1. Security of eGovernment, European Parliament, Brussels 2013 Max Snijder, Linda Kool, Geert Munnichs L Kool | 1 19 February 2013 Findings from the ePassport study

2. 19 February 2013 EU Regulation Regulation EC No 2252/2004: facial image in passport Amendment EC No 444/2009: 2 fingerprints Objective: Enhance harmonized security standards for passports to protect against falsification Combat fraud by strengthening link between passport and legitimate holder of passport L Kool | ePassport

3. 19 February 2013 Biometric systems Identify individual based on physical characteristics Digital image of physical identifier is compared to a stored digital template System calculates match between ‘stored’ and ‘live’ image: probability score Lower quality images  lower probability score  biometric data is less usable L Kool | ePassport

4. 19 February 2013 Security challenges – Chip Facial image and personal information is protected via encryption (Basic Access Control) Only prevent simple skimming attacks Fingerprints are secured via stronger encryption (Extended Access Control) National keys not distributed adequately: complex and requires trust between MS Fingerprints currently not used for border control throughout EU L Kool | ePassport

5. 19 February 2013 Security challenges - Issuance No quality requirements for biometric images Low quality images could be stored in passport No EU standards for issuance procedures Many MS don’t use live pictures although they are more reliable Quality of captured images depend on skills of personnel, but only Slovenia has certified personnel Risk of storage of wrong fingerprints or look a like pictures Threatens security of passport verification and overall security of border control L Kool | ePassport

6. 19 February 2013 Interoperability challenges Technical interoperability: Exists for facial image + personal information but regular failures in reading this information Exists also for fingerprints, but, in practice non-interoperability due to difficult key exchange Products and components: MS have different vendors causing interoperability problems No independent test and certification criteria in EU exist L Kool | ePassport

7. 19 February 2013 Privacy and data protection challenges Biometric data is sensitive personal data, risks of security breach and identity theft Function creep: central databases for law enforcement Biometric data taken for ePassport is not of sufficient quality for law enforcement Procedures for citizens for correcting errors not addressed by EC/2252/2004; Data protection directive (95/46/EC) is implemented differently by MS Citizens have limited (legal) power to correct mistakes L Kool | ePassport

8. 19 February 2013 Usability challenges Some individuals can’t be enrolled in the system  need for alternatives to not exclude this group High quality images take time and cause inconvenience for citizens High usability seems at odds with high security L Kool | ePassport

9. 19 February 2013 Conclusions – Lifecycle perspective Decision phase: High political ambitions to raise the security level of border control Underestimating technical & practical implications of biometrics Resulted in inadequate legislation at EU level with no criteria for: Quality of biometric images, issuance process, testing and certification schemes Design & operation phase: Different implementations in MS compromises EU’s ambition secure biometric system for border control L Kool | ePassport

10. 19 February 2013 Policy challenges Develop uniform standards for quality of biometric images, issuance process & testing and certification schemes Improve security and interoperability of ePassport Improve procedures for redress for citizens Different requirements at odds with each other: Rethink what the main objectives are for this biometric system L Kool | ePassport

11. 19 February 2013 Thank you for your attention! Thanks to Max Snijder (European Biometrics Group), Geert Munnichs (Rathenau Institute) and interviewed experts L Kool | ePassport

12. 19 February 2013 Back–up: Country studies Different national implementations, different quality levels and different operating procedures  higher tolerance to lower thresholds throughout EU Germany: pro-active approach, developing standards, conducting pilots. Only Czech Republic and Norway take facial images ‘live’ during the application process Operating personnel is trained for capturing biometric data, but some countries certify their personnel No biometric verification takes place at issuance L Kool | ePassport