Kuala Lumpur, yet this information is never given to Soufan or to the FBI Cole investigators, until late August.

35 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh November In response to Soufan’s request to Director Louis Freeh, to be forwarded to CIA Director Tenet, Soufan is told that the CIA has no information on any meeting in Kuala Lumpur or on Khallad Bin Attash [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66-67]

36 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh November But Freeh already knew about this meeting and even knows the CIA had information on this meeting since both the NSA and the CIA had given Freeh this very information in January 2000.

37 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh Late 1999, “the NSA analyzed communications..activities…indicated that several members of an "operational cadre" were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000… persons named Nawaf, Khalid and Salem were involved.” At the FBI, this information appeared in the daily threat update to the Director on January 4, 2000.” [DOJ IG Report page 239]

38 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh - The Counter terrorism center (at the CIA) had briefed the CIA leadership on the gathering in Kuala Lumpur and the information had been passed on... to the Director Freeh and others at the FBI... [9/11 Commission report, Page 181]

39 November 2000 Soufan’s request to Director of the FBI Louis Freeh The FBI Director Freeh withheld material information from an on going FBI criminal investigation and had criminally obstructed the FBI’s own investigation of the Cole bombing

40 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA April 2001 Soufan sends the same request he sent to the CIA Yemen station and Freeh directly to CIA headquarters. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66] Mid-May 2001, Just after the CIA receives Soufan’s request, Tom Wishire is moved over to be liaison to Michael Rolince, head of the ITOS unit at FBI. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

41 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Mid-May 2001 Wilshire and Clark Shannon both obtain Soufan’s request, but do not give any information to Soufan. The fact they have this request is kept as one of the most closely guarded secrets at the CIA. [DOJ/FBI IG Report page 283, 284]

42 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Mid-May 2001 Wilshire obtains three photographs of Mihdhar from the CIA and attempts to identify Khallad in these photos due to information that he remembered from an old cable. NOTE: He clearly had the passport photo of Khallad from Soufan’s request, if he had the Kuala Lumpur photo of Khallad he would have known Khallad was in a different photo from Mihdhar. [ DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 284]

43 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Late May 2001 – In spite of having Soufan’s request, no information is given to Soufan and Wilshire asks Shannon to get Corsi to set up a meeting with Soufan’s own people to find out what the Cole investigators know about the meeting at Kuala Lumpur. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

44 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA Late May The CIA wanted to know if the FBI Cole investigators found out about the Kuala Lumpur meeting and could recognize people who had attended this meeting, Mihdhar and Hazmi. [Prior Knowledge of 9/11, Page ]

45 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Meeting between CIA, FBI HQ agents and FBI New York Cole investigators takes place in FBI New York field office. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

46 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Corsi shows the three photographs of Mihdhar to Cole investigators that Wishire had obtained from the CIA, CIA Officer Clark Shannon asks Cole investigators if they recognize anyone in the photos taken at Kuala Lumpur, one photo only shows Mihdhar and Hazmi. [ Account of Soufan, New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 66]

47 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 – Corsi claims she is told that the CIA wanted to know if Fahad al-Quso had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

48 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, 2001 Corsi and Shannon say that information on the people in the photos can not be shared due to the “wall”. After a heated exchange, Corsi reveals that one person is named Khalid al-Mihdhar and Clark Shannon states that this person had a Saudi passport. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

49 Soufan’s April 2001 request to the CIA June 11, Corsi promised to provide additional information on Mihdhar, but later claims she was prevented by the “wall”. [Account of Soufan New Yorker July 10-17, 2006, Page 67]

50 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar July 23, 2001 Wilshire s his CTC managers and says that he is sure Mihdhar will be found at the location of the next big al Qaeda attack. [Moussaoui Trial Defense Evidence 939] July 24, 2001 Margaret Gillespie finds Doug Miller’s cable that contains the CIA information on Mihdhar and also finds the cable that states that this information had been sent to the FBI FBI IG Report. [DOJ/FBI IG Page 299]

51 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 21, Margaret Gillespie finds cable that states that Hazmi had entered the US on January 15, [DOJ/FBI IG Page 300] August 22, INS tells Gillespie that Mihdhar had re-entered the US on July 4, 2001 and that it is likely both Mihdhar and Hazmi are inside of the US [DOJ/FBI IG Page 300]

52 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 22, Gillespie takes this information to Corsi and both go to the office of Tom Wilshire at FBI HQ. [DOJ/FBI IG Page 301]

53 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 22, 2001 Corsi calls New York office and says CIA will send photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi over to the FBI New York office on August 23, 2001 and that the CIA has a photo of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 301]

54 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 22, 2001 Corsi contacts head of intelligence at New York office and says it is “urgent” they start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar right away. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 301]

55 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 23, 2001 Head of intelligence at New York office says in spite of the fact that the investigation for Mihdhar should be opened with the Cole investigators, he will start an investigation for Mihdhar. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 304] August 23, 2001 Corsi s Wilshire and says FBI intelligence will open an investigation for Mihdhar. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 304]

56 The times the CIA withheld information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 23, 2001 Wilshire and Corsi send photos of Mihdhar and Hazmi to the FBI New York office but continue to hide the photo of Khallad taken at Kuala Lumpur from the FBI Cole investigators. This photo directly connects Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 302]

57 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 23, 2001 Margaret Gillespie requests that the CIA Bin Laden unit issue a world wide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi, this alert that goes right to the top of the CIA. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 302]

58 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 24, 2001 – Wishire receives from Maltbie and Frasca, FBI RFU managers who are sabotaging FBI Agent Harry Samit’s investigation of Moussaoui, updating Wilshire on progress in Moussaoui investigation, and references earlier s. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 151]

59 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 24, 2001 Wilshire knows that about Mihdhar and Hazmi and knows Moussaoui has been arrested because the FBI thought he was an al Qaeda terrorist learning to fly a 747 to take part in a hijacking. He has all of the information needed to prevent 9/11

60 The times the CIA withheld information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 27, 2001 Corsi requests permission from NSA to pass information on Mihdhar and Kuala Lumpur meeting to FBI Cole investigators, eliminating the the “wall”At NSA request approved same day. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 304, Evidence Item 449, Mousaaoui9 Trial]

61 The times the CIA withheld information from Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI August 28, 2001 Corsi receives cable from NSA stating that all restrictions due to the “wall” have been removed and she can give all of the information from Kuala Lumpur to FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing. [Evidence Item 449, Mousaaoui9 Trial]

62 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 28, 2001 Corsi sends EC to New York office to start intelligence investigation for Mihdhar. EC is marked “Routine”, in spite of the fact Corsi had on August 22, 2001 indicated that it was urgent to start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar as soon as possible. [DOJ/FBI IG Report 304]

63 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 28, 2001 Bongardt accidentally receives Corsi's EC to start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 305]

64 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 28, 2001 Bongardt calls Corsi to start the investigation of Mihdhar with his team of Cole investigators. Bongardt is told he must destroy any information he has on Mihdhar and his team can not participate in the investigation for Mihdhar due to the NSA “wall”. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 306]

65 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 28, 2001 Bongardt asks Corsi to get a NSLU ruling on this. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 307] August 29, 2001 Corsi tells Bongardt that NSLU has ruled he or his team of Cole investigators can not have any part in investigating Mihdhar. [DOJ/FBI IG Report Page 308]

66 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 29, 2001 – Sherry Sabol, NSLU attorney denies ever giving this advice to Corsi. She says she would never have given this advice since the information was not connected to FISA, and further states if Corsi wanted to give this information to Bongardt, all she had to do is get a NSA release. [9/11 Commission Report Page 538, Footnote 81]

67 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 29, Corsi’s advice to Bongardt had been fabricated to block Bongardt from any role in the Mihdhar investigation, since it is clear Attorney Sabol was unaware Corsi had received the release from NSA caveats the day before. [9/11 Commission Report Page 538, Footnote 81]

68 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 29, Corsi tells Bongardt that if one piece of paper is ever found at the FBI with his name and the name Khalid al- Mihdhar, his career is over at the FBI. [Joint Inquiry September 22, 2002, Public Hearings]

69 CIA and FBI HQ agents work to sabotage Cole investigator’s investigation of Mihdhar August 30, 2001 – One day after Corsi takes investigation of Mihdhar away from Bongardt, the photo of Khallad is sent over to the New York field office. The Cole investigators are not made aware of this photo until after 9/11 [DOJ/FBI IG report, Page 309]

70 Attacks on 9/11 September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorists fly large US aircraft into the WTC Towers and the Pentagon killing almost 3000 people

71 Attacks on 9/11 September 11, Harry Samit is given permission to seek a search warrant for Moussaoui’s duffle bag only after the Pentagon is hit by hijacked aircraft, information in the duffle bag leads to Ramzi Bin al-Shiebh and connects all of the terrorists together in a few days

72 Summary what we now know! Even to today the American people are still unaware of this information and the fact this clearly demonstrates CIA, FBI HQ criminal culpability in allowing the 9/11 attacks to occur.

73 Summary what we now know! The American people have been told that they are in immense danger from a group of dedicated Islamic extremists that had breached every single defense our security agencies had, and to be protected they must given up rights guaranteed under the constitution.

74 Summary what we now know! But the attacks on 9/11 were allowed to take place due to criminal actions at the CIA and FBI HQ, actions that had prevented FBI criminal agents from protecting the American people, and no loss of our rights will make us any safer!


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