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BANCON 2013 Two decades of credit management in banks: Looking back and moving ahead K.C. Chakrabarty Deputy Governor Reserve Bank of India.

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Presentation on theme: "BANCON 2013 Two decades of credit management in banks: Looking back and moving ahead K.C. Chakrabarty Deputy Governor Reserve Bank of India."— Presentation transcript:

1 BANCON 2013 Two decades of credit management in banks: Looking back and moving ahead K.C. Chakrabarty Deputy Governor Reserve Bank of India

2 Introduction  Business of banking is business of intermediation  Credit risk is integral to banking business  When banking was simple  Lending decisions - made on impressionistic basis  Credit risk management – straightforward  Information requirements – minimal  As banking became diverse, complex, sophisticate  Risks increased, became transmitive and contagious  But, credit risk management – lagged behind  And, information systems – remained primitive and did not capture granular data correctly

3 Objectives  Examine how Indian banks have dealt with credit risk over the last two decades  Evolution of regulatory framework  Analyse trends in asset quality of Indian banks  Trends in gross and net NPAs  Trends in slippages, write offs and recoveries  Trends in restructuring  Dwell on some facets that have a bearing on the asset quality of banks  Risk management and primitive information systems  GDP growth trends  Size / segment analysis of impaired assets  General governance and management structure  Credit appraisal and monitoring standards  Way forward for the regulators, policy makers, banks and bank customers

4 Evolution of NPA regulation in India

5 Prudential norms for NPAs  1985  First-ever system of NPA classification - ‘Health Code’ system  Classification of advances into eight categories ranging from 1 (Satisfactory) to 8 (Bad and Doubtful Debts)  1992  Prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and provisioning introduced  Restructuring guidelines introduced  Assets, where the terms of the loan agreement regarding interest and principal is renegotiated or rescheduled after commencement of production to be classified as sub- standard  2001  90 day norm for NPAs introduced (effective from March 31, 2004)  specified asset classification treatment of restructured accounts tightened

6 NPA trends – Reflecting regulatory initiatives  NPAs rose when prudential regulations introduced - reduced thereafter as regulatory initiatives facilitated improved credit risk management by banks  Pace of introduction / tightening of regulatory reforms slowed after 2001  Regulatory norms were not further tightened during the “good” pre-crisis years  Reflected in poor credit standards and increased delinquencies  Provisioning levels remained low for the Indian banking sector  Norms with regard to floating provisions changed  Provisioning coverage ratio was introduced but relaxed thereafter  Dynamic provisioning coverage yet to be introduced  Mere tweaking and flip flop approach to Prudential norms  Restructuring increased as regulatory requirements were relaxed, especially in the post crisis years  One time special dispensation for asset classification of restructured accounts provided to deal with the impact of the global financial crisis

7 Trends in asset quality

8 Trends in gross and net NPAs  Early 1990s  NPA ratios rose  Immediate impact of prudential norms  Thereafter, the NPA ratios declined  Improved risk management  Increased write offs  Rising credit growth / robust economic growth  Abundant liquidity conditions  Increased restructuring  In recent years, NPA ratios have been rising, though on an average, the ratios are not higher Average NPA in %GNPANNPAs 1997-2001 12.88.4 2001-2005 8.54.2 2005-2009 3.11.2 2009-2013 2.61.2 Mar 2013 3.41.7 Sep 2013 4.22.2

9 Divergent bank group wise trends  1996-2003 – wide variation between NPA ratio of PSBs and other bank groups  2003-06 - NPA ratios of all bank groups moved in tandem  2007-09 – NPA ratios begin to decouple  After 2009, gap between PSBs and other bank groups started rising

10 PSBs – growing asset quality concerns  PSBs share a disproportionate and increasing burden of NPAs – especially in recent years Share in total bank credit Mar-03Mar-07Mar-08Mar-09Mar-13 Sep-13 PSBs 74.072.872.575.276.2 75.3 OPBs 5.0 NPBs 12.816.216.415.014.8 14.7 FBs 5.0 Share in total bank GNPA Mar-03Mar-07Mar-08Mar-09Mar-13 Sep-13 PSBs 75.476.671.164.5 84.8 86.1 OPBs NPBs 14.212.518.720.38.0 6.8 FBs4.24.95.610.74.3

11 Looking beyond the veil of headline numbers Gross and net NPAs numbers have limitations!  In the 1990s, only data about gross and net NPAs were available  Subsequently, data on flow of NPAs (fresh accretions and recoveries) collected, followed by data on restructuring, which allowed better understanding of the real problem of credit management in the banks  A more detailed understanding of trends in asset quality of banks required collection and analysis of granular data about various aspects of NPA management viz. Slippages, Write offs and Recoveries – Segment wise and activity wise  Such data has been collected only in recent years(since 2009), largely due to regulatory impetus  The current analysis is an attempt to examine trends in asset quality based on this detailed information

12 NPA movement over the last decade  Increasing slippages and write offs since the crisis years  New accretion to NPAs exceeds reduction in NPAs post crisis All amount in (Rs crore) 2001-20132001-20072007-2013 NPAs at Beginning of the period 60,434 50,513 New Accretion to NPAs during the period 624,772159,072465,700 Reduction in NPAs during the period 492,006168,993323,013 Due to upgradation 110,91824,00386,915 Due to write-off 203,61673,941129,675 Due to actual recovery 177,47371,049106,424 NPAs at End of the period 193,20050,513193,200

13 Slippages … Trends  Slippages – better metric to assess credit management  Slippages & net slippages  Showed a declining trend in the early 2000s; started rising since 2006-07

14 Recovery efforts deteriorating  Extent to which banks able to reduce NPAs through recovery efforts deteriorating  evidenced by increasing ratio of slippages to recovery and upgradation Average Slippage to (Recovery + Upgradation) Ratio Slippage to (Recovery + Upgradation) Ratio Mar-01 191.3 Mar-02 279.0 Mar-03 190.5 Mar-04 167.1 Mar-05 129.5 Mar-06 125.4 Mar-07 173.2 Mar-08 205.2 Mar-09 221.0 Mar-10 264.1 Mar-11 217.0 Mar-12 255.9 Mar-13 257.0 PSBOPBNPBFB 2001-13 191.1191.3452.8438.6 2001-07 211.3179.6376.6350.6 2007-13 220.6202.7418.7430.3

15 Recovery & write offs – associated moral hazard  Write offs contributing significantly in reduction in NPAs  Reducing incentives to improve recovery efforts  Slippages exceeding reduction in NPAs especially post crisis  The trends indicate weaknesses in credit as well as recovery management Upgradation as % of reduction in NPAs Write off as % of reduction in NPAs Recovery as % of reduction in NPAs Mar-01 12.639.348.1 Mar-02 12.049.438.7 Mar-03 16.050.733.4 Mar-04 12.348.339.4 Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07 14.542.542.9 Mar-08 17.440.741.8 Mar-09 23.839.636.6 Mar-10 21.350.228.4 Mar-11 24.242.433.4 Mar-12 31.733.434.9 Mar-13 33.137.829.2 Reduction as a % of slippages 2001-13 78.4 2001-07 105.3 2007-13 70.8 Upgradation as a % of slippages 2001-13 17.6 2001-07 14.9 2007-13 18.4

16 Write-Off and recovery from Write-offs Recovery from written off Accounts during the FY ended (Rs. crore) Mar-01Mar-02Mar-03Mar-04Mar-05Mar-06Mar-07Mar-08Mar-09Mar-10Mar-11Mar-12Mar-13 All Banks 4245014791,0651,7682,9022,4803,1013,6864,3625,0365,1916,960 PSBs 4184944631,0081,6122,6992,2202,8243,3723,8194,4124,6565,953 OPBs 235264584132173217207231201200 NPBs 324301111091208792197327294779 FBs 01600108164139664029 Write offs of NPAs during the FY ended Mar-01Mar-02Mar-03Mar-04Mar-05Mar-06Mar-07Mar-08Mar-09Mar-10Mar-11Mar-12Mar-13 All Banks 6,4468,71112,02113,55910,82311,65711,62111,65315,99625,01923,89620,89232,218 PSBs 5,5556,4289,44811,3088,0488,7999,1898,0196,96611,18517,79415,55127,013 OPBs 331588653525464544610724616884682671863 NPBs 5808961,5641,2861,6821,4091,2321,5775,0636,7122,3363,0243,487 FBs 207983564406289055901,3343,3506,2383,0831,646855 Substantial Write-off but recovery from write-off has been very poor

17 Divergent bank group wise trends - slippages  In the aftermath of the crisis, slippage ratios rose, especially for FBs and NPBs  FBs and NPBs, though quickly arrested deterioration in asset quality post-crisis through improved credit risk management  In recent years, the ratio rose sharply for PSBs Slippage Ratio All BanksPSBOPBNPBFB Mar-07 1.8 2.01.5 Mar-08 1.7 1.42.1 Mar-09 2.2 Mar-10 2.1 Mar-11 2.0 Mar-12 2.5 Mar-13 2.6 Average slippage ratioPSBOPBNPBFB 2001-13 2001-07 2007-13 2.21.8 3.0 Slippage ratio = fresh accretion to NPAs during the year to standard advances at the beginning of the year

18 Divergent bank group wise trends – net slippages  Recovery performance also varied across banks as revealed by trends in net slippages Net Slippage Ratio All BanksPSBOPBNPBFB Mar-07 0.8 Mar-08 0.9 Mar-09 1.2 Mar-10 1.3 Mar-11 1.1 Mar-12 1.5 Mar-13 1.6 Average net slippage ratio PSBOPBNPBFB 2001-13 1.3 2.51.8 2001-07 2007-13 Net slippage ratio is slippage ratio net of recoveries

19 Divergent bank group wise trends – slippages and fresh restructured accounts  The bank group wise trends in slippages are further re-enforced when the trends in slippages and fresh restructuring are examined All banks PSBOPBNPBFB Mar-09 5.1 5.2 3.96.8 Mar-10 5.4 5.64.0 6.8 Mar-11 2.9 Mar-12 5.4 Mar-13 5.9 Slippages + fresh restructured ratio

20 Summing up…  Standards of credit and recovery administration is inefficient and poor as is reflected from the fact that upgradation as a % of slippage is very low – only less than 20 % of accounts have been upgraded  Recoveries are very less- A major part of reduction is through write-off  Even during 2001-07, recoveries and upgradation were not as good-things have considerably deteriorated thereafter  Gross NPA in itself not a problem but in conjunction with restructured advances they have emerged as a major issue

21 Restructured Accounts … Trends  Growth in restructured accounts  mixed trend in early 2000s  sharp uptick in 2008 / 2009 due to the one time regulatory dispensation  Continued high growth rate thereafter

22 Restructured Accounts … Use and Misuse  Forbearance a necessity, especially for viable accounts facing temporary difficulties  But, increasing evidence of misuse of facility for “ever- greening” of problem accounts by banks  Restructuring of unviable units  Deserving & viable units especially for small borrowers get overlooked  Promoters contribution to equity not ensured  Restructuring increasingly used as a tool of NPA management by banks All Banks (%) Mar- 09 Mar -10 Mar- 11 Mar- 12 Mar -13 GNPA Ratio (GNPA + Rest. Std. Adv) to Total Adv. (GNPA + Rest. Std. Adv) to Total Adv. Mar- 09 Mar-10Mar-11Mar-12Mar-13 PSBs5. OPBs5. NPBs5.54.83.2 3.1 FBs5.

23 Divergent bank group wise trends in restructuring and write -off  Asset quality deteriorates further if restructured accounts and write offs are included, especially in the case of PSBs  Banks which are more aggressive in identifying NPAs appear to be able to manage them better Impaired Assets ratio = (GNPA + Restructured Standard Advances +Cumulative write off) to (Total Advances + Cumulative write off) Impaired Assets ratio PSBOPBNPBFB Mar-09 6.8 6.66.5 Mar-10 8.87.3 9.5 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13

24 Summing up…..  Only less then 10% of the total amount written off (including the Technical Write-off ) is recovered  The amount of restructuring and write –offs distorts inter-segment comparison of credit quality  Technical write –off creates moral hazard and creates a dent in overall recovery efforts  Banks should be given the freedom to decide whether the cases involve restructuring - where only the technical covenants of the loan or the date of commencement of commercial production might have changed and the banks are convinced that the pay-offs from asset created will be sufficient to repay the loan - Cases where the reduction does not bring down the lending rate below base rate should not be considered as concession I 24

25 Segment wise NPA Trends  Deterioration in asset quality highest for industries’ segment  Though banks devote fewer resources to the administration of small credits vis-à-vis larger credits  Within industries segment - deterioration driven by medium and large enterprises (50% share in NPAs) in %Mar-09Mar-10Mar-11Mar-12Mar-13 Micro+Small 10.710.69.49.710.6 Medium+Large Impaired Assets ratio

26 Infrastructure finance – significantly affected Infrastructure projects – strain on banks  regulatory, administrative and legal constraints  Banks’ took inadequate cognizance of the need for contingency planning for large projects in their appraisal  absence or insufficiency of user charges Impaired Assets ratio In %Mar-09Mar-13 Mining4.08.2 Iron and Steel9.316.9 Textiles16.721.3 Infrastructure5.018.0 Real Estate2.52.0

27 Large ticket advances – greater share in restructured accounts  Restructuring – provided primarily to large corporates  medium and large accounts make up over 90 per cent of restructured accounts  larger ticket accounts hold major share in CDR in %Mar-09Mar-10Mar-11Mar-12Mar-13 Share in total bank credit Micro+Small*10.111.412.010.810.7 Medium+Large39.942.945.046.848.4 Share in total bank NPA Micro+Small16.120.421.117.517.2 Medium+Large23.828.727.537.748.8 Share in total bank restructuring Micro+Small12.27.7 4.33.4 Medium+Large77.469.671.183.090.8 * The data for ‘Medium & Large’ and ‘Micro & Small’ pertains to Industries and services sectors.

28 Asset quality worse for Directed Lending – A myth  General belief is that directed lending has contributed to rising NPAs  GNPA ratio higher for priority sector than non-priority sector  However, considering restructured accounts and write offs, asset quality worse for the non-priority sector Priority sectorNon Priority sector

29 Study Conclusions & Other Issues : Why high NPA and such poor state of Credit Management?

30 Primitive Information Systems  Improvements in information systems were not coincident with increased size of asset portfolio, increasing complexities in credit management  Banks ability to manage the quality of their asset portfolio remained weak given  The lack of granular data on slippages, early indications of deterioration in asset quality, segment wise, trends, etc.  Banks failed in identifying / arresting the early pre-crisis trends – from 2005-06 - in asset quality deterioration

31 GDP slowdown leading to increased NPAs! Recent decline in asset quality coincided with deceleration in GDP growth

32 Higher NPAs only a result of GDP slowdown? Beginnings of deterioration in asset quality started ahead of slowdown in economic growth Growth rate of GNPAs started rising before the crisis even as the pace of slippages turned sharply positive in 2006-07

33 Asset quality of PSBs – Economic downturn or sub-optimal credit management?  Recent increase in NPAs not reflected across all bank groups  Though economic downturn faced by all banks  Early threats to asset quality - swiftly and effectively managed by private sector and foreign banks  PSBs suffer from structural deficiencies related to the management and governance arrangements  Reflected in lacunae in credit management  Pre-dates the crisis, but not dealt with on time, unlike in the case of the FBs and NPBs

34 Lax Credit Management  Deficiencies in credit management crept in during the pre-crisis “good years”  In general, banks with high credit growth in 2004-08 ended up with higher NPA growth in 2008-13  The appraisal process failed to differentiate between promoter’s debt and equity  Promoters equity contribution declined / leverage higher  Credit monitoring was neglected  Recovery efforts slowed  Legal infrastructure for recovery remained non- supportive  Restructuring became rampant OPB NPB PSB FB

35  Increasing incidence of frauds, especially large value frauds in recent years  Over 64 % of fraud cases are advances related – over 70% in case of large value frauds (over Rs. 50 crore)  Poor appraisal and absence of equity has led to larger no. of advance related frauds especially through diversion  Moral hazard associated with identifying business failures as frauds  Lacunae in credit appraisal not identified  Fixation of Staff accountability a casualty Increasing frauds – or are they business failures? Advance Related Frauds (>Rs. 1cr) 2010-112011-122012-13 Cumulative (end Mar13) Bank Group No. Amt (in cr.) No. Amt (in cr.) No. Amt (in cr.) No. Amt (in cr.) PSBs 201182022829613096078179214577 OPB 2028914631249149767 NPB 18234127524673631068 FB 3331983416456 277 Grand Total 242237627331833496212276016690

36 Credit appraisal suffered…(1)  Poor Credit appraisal at the time of sanctioning as also at the time of restruturing  Significant increase in indebtedness of large business groups  Sample of 10 large corporate groups - credit more than doubled between 2007 and 2013 even while overall debt rose 6 times  Credit growth concentrated in segments with higher level of impairment  Lending elevated in several sectors where impairments were higher than average Source : Credit Suisse Research Sectors CAGR of credit 2009- 2012 Impaired Assets ratio (March 2013) Iron and Steel2517 Infrastructure3318 Power4118 Telecom2816 Aggregate banking sector 1911

37  Indian corporates - accessing international markets to raise capital  Risk from un-hedged exposures  Risk from increase in interest rates  Impact could spill-over to lenders  Project risks not taken due cognizance of  Contingency planning for large projects  Restructuring extended to large corporates that faced problems of over-leverage and inadequate profitability  Companies with dwindling repayment capacity to repay debt - raising more and more debt from banks  ability of corporates to service debt was falling  exposure of companies to interest rate risk was rising Credit appraisal suffered…(2)

38 Summing up…..  High credit growth in select sectors has led to decline in credit quality in subsequent periods  High incidence of advance related frauds are an outcome of deficient credit appraisal standards  Level of Leverage of corporate borrowers, credit growth, diversion of funds, sub standard assets and fraud cases are highly correlated. They are first order derivative of improper credit and recovery management

39 Assessing the resilience of the banking system

40 Resilience of the banking sector…(1)  Current NPA levels - not alarming though could pose concern if current trends persist Year All BanksPSBs Old Pvt. Sec. Banks New Pvt. Sec Banks Foreign Banks GNPA Ratio NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio NNPA Ratio GNPA Ratio NNPA Ratio Mar 9419.0713.7121.1115.446.933.88 - -1.46-0.65 Mar-9515.3110.4617.1211.987.354.122.210.931.62-0.91 Mar-9714.339.5016.4411.158.294.662.922.513.571.02 Mar-9913.348.9914.6310.1713.027.824.553.525.000.86 Mar-0111.146.2811.996.9711.866.715.403.216.691.72 Mar-038.814.429.364.548.865.417.504.675.341.76 Mar-054.941.965.382.075.972.722.931.533.010.87

41  Stress testing reveals resilience of banking system due to strong capital position June 2013CRARCore CRAR GNPA Ratio Losses as % of Capital Baseline13.49.74.0- NPA increases by 50% NPA increases by 100% NPA increases by 150% 30% of restructured advances turn into NPAs (Sub-Standard) 30% of restructured advances written off (Loss) Resilience of the banking sector…(2)

42 Provision coverage ratios of Indian banks low by international standards – declining in recent times Resilience of the banking sector…(3)

43 Stressed Assets Provision Coverage Ratio Mar 2009Mar 2010Mar 2011Mar 2012Mar 2013 PSBs 38.4729.6134.2930.0027.71 OPBs33.1635.4041.5833.3131.11 NPBs38.9142.6463.2555.5253.73 FBs51.5857.7381.7583.4474.04 All Banks34.8030.7836.2533.0030.25 Stressed Assets Provision Coverage Ratio defined as {(Total Provisions (excl. Provision for std adv) + Tech W/Os) to (GNPAs + Rest Std Adv + Tech W/Os)} Provision Coverage Ratio presents a dismal picture when Restructured Standard Advances are also considered

44 Recommendations and Way ahead

45 Recommendations and way ahead  Short run  Addressing the existing stock of impaired assets – NPAs and restructured  Time bound revival or recovery  Long run  Robust risk management  Improved information system  Facilitating granular analysis of trends in asset quality  Improved credit management  Credit appraisal and monitoring  Facilitative regulatory and legal infrastructure

46 Short term: Review of NPAs / restructured advances  Assess viability of NPA and restructured accounts – on case-to-case basis  Pre-stipulated time-frame for review/ restructuring  Accounts found viable  Promoters to assume their share of losses - not resort to further borrowing for equity  If need be bring new promoters  Burden to be equally shared  Restructuring of small accounts - Reorient restructuring towards small customers – SMEs, priority sector  Accounts found to be un-viable  Put under time bound asset recovery  banks takeover of units where promoters’ equity is low  sale of assets to ARCs

47 Improve credit risk management Enhanced Credit Appraisal  Group Leverage, Source/ structure of equity capital  Complex project structure (as in SPV)  External constraints – effective contingency planning  Keep a check on credit growth and linkage with equity Need for quicker decision making  Appraisal, sanction, disbursement - timely and fast  More compassion to smaller borrower and increased stringency for larger borrowers Strengthen Credit Monitoring  Comprehensive MIS and Early Warning Systems to facilitate regular viability assessment Enforce accountability  Accountability on Individuals and all levels of hierarchy  Accountability to encompass all aspects of credit management  Accountability for delayed decision making / non-action

48 Improved information systems  Information systems – the backbone of credit risk management  Robust information systems needed  Facilitate more intensive data capturing  Integrated into decision making, capital planning, business strategies, and reviewing achievements.  Enable timely detection of problem accounts,  Flag early signs of delinquencies,  Facilitate timely information to management on these aspects  Coordinating mechanism across departments within a bank and across banks  MIS for capturing common exposure across banks

49 Regulatory framework  Need to review the existing regulatory arrangements for asset classification and provisioning  Facilitative and practical regulation  Restructured accounts to be classified as NPA – aligning domestic norms with global best practices  The practice of technical write offs of NPAs to be dispensed with  Increased provisioning requirements in line with international norms and to ensure resilience of the banking system  Uniform approach to regulation – either principle or rule based  For stability in credit risk management practices  To eliminate ad-hoc implementation processes

50 Reforming legal & institutional structures Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR) mechanism  Remove existing bias towards large-ticket accounts  Ensure viability and promoters’ stake upfront  Independent oversight of large CDR account Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) & other legal provisions  Need for vigorous follow up in the case of suit filed accounts  setting up of more DRTs and DRATs Asset Reconstruction Companies (ARCs)  Review and revitalise functioning of ARCs Credit Information Companies (CICs)  Expand use of CICs for credit management

51 Concluding Thoughts

52 Key Messages …..(1)  Present level of stressed asset as an outcome is not a big problem but present processes, systems and structure of creation of stressed assets are a big problem.  Existing level of NPAs are manageable but if corrective actions to arrest the slide in NPA are not initiated, the stability of financial system will be at great risk.  Gross NPAs are not alarming but the quantum and growth of restructured assets is of great concern  Economic slowdown and global meltdown are not the primary reason for creation of stressed assets but the state of credit and recovery administration in the system involving banks, borrowers, policy makers, regulators and legal system have contributed significantly to the present state of affairs.

53 Key Messages ….(2)  Credit quality has a high positive correlation with the prudential norms and regulations prescribed by RBI  Laxity, soft and flip-flop approach to regulatory and prudential norms have contributed significantly to creation of NPAs and stressed assets in the system  Level of Leverage of corporate borrowers, credit growth, diversion of funds, sub standard assets and fraud cases are highly correlated. They are first order derivative of improper credit appraisal in determining appropriate structure of debt and equity both in terms of quantity and quality.  Overall standard and quality of credit management and recovery management is very poor.  Less than 20% of NPAs are upgraded  Reduction of NPAs is less than slippages  About 50% reduction in NPA is through write-off

54 Key Messages ….(3)  Banks following the process of recognizing NPAs quickly and more aggressively are having better control over NPAs.  Appraisal standards are lax for bigger loans both at the time of sanction as also restructuring while appraisal rules are very stringent for smaller borrowers  Restructuring and write off processes are highly biased towards bigger loans as compared to smaller loans.  Credit risk for small borrowers is lower than that for bigger borrowers  Credit risk in priority sector is less than in the non-priority sector  High pace of credit growth has resulted in lower credit quality in subsequent periods

55 Measures …….(1)  Credit Appraisal needs to be strengthened with focus on:  Quantum of equity brought in by the promoters  Sources of Equity  Contingency Planning in respect of infrastructure projects  Improve appraisal and approval process for restructuring proposals  Benefits of restructuring to be also extended to smaller borrowers  CDR Mechanism grossly misutilised and needs a thorough overhaul  Need for an oversight structure for dealing with restructuring of large ticket advances  Independent body to oversee CDR mechanism

56 Measures …..(2)  Restructuring and Technical Write-off as a prudential measure should be eased out by the regulator  Existing NPAs need careful examination for determining rehabilitation or recovery  Conduct viability study  Quick rehabilitation with support from both –the bank and the borrower  Those who put spoke needs to be sufficiently dis- incentivized  Bring new promoter if the existing promoter unable to bring new equity  Restructuring decision should be left to the bank Quick and determined action is the need of the hour !

57 Thank you

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